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1Abstract
This research makes use of a Constructivist approach to norm development, in particular the
concept of the norm life cycle, to assess the emergence and development of the responsibility to
protect as a norm in international society in relation to the conduct of interventions on
humanitarian grounds. This study finds that the responsibility to protect emerged relatively rapidly
in international society as a norm relevant to the formulation and implementation of international
responses to conflict situations characterised by the commission of atrocity crimes. Indeed,
between 2001 and 2010, this study finds that the responsibility to protect norm became codified
and entrenched in international organisation, and could therefore have been expected to
influence state behaviour, and the discourse surrounding that behaviour, in relation to the conduct
of interventions on humanitarian grounds.
However, through an assessment of the application of the norm through the United Nations and
the African Union to the conflicts in the Darfur region of Sudan from 2003 onwards, the study
finds that the norm, while featuring relatively prominently in discourse surrounding Darfur
between 2007 and 2008 in the United Nations, appears to have receded thereafter, disappearing
from discourse by 2009 altogether, and appears not to have been useful to the attainment of its
content goal, namely preventing or halting the commission of atrocity crimes, in the case of
Darfur. Indeed, the norm may even have contributed to complicating, as opposed to facilitating,
international engagement on Darfur.
This study explores the apparent contradiction between the emergence and entrenchment of the
responsibility to protect norm in international society at the same time as the norm appears to
have increasingly faded from discourse surrounding international responses to the conflicts in
Darfur, and assesses the implications of this both for the future development and utility of the
norm, as well as for future responses to conflicts characterised by atrocity crimes on the African
continent.
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9Chapter 1
-
Research Purpose, Scope and Methodology
1.1 Introduction
Historically, interventions on humanitarian grounds in international society have been conducted
and justified on the basis of concepts rooted in understandings of universal human rights,
international law and state sovereignty, and a fusion of these in discourse surrounding
interventions in particular conducted since the end of the Cold War. Yet despite the increasing
fusion of human rights ideals to conceptions of peace and security and the rights of the
sovereign, interventions conducted on humanitarian grounds still prove a more comprehensive
challenge to the sovereign state concept, and therefore to international organisation, than do
notions of universal human rights or the expansion of international law, as it involves the use of
coercive measures which infringe upon traditional sovereignty norms. Complicating this is that the
challenges posed to human security have been evolving over the course of the last decades, and
whereas at the time of the founding of the United Nations (UN) threats to human security were
posed primarily by conflicts between states, at present the overwhelming majority of threats to
human security are posed by conflicts within states. The changing nature of conflict, linked to the
end of the Cold War, and the changing nature of responses to these conflicts, raises fundamental
questions in international society, including whether interventions on humanitarian grounds are
legitimate or not, and how response to threats to human security are to be formulated.
These discussions appear to have received increasing urgency as conflicts have come to be
characterised increasingly by war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and acts of
genocide, and as has become increasingly obvious that states are unable to prevent these so-
called “atrocity crimes”, to respond to them in a timely and meaningful manner, or indeed are
themselves the perpetrators of atrocity crimes. Thus, throughout the 1990s it became increasingly
clear that the norms of state sovereignty, human rights, and interventionism required re-visiting if
states were to meaningfully address the security challenges faced in the 21st century. It also
became increasingly clear that the UN, as well as regional and sub-regional organisations
needed to become more relevant to the peace and security challenges faced in the modern era.
Indeed, the inability of states to prevent or to respond to atrocity crimes, which had been on the
rise since the end of the Cold War, perhaps posed one of the most fundamental challenges to
international society as a whole.
In his Millennium Report to the UN General Assembly, Secretary-General Kofi Annan picked up
on this contentious debate, and laid down a challenge to member states, asking:
If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a
Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our
common humanity (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001: 2)?
In response to this challenge, and building on the evolving debates surrounding international
intervention in humanitarian crises of the time, the Canadian Government in 2000 initiated the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which in 2001 released
its report titled the Responsibility to Protect. The report argued that sovereignty entailed both a
right and a responsibility; sovereign states held the right not to be intervened in, yet concomitantly
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held a responsibility to protect their populations from war crimes, crimes against humanity and
genocide. Should a state be either unable or unwilling to protect its population, the report argued,
the responsibility to protect populations at risk ceded to other states, which were tasked with
preventing atrocity crimes, reacting to atrocity crimes, by force if necessary, to put an end to
extreme human suffering, and to assist in rebuilding states after atrocity crimes had been
committed to prevent them from occurring again in future. The responsibility to protect norm
therefore sought to void notions of the inviolability of state sovereignty under all conditions, and to
make sovereignty, in the sense of non-interference, conditional upon notions of responsibility.
The emergence of the responsibility to protect norm generated much debate in international
society, and vocal proponents and opponents could be found both in the global North and the
global South. Following further investigation, and some alteration, the responsibility to protect
received the endorsement of the UN General Assembly in 2005, and in 2006 of the UN Security
Council. Since that time, the norm has been invoked on several occasions at the level of the UN
and elsewhere, and appears to have become a firm fixture within the normative framework
regulating peace, security and stability within international society. Yet whilst the norm appears to
have been accepted, endorsed and increasingly entrenched by states, a stark contradiction
appears to have developed. At the same time as the responsibility to protect appears to have
gained traction in international society as a norm governing intervention in situations of supreme
humanitarian emergency, the conflicts in the Darfur region of Sudan, which gained international
attention from 2003 onwards, spiralled out of control, resulting in hundreds of thousands of
deaths and millions of persons displaced. Evidence emerging from the Darfur conflicts quickly led
to accusations of war crimes, crimes against humanity, attempts at ethnic cleansing and acts of
genocide being committed on a routine basis, including on the part of Sudanese state. The
conflicts, which were swiftly equated to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda by some, was one of the
most brutal and enduring the African continent had witnessed, and of the nature that, in Kofi
Annan’s words, “shocked the conscience of mankind”. Darfur represented precisely the kind of
conflict that the responsibility to protect norm had been developed to prevent, and, failing that, to
ensure swift international action to bring an end to the commission of atrocity crimes. Yet the
international reactions to Darfur were widely criticised as slow, ineffective, and incapable of
bringing to an end the conflict, or of protecting the civilians who were bearing the brunt of it.
Deriving from this critique, many observers concluded that, despite the best hopes of its
advocates, the norm had failed to bring meaningful change to the manner in which states
responded to the conflicts in Darfur, the very conflict situation it had been designed to addressed
(Bellamy 2005 and 2006, Grono 2006, Udombana 2007). Others however argued not only that
international society had failed in its reactions to Darfur, but that Darfur represented a failure of
the responsibility to protect norm itself (De Waal 2007).
1.2 Research Purpose
The emergence and development of the responsibility to protect norm in international society
concomitant with states’ formulation of a response to the Darfur conflicts raises several
challenges to the peace and security architecture of international society, and several interesting
questions for the fields of Political Science and International Relations. At one level, an analysis
of the development of the responsibility to protect and of international reactions to the Darfur
conflicts provides deeper insight into the manner in which interventions on humanitarian grounds
have changed in international society, both in terms of their permissibility within the structures of
that society, and in terms of when and how they are conducted by states within that society. At
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another level, an assessment of the development of the responsibility to protect and responses to
the Darfur conflicts generates insight into how norms of state sovereignty, human rights,
interventions and the use of force develop, change, and are impacted on by one another at the
international level. This is interesting on a range of levels. For one, such an analysis generates
insight into how states make use of norms to structure international society and their
engagements with one another. For another, it sheds light on how the rules of interaction within
international society impact on state behaviour, if at all, and how these rules are amended by
states in a changing context. Finally, an analysis of this kind contributes towards a greater
understanding of the development of norm-based security architectures and actions in an
increasingly globalised characterised by multi-polarity.
Yet an assessment of the development of the responsibility to protect norm at the same time that
responses to Darfur were being formulated by states at the international level is interesting on a
further level. As will be argued later, it appears as though the norm developed along a somewhat
different trajectory at the level of the UN than it did at the level of the African Union (AU). For one,
while the norm was endorsed and became increasingly utilised at the level of the UN, it received
no such endorsement at the level of the AU, and appears not to have entered into discourses in
African responses to the Darfur conflicts. Indeed, the African responses to Darfur appear to have
been fundamentally different to those of the UN in several interesting ways. Therefore, an
analysis of the application and utility of the responsibility to protect at the level of the international
(UN) and the regional (AU) responses to Darfur yields interesting insights into the development
and application of security norms at different levels of international interaction. Assessing whether
norms designed to govern international peace and security hold equal merit at the global and the
regional levels, or whether they develop along different trajectories and therefore hold different
intrinsic values at different levels, it is argued, will contribute to an enhanced understanding of
how norm-based security responses develop and are implemented in practice at the global and
the regional levels. Such an analysis, in turn, contributes to the development of an enhanced
understanding of the utility of the responsibility to protect norm, and its possible future
development and application.
It should be noted that the proposed research is not designed to focus on linear developments in
international society, nor is aimed at understanding the “cause” and “effect” of developments.
Rather, it is designed to explore the realm of the possible, and of the impossible for that matter, in
a system of state interaction developing within a changing global context. As Martha Finnemore
argues, understanding how the practice of intervention is constituted socially within international
society is essential to explaining much of the behaviour witnessed in global politics. New beliefs
about valid behaviour, as Finnemore argues, reconstitute the meaning and rules of behaviour,
although not in a mechanistic causal fashion. Rather, new beliefs make possible new behaviour
by creating new norms of behaviour and new possibilities for action, which perhaps previously did
not exist. Reasons for action are of course not to be considered the same as causes of action as
understood by utilitarian theories. Rather, by creating new social realities (new norms enabling
new desiderata for decision-makers), as Finnemore argues, new beliefs create new policy
choices and even policy imperatives. Therefore, understanding beliefs about intervention is not
merely a descriptive exercise, as beliefs about legitimate intervention constitute certain
behavioural possibilities, and in that sense both enable and cause them. Analyses of this nature,
then, are less directed towards answering the “why” questions in International Relations, than
they are directed towards the “how”, or more specifically, the “how possible” questions
(Finnemore, 2003: 14 - 15).
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Yet caution must be exercised with this kind of analysis as well, as it should be understood that
answers to the “how possible” question are context-dependent, and what may have been
possible at one time within a certain context may not be possible either at the same time within a
different context, or at another point in time within a changing context. In particular, given the
analysis which will be undertaken here, caution should be urged against an interpretation of
findings that suggests linear development within international society. Some of the more regarded
literature on intervention in cases of human suffering, such as that of Finnemore (1996[b] and
2003), Nicholas Wheeler (2000[a]) and Nicholas Wheeler and Timothy Dunne (Wheeler and
Dunne 2001), appears to argue that interventions for humanitarian purposes have come
increasingly to be regarded as just and morally defensible, and will occur more frequently in
future. Indeed, Finnemore argued that traditional understandings of state sovereignty, which had
come to trump all other claims in international society throughout the Cold War, including
humanitarian claims, may have peaked in world politics with the Cold War, and that humanitarian
activity in the 1990s suggested that certain claims, particularly human rights claims, would trump
sovereignty claims and legitimise interventions in ways not previously accepted (2003: 21). Yet
the challenges faced when formulating responses to Darfur appear, at least on the surface, to go
against such claims. However, to understand this apparent reversal, it is important not to look
only at the development of interventions on humanitarian grounds from a historical perspective,
but to also investigate the specific context(s) within which understandings of such interventions
were developed and applied. Therefore, understanding how the responsibility to protect norm
developed both in time and in context, and specifically assessing its application and utility in the
case of Darfur, both at the level of the UN and the AU, will generate meaningful insight into the
manner in which responses characterised by the commission of atrocity crimes are formulated
and implemented, and how these should be evaluated.
1.3 Delineating Concepts
It is useful to provide for some degree of conceptual clarity the major terms which will be made
use of during this study. Whilst precise meanings of terms and of their use remains a perpetual
construction site in the field of International Relations, and no attempt should be made at the
provision of definitive terms, a degree of delineation does prove useful for the purposes of this
study. Several terms will therefore require some form of elucidation, before they can meaningfully
be applied here.
The concept of humanitarian intervention proves inherently controversial in the overlapping
discourse of Political Science, International Law and International Relations. This is not least due
to the nature of the concept itself; as a principle, humanitarian intervention infringes norms of
humanity, humanitarianism and human rights on the norms of state sovereignty, non-intervention,
the non-use of force and the prohibition on interference in the domestic or internal affairs of a
state, which have proved such fundamental pillars of international society as it has developed
since the emergence of the Westphalian state system.
The term ‘humanitarian intervention’, as Finnemore shows, has evolved over time, focusing first
on military action to rescue one’s own citizens in other states, then expanding to include the
protection of citizens of other states in those states by military means, and today is eclipsed
altogether in policy discourse by notions of ‘responses to complex humanitarian emergencies’
(Finnemore, 2003: 10). Finnemore argues that an intervention on humanitarian grounds is the
deployment of military force “across borders for the purpose of protecting foreign nationals from
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man-made violence” (2003: 53). Finnemore excludes interventions to protect foreign nationals
from natural disasters as well as interventions aimed at the protection of a state’s own nationals
from abuse (2003: 53 - 54). Nicholas Wheeler sums this concept up well and provides a short yet
apt definition of the concept of humanitarian interventionism in the title of his work “Saving
Strangers” (2000). Yet humanitarian intervention as a concept should be characterised as much
by what it entails as by what it excludes. A notion of humanitarian intervention which offers
conceptual clarity and academic rigour is offered by a scholar from the international legal
discipline. Thomas Rytter defines humanitarian intervention as:
coercive action by one or more states involving the threat or use of force in another state without the consent of
its government, for the purpose of preventing or putting to a halt gross and massive violations of human rights
or international humanitarian law (own emphasis, 2001: 122).
Interventions on humanitarian grounds, according to this definition, may be conducted either with
or without the authorisation of the UN Security Council. This distinction is important in legal terms,
as the use of force authorised by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter for the
maintenance of international peace and security is considered lawful, whereas interventions
without the authorisation of the Security Council find no explicit legal basis in the UN Charter or
the international legal system (Rytter, 2001: 122 - 123).
Drawing on the above, interventionism on humanitarian grounds for the purposes of this study will
be defined as coercive action by one or more states involving the threat or use of force in another
state without the consent of its government, for the purposes of preventing or putting to a halt
gross and massive violations of human rights or international humanitarian and human rights law.
The concept of state sovereignty is also an inherently puzzling one in the fields of Political
Science and International Relations. The concept is a frustrating one, as it appears to enjoy little
conceptual clarity or agreement, and interpretations of its meaning both vary widely and appear to
change regularly. Alexander Wendt approached the sovereignty concept from a rights-based
perspective, arguing that state structures constituted state actors with sovereignty, traditionally
divided into ‘internal’ and ‘external’ sovereignty rights. Internally, sovereignty provided for the right
of the state to act as the supreme locus of political authority in society, with the final right to
decide and to enforce its decisions. This ‘right’ of decision and enforcement for Wendt was
crucial, as sovereignty was not about de facto freedom of action relative to society or state
‘autonomy’ but about being recognised by society as having both authority and powers. These
powers could of course be limited, as with the concept of the night-watchman state, or extensive,
as in a totalitarian state, but as rights they were legal rather than political facts, de jure as
opposed to de facto (Wendt, 1999: 206 - 207).
Finnemore approaches the concept of state sovereignty from another angle, investigating the
concept not from a rights perspective but from a social perspective. Finnemore argues that the
term ‘statehood’ as the only appropriate and legitimate political unit in international politics has
only recently been opened up for investigation, having previously been viewed as a naturally
occurring and inevitable form of political organisation rather than as a socially constructed and
historically contingent entity (1996[a]: 23). Finnemore argues that sovereignty became universal
as a principle for political organisation as colonies, empires and other such forms of political
organisation disappeared, with sovereign nations coming to be understood as equal under
international law and within international society. During the Cold War sovereignty came to be
understood as a right of non-intervention, and an increasing number of states, in particular the
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newly independent ones, guarded this interpretation carefully, and utilised it to trump other
claims, such as those of human rights and international humanitarian law. Sovereignty, then,
connoted the right of non-interference and to conduct the affairs of the state, internally at least, in
any manner deemed appropriate by the sovereign power. This understanding of sovereignty,
argues Finnemore, appeared to have peaked during the Cold War, and during the 1990s it
appeared as though certain claims, particularly human rights claims, increasingly encroached
upon and altered the normative understandings of sovereignty. Increasingly then, the inter-state
use of force and interventions in the affairs of previously exclusively sovereign states came to be
shaped by Weberian rational-legal authority structures, particularly legal understandings of
sovereignty and the rules and norms of international organisations (Finnemore, 2003: 21).
Tapping into this discourse, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in 1999 argued that two concepts
of sovereignty were emerging in international society; a ‘sovereignty of rights’, and a ‘sovereignty
of responsibilities’, whereby states held both internal and external rights and simultaneous
responsibilities, both of which mutually constituted sovereignty (United Nations Department of
Public Information, 1999: 44). Sovereignty therefore is a malleable concept, and one which has
been the centre of much debate since the end of the Cold War. Part of the focus of this research
is of course to tap into that debate, and to generate an enhanced understanding of how the
normative underpinnings of the state sovereignty concept have been shaped and altered since
the end of the Cold War. Indeed, tracking this debate, as will be shown later, is one of the keys to
understanding the emergence and development of the responsibility to protect norm in
international society. But it is useful at this stage to bear in mind that sovereignty remains a
contested and changing concept in International Relations, not only in the study of the discipline,
but also in its practice, in other words, in the conduct of international relations.
Finally, it should be highlighted that this research focuses on interventions on humanitarian
grounds in situations of extreme human suffering. To this end, the study focuses on what will be
labelled the commission of atrocity crimes, which in turn is broken down into the commission of
war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and acts of genocide. These terms of
course all require further investigation, and will be explored in greater depth in turn throughout the
progression of the research, as the meaning of the terms has evolved historically, and tracking
this historical evolution is important to tracking interventions on humanitarian grounds, the focus
of this study. What should be clarified here however is that the study focuses on interventions on
the basis of atrocity crimes as noted above, and not on humanitarian intervention more broadly,
which has come to encompass the delivery of humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, food aid
and other forms of assistance in situations of humanitarian crisis. Whilst intervention in such
situations provide an interesting area of study in the field of International Relations, they do not
form the basis of analysis here. For this reason, and as explored above, the term ‘interventions
on humanitarian grounds’ as opposed to ‘humanitarian intervention’ will be made use of
throughout this study, in an effort to reduce confusion between the types of interventions which
take place within international society, whereby interventions on humanitarian grounds are
conceived of as interventions to prevent, avert or halt the commission of atrocity crimes.
Finally, this research seeks to assess whether the responsibility to protect norm contributed to the
formulation of effective responses to the conflict situations it was intended to address, through an
analysis of the application of the norm in response to the conflicts in Darfur from 2003 onwards.
Here, moral and prudential claims must be distinguished from one another. This research does
not seek to adopt a moralistic approach, assessing whether intervention for moral purposes at
any point in time was justified or not, nor does the research seek to assess the weight of moral
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claims for state action or inaction, or discourse surrounding that action. Rather, this research
seeks to assess whether the responsibility to protect norm when invoked contributed to the
attainment of its content goal, namely preventing or bringing to a halt the commission of atrocity
crimes in a conflict situation. In this sense, the research seeks to assess whether the
responsibility to protect norm contributed to the formulation of effective responses towards the
attainment of its content goal from a prudential point of view. Thus, whether the norm contributed
to the development and implementation of international responses which prevented atrocity
crimes from occurring, or which halted the commission of atrocity crimes. Effective in this sense
then means whether utilisation of the norm facilitated, as opposed to obstructed, international
engagement with the conflicting parties, facilitated the delivery of assistance to those affected by
the conflict, assisted policy-makers when confronted by hard choices, and ultimately, contributed
to bringing an end to the conflict situation and thereby protection to those affected by a conflict.
While moral claims are certainly important and valid, this research seeks to go beyond an
assessment of the moral value of action or inaction, and to generate an understanding of the
impact of the responsibility to protect norm that includes the prudential elements of action, and of
inaction.
1.4 Research Questions
To generate meaningful insight into how responses to atrocity crimes are formulated and
implemented, and how they should be evaluated, several questions will require investigation.
First, an understanding of how norms develop which enable and constrain behaviour within
international society must be generated. This analysis must develop both a theoretical approach
towards analysing norm development in international society more broadly, and to assess the
development of norms governing interventions on humanitarian grounds within that society given
changing socio-political contexts. Thus, this research seeks first to assess how norms develop in
the international system.
Second, and building on the above, a framework which enables an assessment of the
development and utility of the responsibility to protect norm since its inception must be generated.
Such a framework will allow for the development of an understanding of how the responsibility to
protect norm emerged within a historical context, and the manner in which it developed within
international society. A conceptual approach that does not also shed light on the utility of the
norm in international society, and how this relates to state behaviour within that society, will
however not be of much use to generating a deeper understanding of what actions are deemed
possible or impossible at any given point in time. Thus, the research also seeks to assess how it
was possible that the responsibility to protect norm emerged and developed in international
society when it did.
Third, the application of the responsibility to protect norm, once its relevance to international
society has been demonstrated, must be tested. As will be argued elsewhere, norms governing
state behaviour in international society are of little value if they do not either enable or constrain
behaviour, and are not utilised by decision-makers when taking actions. Here, the application and
impact of the responsibility to protect to the conflicts in Darfur from 2003 onwards will be
assessed. It is important that the application of the responsibility to protect is tested at two levels
for at least two reasons. For one, it is possible that a disconnect exists between norm
development and application at different levels of interaction. For another, context-specific
differences (cultural, social, historical or political) may impact on norm development and
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application differently within different contexts, which cannot be demonstrated through an
analysis at one level, but only through a comparative analysis on at least two levels. Therefore,
the responsibility to protect norm, in its development and application, will be tested at the level of
the UN and the AU in two ways. For one, the development and application of the norm will be
assessed at both levels. For another, the responses both of the UN and of the AU to the conflicts
in Darfur, which will be argued was the first test case for the responsibility to protect norm, will be
analysed. This will be done in an effort to assess whether the responsibility to protect contributed
to the formulation of effective responses to the kinds of conflict situations it was designed for.
Fourth, following an analysis of the application of the norm, an assessment of its utility must be
made, as well as its role in future responses to conflict situations where atrocity crimes are
committed. This is important not just to understanding if and why the responsibility to protect has
made a meaningful impact on the formulation of responses to conflicts characterised by atrocity
crimes, but also to understanding what possibilities exist in the future to both prevent and respond
to atrocity crimes on the African continent, both at the level of the UN and at the level of the AU.
Therefore, the research will also seek to assess how future responses to conflicts in Africa
characterised by atrocity crimes may be formulated, and what role the responsibility to protect
norm may play.
This research therefore seeks to (1) how norms develop in the international system, (2) how it
was possible that the responsibility to protect norm emerged and developed in international
society when it did, (3) whether the responsibility to protect contributed to the formulation of
effective responses to the kinds of conflict situations it was designed for, and (4) how future
responses to conflicts characterised by atrocity crimes in Africa may be formulated, and what role
the responsibility to protect norm may play.
1.5 Research Structure
Following Chapter 1, which contextualises the research, defines the problem statement, sets out
research questions, clarifies the research methodology utilised, and sets out the limitations and
delimitations of this research, chapter 2 will develop the theoretical approach of this study. The
research makes use of a Constructivist approach to International Relations, arguing that
international society, as a social system of interaction between states, is both constructed and
governed on the basis of norms which both enable and constrain behaviour. More specifically,
this research will draw on and make use of the norm life cycle theory, as advanced by Martha
Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998), as a basis for investigating the development of the
responsibility to protect norm in international society.
Chapter 3 will then explore the development of interventions on humanitarian grounds in
international society from a Constructivist perspective, assessing the role that norms relating to
state sovereignty, human rights, the use of force and intervention in international society played in
relation to assessments of the legitimacy of interventions on humanitarian grounds, and the
manner in which, as will be argued, these constrained the conduct of such interventions during
the Cold War. The chapter will continue the exploration of these themes in the post-Cold War era,
and will argue that the changing international context following, the elevation of human rights
norms and standards and the more assertive role played by the Security Council in the
maintenance of international peace and security enabled a context in which the responsibility to
protect norm could emerge when it did.
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Building on the above analysis, chapter 4 will analyse the development and entrenchment of the
responsibility to protect norm in international society, utilising the norm life cycle approach. While
the principles embodied in the norm are of course recognised as themselves being in existence
prior to the development of the responsibility to protect label, this chapter will track the
development of the norm from its emergence in 2001 through its endorsement by the UN General
Assembly in 2005 and the UN Security Council in 2006 to its utilisation by the Security Council in
2007 and its increasing entrenchment in the UN system to the end of 2010. The chapter will also
explore normative developments in the field of peace and security in particular on the African
continent following the end of the Cold War, to assess the ‘normative fit’ of the responsibility to
protect in the maintenance of peace and security in Africa, in particular in the context of the
transition from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to the AU, and in the context of a still
developing African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
Chapter 5 will in turn track the application of the responsibility to protect norm in response to the
conflicts in Darfur between 2003 and 2005, both at the level of the UN and at the level of the AU,
to assess the degree to which the responsibility to protect norm impacted on policy decisions and
on state behaviour in designing and implementing responses to the Darfur conflicts. The chapter
tracks these developments against the backdrop of the emergence of the responsibility to protect
norm, to assess whether the still emerging norm impacted on the formulation of responses to
Darfur, and what differences, if any, can be observed between the impact of the norm at the level
of the UN and at the level of the AU.
Chapter 6 in turn tracks the application of the norm in relation to the Darfur conflicts from 2006 to
2010, against a backdrop where the norm had been endorsed by the UN General Assembly and
the UN Security Council. In particular, the chapter seeks to explore how the norm, now
increasingly becoming entrenched in the UN, impacted on policy decisions and on state
behaviour in designing and implementing responses to the Darfur conflicts. Specifically, the
chapter seeks to assess whether the norm contributed to the formulation of effective responses to
the conflicts in Darfur, the very conflict situation it was intended to help address. In addition, the
chapter will explore and what differences, if any, existed in the interpretation and application of
the norm between the two main intervening organisations, namely the UN and the AU.
On the basis of the findings generated, chapter 7 will then assess in particular the utility of the
responsibility to protect norm, its impact on responses to situations of conflict in which atrocity
crimes are committed, and accordingly, prospects for the future development of the norm, in
particular in relation to international responses to future conflicts characterised by the commission
of atrocity crimes in Africa. The chapter will also present an assessment of the application of the
norm life cycle approach to tracking the development of the responsibility to protect norm, and will
generate recommendations for further research.
1.6 Methodology
The present research, employing a qualitative approach, seeks to cover the exploratory,
descriptive and explanatory elements of the research process. The research is considered
exploratory, as it seeks to apply the norm life cycle concept to a norm which, for all intents and
purposes, is still to be considered developing, and which, as will be argued later, has not
progressed through all stages of the norm life cycle, and entered into the internalisation phase.
Other attempts at delivering a comprehensive analysis of norm development have tended to be
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more historical. Researchers have to date focused on assessing norm development
retrospectively, making use of the advantages brought with historical hindsight. Thus, norm
development research has focused on the rise of environmentalism (Conca 1995), the
development of anti-apartheid thinking (Klotz 1995), the abolition of the slave trade, the
emergence of human rights, and the fortification of gender equality (Finnemore 1996). Yet very
little work has been conducted on norms which are still in the development process, and where
their application or strength has not been tested several times.
Whilst it is possible to understand norm development from a historical point of view, it is more
difficult to be able to predict the development trajectory of a newly developed or still developing
norm. Yet an enhanced understanding of norm development, and the factors which are most
likely to impact on the development trajectory of a norm, are critical to generating an enhanced
understanding of which normative frameworks are more, and which less, useful to contemporary
international society. Such an understanding is critical to the creation and operationalisation of
structures and systems which have meaning, and which are relevant to their intended purpose.
Therefore, understanding norm development from a historical point of view is useful, but
understanding norm development given prevailing contextual conditions is important as well. The
current research will thus aim to contribute to this endeavour through the application of norm
development approaches to a situation in which a norm is still developing, rather than a situation
in which a norm historically developed at one point in time. In addition, the research seeks to be
both descriptive and explanatory. Through both describing and making attempts towards
analysing findings, the current research seeks to both apply Constructivist norm development
theory to empirical data, to assess which data both strengthen and detract from the theoretical
approach, and to provide an assessment both of the findings through the perspective of the
theory, and of the theory from the perspective of the findings. It is therefore not assumed that only
the theory can inform the validity of the findings, or that the findings can inform the validity of the
theoretical approach, but that both the theoretical approach and the findings generated through
the application of this approach must inform one another. The research process is therefore
considered both deductive and inductive and hypothesis-testing and hypothesis-generating.
This resembles quite closely an approach utilised by Finnemore in her 2003 work assessing the
changing purpose of intervention in international society. Descriptively, each section of the
research lays out a chronological sequence of events, paying attention to the manner in which
each affects another, but going further by articulating a cohesive structure for the analysis of
these events by configuring them in a particular manner which emphasises aspects of importance
for the purposes of the research. Finnemore, borrowing from John Ruggie (who in turn adapted it
from the work of Charles Pierce) labelled this approach ‘abduction’. Abduction, as described by
Finnemore, is neither a process of deduction nor of induction, but a dialectical combination of the
two. In each case of analysis, deductively derived hypotheses that shape the initial design of the
inquiry are presented, but these are quickly shown to be limited in their explanatory power of
events. Consequently, deductive arguments are supplemented with inductively derived insights to
create an understanding of events which is plausible to others conducting a similar analysis
(Finnemore, 2003: 9 - 13). This approach contains considerable advantages to the research
undertaken here, as, as also noted by Finnemore, no deductive arguments about the changing
purpose of force (including its legitimacy, its application, and the assessment of its use) are
sufficiently well specified to test with dispositive results. On the other hand, the use merely of
induction does not provide clear guidance as to where the process of inquiry should commence.
Thus, combining both deduction and induction provides a good starting point for the research, but
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also allows the research design to be flexible enough to meaningfully evaluate the usefulness of
findings in a reflexive manner (Finnemore, 2003: 13 - 14).
Building on this approach, the research will also make use of discourse analysis as a primary
means of investigation. Using the state international organisations and the bureaucratic officials
of international organisations as the units of analysis, the research seeks, through a review of
primary (official records, communiqués, statements, speeches, submissions and other forms of
documentation) and secondary (academic research, analyses of primary materials, reports,
media analyses and other forms of documentation) source material to apply discourse analysis to
generate, compare and assess findings. This application of discourse analysis will be made at the
level of individual states, as well as at the level of international organisations and their
bureaucratic officials. Indeed, as Michael Barnet and Martha Finnemore (2004) have illustrated,
international organisations can be treated as autonomous actors in international relations, which
not only regulate but also constitute and construct the social world. In turn, the bureaucratic
officials of international organisations can be viewed as representing the interests of international
organisations, of formulating and articulating the interests of these organisations, and of using
international organisations as platforms for impacting on the behaviour of their member states.
This analysis of behaviour individually and collectively should not easily be dismissed as an
analysis of diplomatic rhetoric or showmanship. Indeed, it cannot be denied that states use the
fora provided by international organisations to pursue their (perceived) national interests, but an
undercurrent of Cosmopolitanism also exists in the language and actions of states in these fora.
Similarly, international organisations and their bureaucratic officials as actors in the international
system hold interests, and use the platforms provided by international organisation to articulate
and advance these interests, sometimes representing the interests of states, and sometimes not
(Barnett and Finnemore, 2004).
For instance, the UN Security Council refers to itself as representative of states, and tasked with
the maintenance of the well-being of that community. Similarly, communiqués emanating from the
AU Peace and Security Council refer to the Council as tasked with the defence of the well-being
of all members of the Union, and not only of the Council itself. Further, it is acknowledged in the
International Relations field that states do take the posturing of the UN Security Council, though
perhaps less so of the AU Peace and Security Council, seriously. Whilst it is difficult to precisely
measure the influence that the Security Council has on the actions of states, a Security Council
review of serious human rights violations, of arms stockpiling, or of cross-border aggression is
usually taken seriously by state parties, and does inform the actions of those states, even if it is
only to dismiss the actions of the Council. The very fact that states take the trouble to publicly
dismiss the Security Council, however, is already evidence of the impact that the Security Council
has on state behaviour in international society. Inter-state co-operation at the multilateral level is
therefore, as Michael Barnett argues, not merely a technical feat, but is also a connection to a
moral order. Through their discourse and practices, state parties to multilateral organisations not
only address particular problems but also connect themselves and their activities to a set of
transcendental values (Barnett, 1997: 570 - 571). Following this line of inquiry, as argued by Paul
Williams, evidence of the security culture of an organisation, in Williams’ analysis the AU, can be
found in the documents and statements of that organisation and its officials, its predecessors, and
foreign policy pronouncements of its member states. Of particular value to Williams are
expressions of collective identity, solidarity, and what counts as appropriate and legitimate
conduct by member states (2007: 257). A similar approach therefore will be applied both to the
UN and the AU in trying to better understand the generation, internalisation and application of
security response in line with a developed or developing security culture.
20
In addition to the utilisation of discourse analysis and an analysis of state behaviour based on a
review of primary and secondary materials, the research draws on fieldwork which was
conducted between 2007 and 2010. From June 2007 to December 2009, the author worked as
intern, senior programme officer and unit head respectively for the African Centre for the
Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), a non-governmental organisation based in
South Africa and working across the African continent specialising in conflict management
interventions. From January to June 2010, the author was a visiting researcher at the Norwegian
Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), based in Oslo, Norway, and from August 2010 onwards
the author worked as a civilian planning and coordination officer in the Peace Support Operations
Division (PSOD) in the African Union Commission, based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, which is
responsible for the planning and management of African Union-mandated peace support
operations. During this time, the author conducted fieldwork in support of this research. At all
times, the author disclosed the purposes of the research, and sought the consent of research
participants prior to the conduct of fieldwork and interviews. A clear distinction was maintained
between the author’s work in the conduct of professional duties and the conduct of research for
the purposes of this study. Where information relevant to the purposes of this study was obtained
through the conduct of professional duties, this was disregarded unless it could be alternatively
verified at a later stage through the clear identification of the researcher’s intentions to
participants.
The fieldwork included participation in meetings of various bodies and specialised agencies of the
UN and the AU, interaction with and participation in meetings of regional bodies such as the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development
Community (SADC), engagements with various Ministries of Foreign Affairs on the African
continent and beyond, and field visits to Addis Ababa, Berlin, Bujumbura, Gaborone, Goma,
Juba, Kigali, Kinshasa, Khartoum, London, Monrovia, Nairobi, New York, Oslo and Pretoria. The
research also draws directly and indirectly on observations made by government officials,
employees of non-governmental organisations, academics and other stakeholders involved in
international response to conflicts in Sudan throughout the conduct of this study.
1.7 Delimitations
Whilst an analysis of the development of the responsibility to protect norm and its application to
the conflicts in Darfur is, by necessity, a wide-ranging undertaking, such an analysis, if it is to be
useful, must be both narrow and deep. Narrow in the sense that the unit and level of analysis
must be limited, deep in that the research must qualitatively demonstrate analytically relevant
findings as opposed to conjecture and loose interpretationism. To ensure that the research is
both deep enough and narrow enough, several limitations are placed on the scope of this study.
For one, the level of analysis must be limited in two ways. On the one hand, the level of analysis
is limited to using the state and international organisations as the units of analysis. Of interest to
this research are the actions and interactions of states and the bodies representing their interests
in international society, based on understandings of norms which enable and constrain behaviour
and thereby state action. Whilst it is acknowledged that other actors (including for example multi-
national corporations, civil society organisations, and individuals) impact on the actions of states,
and therefore on international society, for the purposes of this research, these roles and
relationships cannot be explored in depth. Whilst the impact of some of the above will be
assessed where relevant to the actions of states, this is not the primary focus of this study. On
the other hand, when analysing the behaviour of states in international society, this analysis of
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interaction is limited to the interaction of states at the multilateral and at the bilateral levels,
through the formal and informal workings of state agencies, foreign affairs machinery, and other
means of engagement.
This is not to say that state behaviour at the international level is governed only by interaction
with other states in the system. It is fully acknowledged that domestic factors are also important
when it comes to understanding state behaviour in international society, and to understanding the
salience of a norm in decision-making, as argued by Thomas Risse-Kappen, Jeffrey Checkel,
Jeffrey Legro and James Davis (2000). Yet as Andrews Cortell and James Davis highlight,
insufficient attention has been devoted to the measurement of a norm’s strength, legitimacy and
salience in the domestic political arena, and until this shortcoming has been addressed, it will
remain difficult to meaningfully assess the impact that domestic factors have on the behaviour of
states externally. In addition, the mechanisms and processes by which international norms can or
cannot attain domestic legitimacy remain under-explored, as research has tended to be biased
toward processes and dynamics at international society level (2000: 67 – 68). However, for the
purposes of this research, it is not feasible to include an assessment of the domestic
development of norms, and the impact this has on the behaviour of states at the international
level. This is recognised from the outset as a limitation of this study.
A further limitation is placed on the research in its focus of analysis. The UN and the AU have
been selected as fora in which to explore reactions to the Darfur conflicts within the context of the
responsibility to protect, whereas other fora, such as the European Union (EU), the
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Arab League, the Organisation of the
Islamic Conference (OIC), the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC - previously the
Human Rights Commission) and other fora which have played a role in shaping international
responses to the Darfur conflicts have been omitted, save for instances where their actions have
proved relevant for the purposes of this study. Whilst such a broad analysis would certainly have
been interesting, it would not be as relevant here as focussing on the UN and the AU. These
organisations were selected as one holds the mandate for the maintenance of international peace
and security, whilst the other holds the mandate for the maintenance of regional peace and
security, and both organisations have been key to shaping the international responses to Darfur.
An analysis of actions in these fora, therefore, is deemed as most relevant to the present
research. Yet even when narrowing the focus of analysis to actions in these two fora, it would not
be possible to assess all actions at every juncture. Rather, emphasis will be placed on actions, as
well as instances of inaction, that are relevant to the focus of this research, and which serve to
both validate and detract from the line of argumentation presented.
Finally, the research is limited in terms of the timeframe under review. The development of norms
governing intervention on humanitarian grounds in international society is assessed from the Cold
War to the turn of the 21st century, following which the responsibility to protect, as a norm
governing approaches to interventions on humanitarian grounds from 2001 onwards is analysed.
The development of the responsibility to protect norm is assessed from 2001 to 2010. Similarly,
international reactions to the Darfur conflicts within the context of the responsibility to protect
norm are assessed from 2003 through 2010 only. Responses to the conflicts in Darfur, the origins
of the current round of conflicts arguably being traced to 1916 or earlier depending on one’s
perspective, are not assessed prior to 2003, when the AU and the UN first formally took notice of
the conflicts and made attempts at responding to them. On the other end of the scale, responses
to the conflicts are not assessed beyond the end of 2010, the timeframe of analysis being limited
22
to the practical purposes of this research and the period during which in-depth desktop and
fieldwork research for this study was conducted.
1.8 Limitations to the Conduct of this Study
Whilst every attempt has been made to construct the research design in as rigorous a manner as
possible, certain limitations are of course placed on the research process itself. For one, access
and security considerations did not permit the conduct of fieldwork in Darfur itself. Whilst this is by
no means critical to the outcomes of this study, it does nonetheless place limitations on the ability
of the researcher to gain an enhanced understanding of the conflict dynamics, and of
perspectives from the ground, both of UN and AU personnel, as well as by those affected by the
conflict and the political decision-makers. Where possible, relevant stakeholders have been met
with outside of the Darfur region, either in Khartoum or in Juba, or outside of Sudan itself.
However, such interactions by their very nature can only be limited. A further limitation placed on
the research process relates very much to the political sensitivities related to the Darfur conflict.
Whilst valuable insights and perspectives were gained in relation to the responsibility to protect
norm, the conflicts in Darfur and the work of the UN and of the AU, not all material could be used
meaningfully for the purposes of the current research, as meetings attended by the researcher
were generally governed by the concomitant rules of confidentiality and anonymity, and where
interviews were conducted, none of these could be recorded. Where valuable information was
obtained, this was done so outside of the confines of formal interview processes, and therefore
cannot always be rigorously referenced. Thus, whilst extensive fieldwork was conducted, not all
findings from the fieldwork could be incorporated in this study. In addition, certain information has
been included in this study by means other than through direct reference to interviews conducted.
A further limitation relates to the limited time-frame within which this study could be conducted.
The research for the purposes of this study was conducted between January 2007 and July 2010,
and therefore is limited to the outcomes of the research process over a three year period. In
addition, the limited timeframe of analysis which has been chosen for this study places a
limitation on the outcomes generated as well. The conflicts in Darfur, for example, are not new
and most certainly did not arise in 2003. Indeed, the genealogy of the current round of conflict
can be traced to the 1920s, or to the 1860s, depending on one’s interpretation of the conflicts,
and an analysis of international reactions to the conflict since that time may have added value to
this study. However, such an analysis was considered both impractical to this study, and as one
which would add limited value to the overall purposes of the current research. Therefore,
reactions to the conflict have been studied only from 2003 onwards, when the conflicts escalated
to the point where they formally formed part of the agenda of work of the UN and the AU. This
limitation is recognised, and its impact on the research findings clearly acknowledged.
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Chapter 2
-
Norm Development and Utility in International Relations
2.1 Introduction
The discipline of International Relations is plagued by numerous challenges which, despite the
best efforts of its adherents, simply will not be done away with in the immediate future.
Challenges are already encountered when breaking down the field itself. The study of
International Relations, by default, connotes the study of that which extends beyond the borders
of states as the primary building blocks of the discipline (hence the international component), and
of the relationships, forms of engagement and interactions between these states (hence the
relations component). International Relations therefore refers to the study both of the structure of
international society, and of the goings on within that structure. From a positivist epistemological
perspective, this in and of itself does not pose a challenge, as positivism advocates that the
natural world can be studied by the disciplines that collectively make up the natural sciences, and
that, equally, the structures that govern the social world can be studied by the disciplines that
combined connote the social sciences, of which International Relations is a firm component.
Building on this understanding, a structuralist approach to the discipline of International Relations
advocates that the structures of international society, created as social structures to govern
social interactions at the supra-national level, are created on a normative basis which is both
defined by, and which defines, interpretations of meaning in that system. The normative basis
upon which international society is constructed can of course be shared or contested, but through
interactions which both reiterate or re-shape that normative basis, and therefore the system itself,
interactions in the world, which result in actions on the part of states, are enabled. These actions
can take a variety of forms, and can be articulated in forms of cooperation and collaboration at
one end of the spectrum, to competition at the other end of the scale. It is in the study of these
structures, and of the actions and inactions which the structures, as social constructs, both
enable and constrain, that meaningful understanding of international society is generated. Yet the
study of international society can, unfortunately, not be approached in the same scientific manner
that the natural world can. Rather, due to the limitations inherent in the study of the social by the
social (if human beings are to be considered social beings), an interpretavist approach is
necessitated to give meaning both to the study of international society and to give meaning to the
findings generated by such an analysis. For the purpose of this research, and as will be further
expanded upon below, the interpretavist approach utilised here will be informed by Constructivist
approaches to International Relations.
This study is devoted to the study of interactions in international society at various levels of
engagement, and to contributing towards an enhanced understanding of their meaning. On this
basis, a degree of inter-subjectivity is required, as, through an analysis of relationships and their
understanding, meaning is infused into an analysis which aims to be useful to the discipline of
International Relations. To be able to understand the importance and meaning of inter-
subjectivity, this study will argue that discourse and its analysis are critical components to
maintaining and understanding an international system which is constructed and driven by
understandings of the nature and content of that construction. It should be highlighted at this point
already however that this study will not employ Constructivism as a grand theory in the study of
International Relations. Indeed, it would be quite incorrect to argue that Constructivism either
serves as a grand theory, or that it is capable of doing so. Rather, Constructivism should be
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portrayed as one approach, or perspective, within a range of approaches geared towards making
sense of international society collectively and the behaviour of its individual components.
It should be noted however at the outset as well that it would prove very difficult to rely solely on
Constructivism to make sense of the world around us, and that, therefore, the research presented
here cannot and should not be considered as a purist form of Constructivism, if such a
phenomenon exists. Rather, this research will draw on Constructivist influences to assist in the
creation of a research framework, and to make sense of empirical phenomena considered useful
to this study. However, as will be witnessed relatively early in the application of this framework,
other influences, including those of Realism, Neo-liberalism, Cosmopolitanism and
Communitarianism, as well as useful approaches such as neo-functionalism, may be drawn upon
where these prove useful. As should always be acknowledged in the study of International
Relations, no one theoretical framework can claim dominance over the others, or horde claims to
epistemological validity. Rather, it is through the combination of approaches and frameworks that
an epistemological “truth” is, if not arrived at, at least honed in on, although caution against
incommensurability should certainly always be maintained.
This chapter will seek to create the basis for an approach which assumes that international
society is both a social construction and representation, before exploring Constructivism, in
contrast to other possible theoretical approaches, as a useful tool for the purposes of this
analysis. From this basis, the chapter will review Constructivist approaches to analysing and
understanding norm development and utility within international society, before reviewing a
particular approach, the ‘norm life cycle’ concept, as developed by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998).
While the concept has several limitations and requires further development, attempts at which will
be offered, it will nonetheless be presented as a useful approach through which to conduct the
present study. The chapter will conclude by presenting the manner in which the theoretical
framework will be applied throughout the remainder of this study.
2.2 The Constructivist Approach to International Relations
Constructivism as an approach in the discipline of International Relations focuses on the socially
constructed nature of international society, and the social norms which underpin interaction at the
level of the international. The key to understanding the importance and influence of social norms,
culturally determined roles and rules, and historically contingent discourse on actual outcomes in
international organisation is an analysis of change. Patterns of change, for Constructivists, are a
clear indicator that social structures are at work. Rapid global changes across dissimilar units,
argues Finnemore, suggest structural-level rather than agent-level causes of change. They do not
prove these though, and mechanisms of change need to be included in an analysis that indicates
a common source of new preferences and behaviour (Finnemore, 1996[a]: 22). An analysis of
change therefore is crucial to the Constructivist toolkit. Yet, when analysing change, what role is
given to acts of persuasion and acts of coercion in international society on the part of states?
Further, of critical importance here is an enhanced understanding of states as rational actors,
acting out of rational choice in their interaction with other states. Yet rational choice requires
knowledge and understanding of utilities. A rational actor must know what it wants before it can
calculate the means to the desired ends. Constructivists argue that social structures, including
norms of behaviour and social institutions, can provide states with direction and goals for action,
in that the values they embody and the rules and roles they define can channel state behaviour.
States as actors conform to these, in part, for rational reasons, but also because they become
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socialised into accepting these values, rules and roles as in their own interest. In Finnemore’s
words, states:
internalise the roles and rules as scripts to which they conform, not out of conscious choice, but because they
understand these behaviours to be appropriate (1996[a]: 29).
Rules, norms and routines are of course followed carefully by states on the basis of considered
reasoning, and determining which rules and norms apply in which situations involves
sophisticated reasoning processes. Contrasting this ‘logic of appropriateness’ with a ‘logic of
consequences’ is important. A logic of appropriateness is driven by social structures of norms and
rules which govern the kinds of actions that are contemplated and taken. These social structures
also define responsibilities and duties, and therefore impact on which actors will contemplate and
take certain actions over others. A logic of consequences, on the other hand, is driven by pre-
specified agents, making means-ends calculations and devising strategies designed to maximise
utilities. Norms, rules and routines may be created in this process, but these will be designed to
serve the interests of powerful actors, and would not survive for long if they did not. A logic of
appropriateness, on the one hand, would predict similar behaviour from dissimilar actors because
rules and norms may make similar behavioural claims on dissimilar actors, while a logic of
consequences, on the other hand, would predict dissimilar behaviour from dissimilar actors
because actors possess different utility functions and capabilities and will therefore act differently.
However, the two approaches to logic are not entirely dissimilar, and should not be totally
disconnected from one another. As with the agent-structure debate, the two forms of logic are
intimately connected, and actors create structures which take on a life of their own and ultimately
shape the action of actors (Finnemore, 1996[a]: 29 - 30).
For Finnemore, this implies that consequentialism can be applied to the agent component of the
debate and appropriateness to the structure component, whereby agents create social structures
for consequentialist reasons, but these spread for reasons of appropriateness. The construction
and dissemination of new normative structures, then, appears to have a strong inherent element
of the logic of appropriateness (Finnemore, 1996[a]: 30 - 31). An understanding of
‘appropriateness’ should not however be confused with an understanding of ‘good’. Social norms
are not inherently good or bad, they are simply relative to the context in which they arise. Norms
allowed for colonialism, slavery and apartheid as much as they did for anti-colonialism, the
abolishment of slavery and the end of apartheid, given a certain context. Moral concerns of right,
just and appropriate behaviour therefore are context-dependent within the structure in which they
exist, and it is this that is referred to by the logic of appropriateness.
It is this change over time in the logic of appropriateness, context-specific as it is, that is important
for Constructivists. States clearly evolve in an international social context that shapes the
direction of change in coordinated and consequential ways. States, therefore, are reorganised,
redirected and expanded, at least in part, according to shared normative understandings of what
it is that states as political entities of action are supposed to do (Finnemore, 1996[a]: 35). States,
then, develop perceptions of interest and understandings of desirable behaviour from social
interactions with other states in the structures of international organisation which they share, and
are socialised to accept certain preferences and expectations by the international society in which
they, and the people which constitute them, live (Finnemore, 1996[a]: 128). On this basis, the
defining feature of Constructivism for Finnemore is its focus on the social construction of
international politics, with observable phenomena arising as a result not only of an objective,
material reality, but also of an inter-subjective social reality. What actors do in international
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relations, the interests they hold, and the structures within which they operate, therefore, are
defined by social norms and ideas rather than by objective or material conditions (Barkin, 2003:
326).
While Constructivism appears to provide a useful basis for the study of international society as a
social structure, and provides a useful basis from which to account for change in that system,
several limitations restrict the value which Constructivism can bring to the International Relations
field. For one, as argued by Alexander Wendt, Constructivism is not a theory of international
politics. Constructivist influences allow for an observation of the manner in which actors are
socially constructed, but they do not generate insight into which actors to study or where they are
constructed. Before Constructivism as an approach can be useful, units or levels of analysis must
be specified, or, for the purposes of the International Relations field, agents and the structures
within which they are located must be identified. Wendt criticises the state-centric approach that
is so dominant in the International Relations field, but concedes that states must be the key unit
of analysis, as, ultimately, within the current system, change happens through states (Wendt,
1999: 7 - 9). States and state systems are real (ontological) and knowledgeable
(epistemological), despite being unobservable for Wendt, and as objects are defined by their
relationships to one another in a structure, which reinforces and reifies relationships, beliefs and
actions (Wendt, 1999: 48 - 74). Despite Constructivism not being a theory, as an approach to
International Relations it inherently makes use of inferences from observable events to broader
patterns, and inferences always involve a theoretical leap. This, Wendt concedes, is true whether
these inferences are purely inductive, generalising from a sample of events, or abductive, positing
underlying structures that account for those events. But in neither case does raw data speak for
itself, and ultimately requires an infusion of interpretationism (Wendt, 1999: 87).
Another challenge posed to Constructivism is that, as Finnemore articulates, “simply claiming that
norms matter” is not enough. Constructivism must be able to demonstrate substantively which
norms matter, under which circumstances, how they matter, what their impact is, and, ultimately,
why they matter (Finnemore, 1996[a]: 130). Yet, as noted by Ruggie early on, Constructivism was
not sufficiently developed to specify a fully articulated set of propositions and rigorous renderings
of the contexts within which these were expected to hold (1998: 27 - 28). Political Science
research on norms more generally has tended to focus around specific issue-areas, and therefore
argues that particular norms matter in particular issue-areas. Constructivists have attempted to
tackle this gap but, as argued by Finnemore, have generally not succeeded in presenting an
integrated argument about how various norms in different issue-areas fit together (1996[b]: 327).
Added to this is the challenge that, to date, Constructivists have tended to focus on the spread of
‘good’ norms, despite norms having no intrinsic ‘good’ or ‘bad’ characteristics. As argued by one
observer, Constructivists who write about human rights have generally tended to look at the role
of international civil society, however understood, as changing the behaviour of states for the
better. This applied Constructivism, focused on inter-subjective norms affecting definitions of
interest, is liberal-idealist, in the sense that these norms are accepted largely uncritically as
‘good’, as are the elements of international civil society involved in spreading them (Barkin, 2003:
335). The application of Constructivism to the field of International Relations therefore, by some
accounts, has appeared to be based on cosmologies influenced by cosmopolitanism, or neo-
liberal idealism.
Extending this critique, it should also be highlighted that the application of Constructivist analyses
to date has focused predominantly on instances where change has taken place, and not much on
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instances where change has not taken place, or where attempts at change have failed. Thus,
Constructivism has tended to focus on ‘the dog that barked’ to make itself useful in the
International Relations field, but a focus on ‘the dog that did not bark’, and ‘why it did not bark’, is
lacking in Constructivist discourse. As a relatively new approach to the discipline of International
Relations, this is perhaps to be expected, just as Realist approaches would hesitate to attempt
explanations at instances where states seemingly acted in a manner wholly contrary to their
apparent national interest. Yet as Constructivist discourse advances, it must be able to
investigate more rigorously both instances in which change takes place, and instances in which it
does not.
A further critique of the Constructivist approach is warranted at this stage. Constructivism has
been demonstrated to be a useful tool in the analysis of norm development and system change in
International Relations from a historical perspective. Thus, Constructivist analysis has been
applied to, for example, the abolishment of the slave trade, the end of colonialism, the demise of
apartheid, and anti-foot binding campaigns in China. However, comparatively little work has been
done on ongoing processes of norm development and system change, where the benefit of
historical perspective and hindsight is not available to the observer. This may not prove a
challenge only to Constructivism, and is a critique that can be levelled equally at neo-utilitarian
and other approaches to the study of International Relations or of the social sciences more
broadly. However, it does restrict the predictive utility of the Constructivist approach in ongoing
processes of social structural change which impact on the practice of the political at the inter-
state level, and makes it more useful to the analysis of historical social structural change.
Yet these challenges are inherent to the studies of Political Science and International Relations, if
one subscribes to the disciplines as inherently social, in and of themselves. The strengths of
Realism and Liberalism lie in their axiomatic structure, which permits a degree of analytical rigour
and theoretical specification. As John Ruggie argued, rigour and specificity are desirable on
intellectual grounds, as they make cumulative findings more likely, and on policy grounds as they
raise the probability that predicted effects will actually materialise. Yet a key weakness also lies in
this axiomatic structure, as in its ontology it leads to a distorted or incomplete view of international
reality. This, as argued by Ruggie, poses a serious challenge to the study of International
Relations at a time when states are struggling to redefine sets of interests and preferences
regarding key aspects of international order (1998: 37). Although Ruggie made this argument
criticising Realism and Liberalism at the turn of the 21st century, it remains as valid today as it did
then. The obverse is of course true of Constructivism. Constructivist analyses rest on a deeper
and broader ontology, providing a richer understanding of certain phenomena and shedding light
on aspects of international society which simply do not exist in neo-utilitarian assessments of
global polity. However, this broad approach lacks both rigour and specification, and is relatively
poor at specifying its own scope conditions, the contexts within which its explanatory features can
be expected to make how much of a difference (Ruggie, 1998: 37). Improvements are of course
to be expected as Constructivist work accumulates over time, but inherent challenges to the
approach remain.
Finnemore highlighted similar challenges to the Constructivist approach in the manner in which it
had been practiced, at least initially. Constructivism, argued Finnemore, was plagued by its
amorphous perspective emphasising the causal nature of social structures. Constructivism
emphasises a wide range of social structural elements, yet conceptual clarity on the manner in
which different elements of social structures relate to one another either conceptually or
substantively was limited. Conceptually, the relationship between principles, norms, institutions,
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identities, roles and rules was not well defined, and substantively, the social elements
investigated by Constructivist scholars tended to be limited in scope, usually to one issue-area.
Focus was placed on particular social frameworks in which interaction took place in discrete
issue-areas, and how these shared beliefs, norms and discourse shaped actors and preferences.
Thus, social structures in the plural were investigated, with little attention being paid to questions
relating to the relations among specific social elements and whether these could exist
independently, or only as part of a mutually reinforcing collection of norms, institutions and
discourse. On the basis of this limited analysis, Constructivists had not succeeded in exploring
the possibility of overarching social structures, or of a single coherent structure (as argued by
Ruggie) that coordinates international interaction along coherent and predictable lines
(Finnemore, 1996[a]: 16).
Despite these challenges however, and acknowledging the shortcomings inherent in utilising a
Constructivist approach as outlined above, Constructivism does still provide the most useful basis
from which to study processes of change in an international system which is considered from the
outset as being of a socially constructed nature. If it can be assumed that states, as social
constructs themselves, operate in a system of international organisation which is similarly socially
constructed, and that meaning is both socially created and inter-subjective within this system,
then Constructivism should be able to most usefully and meaningfully account for change within
this system, and, particularly, under which conditions change becomes possible. Building on this
analysis, Constructivism should also prove most useful in analysing inter-subjectivity in relation to
norm development in international society.
Of particular importance to this study, of course, is not only the development of norms, but also of
their impact, both in terms of the impact that norms have on the evaluation of a particular situation
requiring action on the part of states, and on the actions that states take based on this evaluation.
However, the utilisation of a Constructivist approach in and of itself, while forming the basis for
this analysis, is not enough. Rather, a more detailed framework which assists in observing the
development of norms is required for the analysis proposed here to be useful. Therefore, both the
role of norms in Constructivist analysis and a framework for observing the development and
impact of norms is required.
2.3 The Role of Norms in International Society
Norms are critical to the Constructivist understanding of social systems which are created by
socially cognisant actors. Yet the role of norms in a socially constructed system, and the impact
that these norms can have, cannot simply be assumed. An understanding of norms should
perhaps commence with an understanding of collective intentionality, which, for Ruggie, governed
outcomes in international order. Collective intentionality can be explored at several levels in
international polity. At its deepest level, collective intentionality governs notions of who counts as
a legitimate actor in international society. States exist on the mutual recognition of sovereignty, a
recognition which states collectively ‘will’ into being, and this mutual recognition is the basis for
the functioning of an international society of states. Sovereignty, as with any other good or
concept, does not exist outside of a social framework which gives it meaning, and this meaning is
not static, but changes over time, as understandings of its meaning change. Sovereignty
therefore is for Constructivists a matter of collective intentionality (Ruggie: 1998 : 21). Yet the role
of collective intentionality is not merely a constitutive one. Collective intentionality also plays a
deontic function, in that, within a system of states, it can create new rights and responsibilities, or
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alter previously existing ones (Ruggie, 1998: 21). Through both its constitutive and deontic
functions, collective intentionality creates inter-subjective frameworks of meaning which include
shared narratives within international society, which are represented by ‘rules’ which form the
basis of social interaction. These rules may of course be more ‘thick’ or ‘thin’ in different social
contexts, however, the recognition of their existence, through adherence or the challenging of
them, govern social life, including at the level of international politics. Certain constitutive rules
such as exclusive territoriality, as Ruggie highlights, are so deeply sedimented and reified that
actors no longer think of them as rules at all. But their durability clearly remains based on
collective intentionality, even if they commenced with acts of force, such as the seizing of territory
(Ruggie, 1998: 24 - 25). Constitutive rules, based on inter-subjectivity, constitute social facts,
which in turn constitute norms, or standards of appropriate behaviour, based on inter-subjective
meaning (Ruggie, 1998: 85).
It is important to understand however that norms, whilst both enabling certain forms of behaviour
and constraining others through processes of inter-subjective legitimisation, are not able to
‘cause’ behaviour in a consequentialist sense of the term. Norms are able of course to guide,
rationalise, inspire, justify or condemn behaviour, but they are not able to cause behaviour. In
addition, as highlighted by Ruggie, norms are counter-factually valid, in that counterfactual
evidence does not necessarily refute the existence of a norm. Therefore, neither the violation of a
norm, nor necessarily the ‘non’-existence’ of the norm, refutes its validity (Ruggie, 1998: 97).
Such a line of argumentation, of course, must be justified if the analytical value of Constructivist
approaches it to be retained.
The impact of norms on international organisation is not a passive one, which can be ascertained
in an analogous fashion. Because norms are inter-subjective, the analysis of their utilisation or
reference to them is what defines explanations regarding the efficacy of norms (Ruggie, 1998:
98). Put differently, if norms can be conceived of as shared standards or expectations of
appropriate behaviour held by a community of actors, then norm violation is as much a testament
to the existence of a norm than is norm adherence, in that reference to a norm which has been
violated indicates the existence of the norm in the first place. This, notes Finnemore, is the
difference between norms and ideas. Whereas norms are inter-subjective and concern behaviour,
ideas are subjective, in that they are held individually, and may or may not have behavioural
implications (Finnemore, 1996[a]: 22). Evidence for the existence of norms is drawn from two
places. First the existence of norms can be witnessed in patterns of behaviour which are in
accordance with their prescriptions. Second, norms can be articulated in discourse, although this
may not always be true of the most internalised and entrenched norms, as they are not always
the subject of conscious reflection. Because norms are inter-subjective and collectively held, they
are often the subject of discussion among actors, which may specifically articulate norms in
justifying actions, or in attempting to persuade others to act in a certain manner (Finnemore,
1996[a]: 22 - 23). For this reason, the analysis not only of behaviour in international society, but of
the discourse surrounding that behaviour, is critical to an analysis of norms, as norms
demonstrate the power of social structure, both in that they influence states, and in the manner in
which they influence states.
Norms of course do not replace the concept of interest in International Relations, nor can it be
argued that norms attain a higher level of importance than interests. Norms do however shape
interest, in that norms determine the manner in which interests are constructed. To assess this, a
Constructivist approach focuses on behaviour which is either in line with a given norm, or not, and
then places focus on discourse surrounding that behaviour, assessing whether actions are
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justified according to that norm, or emphasise the importance of that norm. When assessing norm
violations, emphasis in analysis is placed on whether norms are challenged, or interpretations of
norms are challenged (Finnemore, 1996[a]: 140). Norm contestation is however a prominent
feature of norms at work in international society, and, as Finnemore argues, norm contestation
processes are inherently political, as they reflect normative contestation, or competing values and
understandings of that which is good, desirable and appropriate in collective communal life
(Finnemore, 1996[b]: 342).
It is this norm contestation which both allows for and drives change within international society as
well, as processes of norm adjustment or replacement allow for the generation of new patterns of
behaviour on the part of states. On the basis of this understanding, the work of Constructivist
scholars has contributed to an enhanced understanding both of how new patterns of behaviour in
international society become possible, and how these shape international organisation. Thus, for
example, Constructivist work has shown that whilst domestic human rights conduct (including the
most excessive of abuses) was considered the internal affairs of sovereign states and beyond
condemnation throughout the Cold War, as human rights increasingly came to be the subject of
bilateral, multilateral and transnational international relations, human rights abuses became
legitimate standards by which states could criticise and censure one another, should they choose
to do so (Donnelly, 1995: 115). Similarly, researchers have shown how the development of norms
at the international level has come to affect state behaviour globally, regionally and domestically
in areas as diverse as slavery (Donnelly, 1995 and Finnemore, 2003), environmental protection
(Conca, 1995), the adoption of anti-apartheid policies (Klotz, 1995), the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction (Nolan, 1995), and anti-colonialism (Finnemore, 2003).
Yet, despite an understanding of the role of norms slowly being generated by Constructivist-
inspired work, questions surrounding the manner in which the study of norms is best approached
remain a construction site among Constructivists. Two key questions which emerge however are
how best an understanding can be generated of why states comply with norms, and how an
understanding can be generated of which norms serve as reference points in international
political order. On the first point, of why states comply with norms in the absence of a global
enforcement power, focus has been placed on the regulative function, or the ‘effect’ of norms in
world politics to explain opposing and changing sets of institutionalised causal norms that guide
action on the part of states. On the second question, focus was placed on the construction and
meaning of norms which were ascribed a stabilising role (though the norms themselves were not
‘stable’), where rules based on norms were viewed as a means to maintain social order. These
questions, as Antje Wiener (2003) notes, lead to the development of two theoretically distinct
approaches to the study of norms in Constructivism, which could be classified as the ‘compliance
approach’ and the ‘societal approach’. Both approaches could of course be considered as
complimentary, and not in opposition to one another. The compliance approach sought to
address behavioural change in reaction to norms, whilst the societal approach sought to
understand not only the impact but also the emergence of norms (Wiener, 2003: 253). Early
Constructivist work focused precisely on honing in on this challenge, based on assessments of
the duality of structure. But this reflexive sociological approach was soon abandoned in favour of
a focus on the role of social facts. Thus, a focus on assessing the mutual constitution of structure
and agency was left behind in Constructivist work, and so too did work focused on the emergence
and impact of norms, resulting in a gap in Constructivist applications in International Relations
(Wiener, 2003: 254). This lack of serious application of Constructivism to the International
Relations discipline raises several questions and challenges.
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Whilst Constructivist scholars agree on injecting notions of the social into an under-socialised
discipline, they largely disagree on the development of robust analytical approaches to the study
of the inter-subjective in political action. Further, whilst Constructivist research has focused on
formal institutional change, it has done so at the expense of focusing on changes in supra-
national or trans-national norms (Wiener, 2003: 261). This is because much of the body of
Constructivist work has focused on stable norms in international society, assuming that stable
norms emerge based on the specific identities of actors, and these stable norms impact on
institutions, resulting in institutional change and norm diffusion. As noted by Wiener, this basic
assumption about the stability of norms has contributed to the consolidation of an impressive
research programme on actors’ behaviour in world politics, focusing in particular on the problem
of norm implementation mostly in the arenas of human rights, social equality, education and the
diffusion of administrative culture (institutionalisation at the international level). Yet the change of
ideas and norms has received far less attention (Wiener, 2003: 262).
Constructivist work, by this analysis, has either focused on assessing change in the structures of
international society on the basis of assumed norm stability, or has focused on identity change on
the part of actors on the basis of normative structural changes. Bringing the two strands of
thought together, however, has received less attention. As a result, concepts which can
meaningfully be utilised to critically and rigorously assess norm emergence (under which context
and how norms emerge), norm development (how norms develop, how are they shaped and
driven, and how they find their way into political discourse), how they are moulded to fit social
requirements (norms are social constructs, and therefore malleable), how they are
institutionalised (norms must be codified in some form or another to become institutionalised),
how they impact upon the structures of international society (norms which are institutionalised
impact on the social structures of international society in some manner or another), how they
impact on state behaviour (norms either enable or constrain state behaviour, in that they regulate
perceptions of appropriate behaviour), and how state behaviour in turn impacts on the further
development of the norm (norm development is not a top-down process only) are scarce and
under-developed in Constructivist literature.
Despite these limitations, certain concepts relating to the analysis of norms do prove useful when
assessing norm development and impact in international organisation, which also prove of value
to the analysis presented here. For one, the concept of norm salience is a useful way to assess
the strength of a norm. As explained by Cortell and Davis (2000), salient norms give rise to
feelings of obligation by social actors and, when violated, engender regret or a feeling that the
deviation or violation requires justification. When a norm is particularly salient in social discourse,
its invocation by relevant actors legitimises a particular behaviour or action, creating a prima facie
obligation, and thereby calling into question, or de-legitimising, alternative choices. In policy
terms, claims based on salient norms raise the burden of justification necessary to overcome the
claims of norm supporters in favour of other, competing, options. As Cortell and Davis highlight,
to overcome the objection, facts must be interpreted in an alternative manner, or demonstrate
that the norm in question does not apply to a particular form of conduct, or that some other matter
legitimises non-compliance with the norm (2000: 69). It would of course be both tempting and
incorrect to assign a norm the title of salient merely because state behaviour is observed to be
consistent with an existing international norm, and, paradoxically perhaps, the most salient norms
may become most evident when they are violated, as actors would feel a strong need to justify
their non-compliance, or to apologise for it (Cortell and Davis, 2000: 69 - 71). To meaningfully
measure norm salience however, the explanations offered by actors, in this case states, for norm
adherence or norm violation must be taken seriously. Yet consistent behaviour on the part of
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actors across a range of situations is also to be expected if a norm is to be labelled salient,
bearing in mind of course that norms do not ‘cause’ behaviour in a consequentialist sense, but
that they either enable or constrain behaviour, thereby creating choices for actors.
Another useful concept, referred to previously, is that of norm stability. The dual quality of norms
(their simultaneous regulative and constitutive nature) has been constructed on the Constructivist
premise of the mutual constitution of structure and agency, as argued early on by Ruggie (1998)
and Wendt (2000). A core assumption drawn from this assessment is that the guiding function of
norms is only possible once actors relate to them or have internalised them. On the basis of this
core assumption, much Constructivist work focusing on the process of mutual constitution of
regulative and constitutive functions has reduced the assessment to one of delving into the
relation between the emergence of stable norms and the behaviour and identity-formation of
actors in relation to these stable norms. On the basis of this narrative, norms are posited as
intervening variables that influence the behaviour of actors. As Wiener notes, norms are therefore
anthologised as stable factors in world politics (2003: 265).
This assumption however leads to a broad range of challenges in norm analysis. For one, it does
not adequately take into consideration the emergence of norms as a contextualised process,
which can potentially be conflictive in nature. Also, it neglects the concern that norm interpretation
can vary based on contextual differences. Therefore, questions related to the validity of norms
across social boundaries and political arenas, constructed as they may be, and the role of context
in norm legitimisation, let alone processes of norm contestation, are left under-explored (Wiener,
2003: 265 - 266). For Wiener, the assumption of norm stability is problematic for research on
norm resonance as norm change requires an understanding of the mutual constitution of
practices and norms. In addition, for Wiener it is necessary to mediate between international and
transnational contexts on the one hand, and domestic contexts on the other, to generate a more
meaningful understanding of processes of bargaining and argumentation in norm development
(2003: 266). For Wiener, then, the assumed stability of norms generates three challenges, which
must be resolved if the concept is to be applied usefully. First, questions around the conflictive
potential between different nationally constructed norms must be addressed. Second, the
adaptation of norms as a part of transnational interaction must be reviewed. And third, the
question of domestic norm resonance requires greater exploration (Wiener, 2003: 266 - 267).
Some of these challenges were of course addressed in the work of Jeffrey Checkel in the later
1990s, when he focused on the concept of normative cultural match. However, Checkel’s work
broadly focused on norm development and processes of institutionalisation in Europe, and its
application to norm development processes at a global-local level, both top-down and bottom-up,
had not been tested. The work of Amitav Acharya (2004) proved somewhat more helpful in this
regard, when Acharya coined the concept of norm localisation. Acharya argued that instead of
merely assessing the existential fit between domestic and outside norms and institutions, and
explaining strictly dichotomous outcomes of acceptance or rejection, norm analysts should focus
on complex processes and outcomes whereby norm-takers construct congruence between
transnational norms (including norms previously institutionalised in a region) and local beliefs and
practices. This process, which Acharya termed norm localisation, witnessed foreign norms, which
may initially not have cohered with local norms, incorporated into local norms through a process
of adaptation (Acharya, 2004: 241). For Acharya, norm localisation describes a process whereby
external ideas are simultaneously adapted to meet local practise, and hence in localisation the
existing normative order and an external norm are in a ‘mutually constitutive’ relationship, but the
resulting behaviour of the recipient can be understood more in terms of the former than the latter,
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although it can only be fully understood in terms of both (2004: 251 - 252). The concept of norm
localisation then is presented as a useful means whereby to investigate why a given region may
accept a particular norm while rejecting another, as well as understanding how variations
between regions in undergoing normative change can be understood (Acharya, 2004: 269).
Whilst the concept is certainly a useful one, and its future application may yield further
refinements, a more holistic basis from which to analyse the emergence, development and utility
of norms, is that of the norm life cycle, as developed by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). While the
concept is dated, and limited in many ways, it does provide the most useful basis from which to
conceptualise norm development analysis for the purposes of this study.
2.4 The Norm Life-Cycle Concept as a Tool for Understanding Norm Development
Processes
Through their work on international norm dynamics and political change, Finnemore and Sikkink
(1998) offered the basis for an approach which facilitates an analysis of norms and of the manner
in which they change forms and phenomena of international organisation. Finnemore and Sikkink
argued that norms evolved in a patterned life cycle, and that different behavioural logics
dominated different segments of the life cycle. An enhanced analysis of these behavioural logics,
through an assessment of state behaviour and discourse, argued Finnemore and Sikkink, should
therefore provide an assessment of norm development and utility in each stage of the norm life
cycle.
Finnemore and Sikkink argued that norms, as a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with
a given identity, involving both inter-subjective and evaluative dimensions, developed through a
life cycle comprised of three stages or phases, termed norm emergence, norm cascade, and
norm internalisation. The manner in which a norm emerged in international society, was taken up
by state actors, and demonstrably impacted upon state behaviour, argued Finnemore and
Sikkink, could usefully be observed through the application of this norm life cycle concept.
Norm emergence, the first stage in the life cycle of a norm, was characterised by persuasion by
norm entrepreneurs and norm brokers, in an attempt to convince a critical mass of states, who
then become norm leaders, to embrace new norms. It should be stressed here that norms were
not presented as simply ‘appearing’ in international society, but that they were considered to be
actively created and propagated by normative agents who held strong notions about appropriate
or desirable behaviour within states. Here, norm entrepreneurs were critical for norm emergence,
as these called attention to certain issue-areas, or in some cases were able even to create ‘new’
issue-areas where none had existed before, through the use of discourse which framed,
(re)interpreted and loaded issue-areas with value judgements (an activity which social movement
theorists have referred to as ‘framing’) (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 895 - 896).
As Finnemore and Sikkink highlight, the construction of cognitive frames is an essential
component of the political strategies of norm entrepreneurs, as, when successful, newly
developed frames of reference resonate with broader public understandings and are adopted as
new discursive and cognitive frameworks on issue-areas. Of importance, in particular for the
current research, is the understanding that in the process of framing, norm entrepreneurs face
firmly embedded alternative norms and reference frameworks that create alternative perceptions
of appropriateness and logic, which results in discrepancies between old and new norms, leading
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to a process of norm contestation. This normative contestation, note Finnemore and Sikkink, has
important implications for understandings of the manner in which the logic of appropriateness
relates to norms. Efforts to promote new norms of course take place within the standards of
appropriateness defined by prior norms, an element elaborated upon by Acharya in the concept
of norm localisation, and to challenge existing and dominant logics of appropriateness, norm
entrepreneurs may need to be explicitly ‘inappropriate’ in the advancement of new norms
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 897).
Finally, the institutionalisation of a new norm is an important factor in its success and progression
through the norm life cycle. Norm entrepreneurs require some form of organisational platform
from and through which to promote new norms, and, in most cases, a norm is required to become
institutionalised in specific sets of international rules and organisations before it can reach a
threshold level of support and move forwards in its development. Therefore, codification of the
norm, its institutionalisation, and the support of state actors is important for an emerging norm to
become entrenched in international society. Such institutionalisation, it is argued, contributes to
the possibility for a norm cascade to occur both by clarifying what the norm in itself entails, and
what constitutes a violation of said norm (which can often be a matter of some disagreement
among actors) (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 899 - 900). An important caveat here is that
institutionalisation is not necessarily a precondition for the occurrence of a norm cascade, and
can follow upon the initiation of a norm cascade. Nonetheless, institutionalisation is an important
element in the progression and development of a norm.
Once a new norm has in some manner achieved codification and institutionalisation and a critical
mass of actors have adopted the norm, a threshold or tipping point is reached, and a norm
cascade is initiated. What precisely is found to constitute a critical mass will invariably depend
upon the content of the emergent norm itself. Finnemore and Sikkink argue that some states may
be critical to the adoption of a norm, and others less so. Yet what constitutes a ‘critical state’ will
vary very much depending on the content of the norm. One criterion offered is that a critical state
is one without the support of which the achievement of the substantive norm goal is
compromised. States can be critical either due to their preponderance within international society,
or due to elevated moral stature on an issue area (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 901). However,
what is clear is that without the support of so-called ‘critical’ states, and without some form of
institutionalisation and codification following an initial process of norm contestation, the norm
cascade phase of the norm development life cycle cannot be attained.
The norm cascade phase is characterised by a dynamic of imitation as norm entrepreneurs and
those states which have adopted the emergent norm, now so-called norm leaders, attempt to
socialise other states to become norm followers (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 895). Here the
notion of norm-socialisation is drawn upon, a process whereby states and state agents are
‘socialised’ through their interactions with other states, state agents and international institutions
to adopt new norms or to internalise new roles.
The norm cascade phase, then, is characteristic of active processes of international socialisation
intended to induce norm-breakers or norm-agnostics to become norm-followers. Within the
context of international relations, the process of socialisation may involve diplomatic praise or
censure, both bilateral and multilateral, which can be reinforced by material sanctions and
incentives. States are however not the only agents of socialisation in international society, and
networks of norm entrepreneurs and international organisations can also act as agents of
socialisation through the use of awareness, advocacy and activism mechanisms (Finnemore and
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Sikkink, 1998: 902). Important in the norm cascade phase are notions of legitimation and esteem.
States do not necessarily wish to be seen by others as rogues or pariahs, or as out of step with
the remainder of states, and may for that reason adopt emergent norms which have gained the
support of critical states (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 903). As argued by Finnemore and
Sikkink, if the notion of ‘community of states’ is employed, the importance of esteem and
legitimation are enhanced, as any member of any community must be seen to be adhering to the
norms which bind and guide that community. Therefore, as an increasingly larger number of
states adopt a norm, and the norm becomes increasingly accepted, codified and entrenched
within states, so it can be expected that increasingly more states will come to adopt the norm.
Increasingly, then, an emergent norm not only comes to be adopted, but also to be internalised
by states. The final stage in the norm life cycle, norm internalisation, is hereby attained.
Norm internalisation, the final stage in the norm life cycle concept, is said to occur when a norm
has acquired a taken-for-granted quality, and is no longer considered a matter of broad public
debate (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 895). Norms become internalised by actors to the degree
that conformance with the norm is almost automatic, and for this reason internalised norms can
be both extremely powerful (as behaviour which adheres to the norm is not questioned) and
difficult to discern (as actors do not seriously consider or discuss whether or not to conform to the
norm) (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 904). It is in this, final, stage of the norm development or life
cycle that a norm is no longer considered emergent by Finnemore and Sikkink, but entrenched, or
salient if following the logic of Cortell and Davis.
It should be noted that the progression of a norm from emergence to cascade and finally
internalisation is by no means to be considered an inevitable process, and Finnemore and Sikkink
highlight that many emergent norms fail to reach a tipping point (1998: 895). Norms may
therefore emerge, but fail to become institutionalised and codified. Norms which find an
institutional platform, and which receive the support of ‘critical’ states, may not reach a tipping
point. In addition, a norm which has reached a tipping point and appears to cascade in
international society may never become internalised, and may remain the subject of norm
contestation, processes of localisation, and competing efforts at socialisation for a long time,
failing therefore to become truly internalised.
Finnemore and Sikkink, whilst recognising this constraint to the applicability and analytical value
of the norm life cycle concept, do however argue that norms which adhere to certain conditions
appear to enjoy more success than others. For one, norms held by states widely viewed as
successful and desirable models within states, it is argued, are more likely to become prominent
and diffuse than norms held by less successful states. On this basis, so-called Western norms
are argued to be more likely to diffuse throughout international society than non-Western norms.
Similarly, norms that advance universal claims about what is good for all people in all places
(such as many Western norms) would appear to enjoy greater expansive potential than localised
and particularistic normative frameworks. This caveat, whilst an important observation, is limited
however in its analytical value. It is not, for example, elucidated whether a ‘Western’ norm is one
that arises in the ‘West’, one that receives the support of the ‘West’, or one that conforms to the
dominant political form of organisation in the ‘West’, that of political Liberalism. This caveat
therefore requires further investigation and interrogation.
In addition, the relationship between new normative claims and existing normative frameworks
can influence the adoption of a new norm. This relationship is applicable both in terms of the
relationship between new norms and existing norms at the global level, as well as new norms at
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the global level and existing norms at the local level. In terms of the latter relationship, the
concept of norm localisation becomes a useful one. In terms of the former relationship, norm
contestation and the logic of appropriateness, or perhaps of inappropriateness, come into play
more clearly. Concepts of cultural match and of norm socialisation will also come into play here,
as the power and the persuasiveness of a new normative claim are tested in relation to existing
normative frameworks. This could perhaps aptly be labelled as a process of assessing the
‘normative fit’ within the social context in which it has arisen, and to which it is to be applied.
Finally, Finnemore and Sikkink argued that major events within international society appear to
either accelerate or prevent the spread of new norms. Here, for example, the end of the Cold War
appears to have opened doors to normative claims that had been inadmissible throughout much
of the 20th century. Major events in international society appear to have the ability of impacting
starkly on the normative social context within which international organisation takes place, which
appears apparent if international society is considered as a social one composed of social actors;
states. Notions of ‘world time’, then, allow for the dramatic expansion of new norms and create
new opportunities for norm entrepreneurs, as much as they can restrict and impede upon the
development and expansion of new norms at other times or in other contexts (Finnemore and
Sikkink, 1998: 906 - 909).
The norm life cycle concept provides a useful basis from which to analyse norm emergence,
norm development, and norm utility in international society. In particular, through the notions of
norm emergence, norm cascade and norm internalisation, it is possible to generate an
understanding of the role that norms play at different stages of their own development, and the
factors that impact on norm development and utility at each step of the way. It also provides a
platform from which to enhance the understanding that norms do not simply emerge and become
internalised. Rather, the norm life cycle concept is useful in that it is able to incorporate
understandings of the complex nature of norm development, of the importance of inter-
subjectivity, of norm contestation and socialisation, of norm localisation, and of the importance of
codification and institutionalisation in assessing the development and (potential) impact of a
norm.
However, the norm life cycle concept contains inherent limitations and deficiencies, which must
be acknowledged here and, where possible, bridged as best as possible, if the concept is to be
meaningfully applied. For one, and as is acknowledged by Finnemore and Sikkink, the danger of
the norm life cycle concept is that it can be seen to portray norm development as a linear
process. This is of course not the case, and norms which emerge are not considered as
automatically being capable of successfully passing through the norm life cycle. However, it
should be emphasised again that norm development is not a linear process, and the norm life
cycle is useful more for illustrative purposes than for predictive purposes. Norm development can
be progressive or regressive, and norms can emerge and cascade before becoming irrelevant or
replaced, and thus never becoming internalised. Alternately, norms can emerge but, due to
contestation and a lack of ‘normative fit’, fail to become endorsed, codified or institutionalised.
Therefore, norm development can be progressive or regressive, depending entirely on the
circumstances under which norms emerge and develop, the content of the norm, and the
‘normative fit’ of the norm to the social context.
However, the norm life cycle concept, whilst not able to predict the precise form of norm
development does provide useful indications for where to look for norm development, and how to
recognise it when it is witnessed. If norms emerge, appear to enjoy the support of critical states,
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and find institutional platforms which allow for codification, then it could reasonably be assumed
that a cascade may take place. In turn, if phenomena are witnessed which appear to indicate a
cascade, then it may be reasonably assumed that the norm would become more or less
internalised (or more ‘thick’ or ‘thin’) by states. For this reason, despite its lack of predictive
capacity, the norm life cycle is useful in that it allows for the observer to make sense of
phenomena witnessed in the empirical world.
A further limitation, which has been made reference to elsewhere, is the norm life cycle’s reliance
on the assumption of the stability of norms throughout norm development. Norms are of course
not stable, and are subject to change and alteration at every step of development. Similarly, the
existing norms that new norms compete with are also not to be considered stable, and may or
may not be impacted upon by newly emergent norms. The reliance on notions of norm stability
however applies to Constructivist work across the spectrum, and is an inherent limitation to the
approach in its entirety. However, one way around this assumption of the stability of norms is to
strengthen the focus on the social context in which norms emerge and develop, to assess the ‘fit’
of the norm to the prevailing normative context, and to test whether or not the norm appears more
or less stable at every stage of development.
Building on the above, it must also be argued that the norm life cycle concept does not sufficiently
take into consideration the importance of local social contexts, and focuses more on the
prevailing international social context. Whilst the nexus between the international and the
domestic in norm development remains under-researched, and therefore few meaningful
concepts could be applied to address this challenge, the concept of norm localisation is a useful
one which, at least to some degree, may assist in bridging this gap both in the norm life cycle
concept and in Constructivist literature.
Each of the phases of the norm life cycle, as elaborated above, of course also have inherent
limitations in their conceptual validity when it comes to analysing norm development and utility. In
the norm emergence phase, a clear limitation is that the importance of norm indeterminacy is not
taken adequately into consideration. Norm indeterminacy refers to the fact that the development
of a norm, once created by norm entrepreneurs, cannot be controlled or directed in a clear
manner. As increasingly more actors take the norm on board, and before the norm is clearly
codified, various interpretations of the norm may arise, leading to contestation not only on the
basis of the validity of the new norm in relation to existing norms, but also on interpretations of the
meaning of the new norm itself. Once a norm is created, and before it is codified, there is no
means of controlling the manner in which the norm will be taken up and interpreted. Of course
norm socialisation plays an important role here, as actors attempt to socialise other actors to
adopt their interpretation of the new norm. However, the limits to socialisation on the basis of
indeterminacy must be acknowledged.
In the cascade phase of the norm life cycle concept, it should also be highlighted that insufficient
focus is placed on ongoing processes of norm contestation and localisation. While a norm may
have become institutionalised and codified, reducing much of the norm contestation which
occurred during norm emergence, contestation nonetheless will still take place during the
cascade phase, as actors contest the meaning of the norm in its application, and contest
interpretations of the situations in which the norm is applicable. Further, norm localisation will in
all likelihood take place during the cascade phase of the norm life cycle, as the norm may be
adapted to suit local contexts, which impacts not necessarily on the spread of the norm prima
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facie, but certainly does impact on the application of the norm, as differences between regions
and individual states arise.
In the internalisation phase, it must be emphasised again that norms do not cause behaviour, but
that they can only be assumed to make behaviour more or less possible through their enabling
and constraining functions. Therefore, norm internalisation cannot be tested by an assessment of
the degree to which actors comply with the content of the norm. Rather, the degree to which a
norm has become internalised, or salient, should be tested through an analysis of state behaviour
and discourse surrounding that behaviour. Here, situations both of norm-compliance and norm-
violation are important, as the violation of a norm does not necessarily weaken the norm in and of
itself. Rather, the degree to which states make reference to normative frameworks either in the
justification of their actions or their violation of the norm provides a better assessment of the
degree to which the norm can be considered internalised or salient.
Finally, it should be noted that the meaningful application of the norm life cycle concept appears
to rest on the availability of complete information. Therefore, it is probably correct to argue that
the approach can more usefully be applied to a historical analysis of norm development than to
ongoing norm development processes. This weakness also relates to the lack of predictive
capacity of the norm life cycle concept. However, and as has been alluded to elsewhere, this
weakness appears to be inherent to most if not all Constructivist work, and, more broadly, to the
social sciences at large. Whilst little can be done to bridge this gap in knowledge generation, its
recognition and acknowledgement should serve to assist in balancing both the analysis and
evaluation of findings.
Thus, bearing in mind the limitations and the attempts above at bridging these, the norm life cycle
appears to remain the most useful frame of reference when exploring norm emergence,
development and utility in international society. Yet the norm life cycle approach has not been
drawn on heavily in International Relations literature, and its empirical application is scarce. This
is however reflective of most Constructivist work, which has weighed in heavily on the side of
developing International Relations theory, and disappointingly lightly on the side of applying said
theory to empirical analysis. Therefore, it is important that consideration be given to the manner in
which the norm life cycle concept can meaningfully be applied to the purposes of this study; that
is, to the analysis of the emergence and development of the responsibility to protect, to an
analysis of the impact of the responsibility to protect in the responses of the UN and of the AU to
the conflicts in Darfur, and, drawing on this analysis, an assessment of the utility of the
responsibility to protect norm to future responses to conflicts in Africa in which atrocity crimes are
committed.
To meaningfully understand change within international society, both the change itself, as well as
the context in which change takes place must be understood, if the meaning and impact of that
change is to be fully appreciated. Therefore, in the field of International Relations, it is not
important merely to ask the ‘what’ question, but also the questions of ‘how possible’? The next
chapter will therefore provide an analysis of how norms related to interventions on humanitarian
grounds evolved prior to, during, and following the end of the Cold War era. Chapter 4 will then
trace the emergence and development of the responsibility to protect as a norm in international
society, while Chapters 5 and 6 will assess the manner in which this norm impacted on decision-
making in relation to responses to the Darfur conflicts from 2003 onwards. Chapter 7 will, on the
basis of the findings generated, reflect on the utility of the responsibility to protect norm, and on
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how the norm may develop in future, as well as on how future responses to conflicts
characterised by atrocity crimes in Africa may be formulated.
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Chapter 3
-
The Evolution of Normative Discourse Surrounding Interventions on Humanitarian
Grounds
3.1 Introduction
As has been noted previously, the concept of interventions conducted on humanitarian grounds in
international society is a controversial and disputed one, but also not a new one. The roots of the
concept, as it has come to be understood in contemporary International Relations discourse, are
usually traced back to 19th century state practice and international legal theory. During the 19th
century no general prohibitions on warfare and the use of force existed within international
society, yet a sense of necessity to justify the use of force on moral and political grounds, in
particular in accordance with the traditions of just war, prevailed. International legal scholarship
here traces the emergence of a doctrine of intervention based on the foundational principles of
humanity, according to which states had the right to intervene, by force, “in cases in which a state
maltreats its subjects in a manner which shocks the conscience of mankind” (Rytter, 2001: 126).
At least seven such instances of military intervention to protect persons other than the citizens of
the intervener can be identified between the 19th and 20th centuries. In all instances, European
states, employing humanitarian claims, utilised military intervention in situations where the
principles of humanity were said to have been abused. On this basis, Great Britain, France and
Russia intervened between 1821 and 1830 in the Greek War of Independence to put a halt to
reported Turkish massacres and the suppression of the revolutionary Greek population
(Finnemore, 2003: 58 and Rytter, 2001: 126). The five European Great Powers intervened in
Lebanon between 1860 and 1861 to stop what were described as massacres of Christian
Maronites, perpetrated by the Druze under Turkish oversight (Finnemore, 2003: 58 and Rytter,
2001: 126). Austria, France, Italy, Prussia and Russia similarly intervened in Crete between 1866
and 1868 to protect the Christian population from purported Turkish oppression (Rytter, 2001:
126). The European Great Powers interfered again, and Russia directly intervened, in the
Balkans between 1875 and 1878 in favour of Christians in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria,
who had reportedly been subjected to massacres (Finnemore, 2003: 58 and Rytter, 2001: 126),
and between 1894 and 1917 the European Great Powers intervened on behalf of Christians who
were apparently being massacred by Armenians (Finnemore, 2003: 58). Similarly, the European
Greats intervened in Turkey between 1903 and 1908 in favour of the ‘oppressed’ Christian
Macedonian population (Rytter, 2001: 127).
Whilst intervention on humanitarian grounds appears to have remained an exclusively
Western/Christian concept throughout most of the 19th century, significant changes to the concept
occurred in the 20th century. The expansion of the understanding of ‘humanity’, which brought
about the end of slavery and colonialism, argues Martha Finnemore, also brought about
significant changes in the manner in which humanitarian interventionism was viewed. This
expansion of humanity both directly and indirectly contributed to change in the normative
structure of international society. It contributed directly by creating identification with, and
legitimating the normative demands of, people who had previously been invisible and without a
voice in the politics of the West, and contributed indirectly through the promotion and legitimation
of new norms of sovereignty related specifically to anti-colonialism and self-determination. As
Finnemore argues, slavery and colonialism were two large-scale activities in which state force
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intersected with humanitarian claims in the 19th century. Slavery in particular, the conceptual
opposite of intervention on humanitarian grounds, involved the use of state force to deny and
suppress claims of humanitarianism, rather than to provide protection to the vulnerable and
oppressed (Finnemore, 2003: 66 - 67). In a similar fashion, colonialism connected views about
humanity with understandings about what constituted legitimate sovereignty and political
organisation. Colonialism was, in part, justified as a humane form of rule, bestowing humanity
with the concept of the mission civilisatrice. Decolonisation, however, involved reconceptualising
the concepts of humane and humanity, and the new sovereignty norms that emerged from that
re-conceptualisation proved extremely important to the subsequent practice of intervention on
humanitarian grounds. As changes of social purpose changed throughout the twentieth century,
therefore, so too did attitudes towards intervention (Finnemore, 2003: 66 - 67).
3.2 The Conduct of Interventions and the Use of Humanitarian Claims
During the Cold War
Developments in the early 20th century limited the impact of this changing normative attitude
towards interventions on humanitarian grounds however. Dominated by the common experience
of two world wars, states appeared convinced that recourse to the use of force to solve
international disputes was not only a violation of state sovereignty, but, over the long term, also
proved detrimental to international society as a whole (Rytter, 2001: 123). Based on this
understanding, the UN Charter, which formally created the United Nations in 1945, prohibited the
use of force between states, except under two strictly proscribed circumstances. First, states
were permitted to resort to the use of force as a means of self-defence against an armed
infringement of their territorial integrity and sovereignty, as outlined in Article 51 of the Charter.
Second, states were permitted to resort to the use of force as and when authorised by the UN
Security Council as enforcement action, as allowed for under Chapter VII of the Charter. All other
forms of the use or threat of the use of force between states were strictly prohibited. The Charter
therefore made no formal provisions for interventions on humanitarian grounds, which had
already been developing conceptually at the international level. The scope for creative
interpretations of the Charter was also limited. Article 2(4) of the Charter, for example, set aside a
state’s historic right to resort to the use of force, arguing that member states should refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state. Article 2(7) of the Charter further proscribed intervention, armed or
otherwise, in international society, arguing that:
nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are
essentially within the jurisdiction of any state […] but this principle shall not prejudice the application and
enforcement measures under Chapter VII (Charter of the United Nations, 1945: Article 2(7)).
Chapter VII dealt with collective responses to threats to international peace and security, whereby
the Security Council had authorised the use of force on the part of Member States. Article 2(7)
therefore vested in the UN Security Council the sole legitimacy for authorising the use of force in
international society. Interestingly however, for the purposes of the present study, is historical
evidence that the notion that a state could conduct its affairs in any manner it pleased within its
own territorial confines, and therefore the prohibition on the interference in the domestic affairs of
states enshrined in the UN Charter, did not receive automatic endorsement. Rather, as
Connaughton notes, this prohibition had more to do with the fact that, in the new post-war
relationship between states, there was no clear vision as to the precise place of domestic sanctity
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in world order. John Foster Dulles noted this concern in 1945 when the United Nations was
founded, writing that:
Article 2(7) is an evolving concept. We don’t know fifteen, twenty years from now what in fact is going to be
within the jurisdiction of nations. International law is evolving, state practice is evolving. […] Let’s just let things
drift for a few years and see how it comes out (in Connaughton, 2001: vii).
Whilst Dulles could not have known how prophetic his words may have been at the time, several
challenges to the new norm of non-interventionism (and to the concept that the Security Council
should be the sole body vested with the right to authorise the use of force in international society)
were to emerge throughout the Cold War, which dominated the work of the United Nations for the
first half-century of its existence. Yet these challenges were slow to be recognised, and even
slower to be addressed. The first genocide in Rwanda, for example, which occurred between
December 1963 and January 1964 and in which thousands of Tutsis were killed, passed largely
unnoticed (De Heusch, 1995: 5). Indeed, the routine response to humanitarian emergencies
throughout the Cold War was one of disinterest and non-intervention, and thus large-scale
massacres of Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi, of Ibo in Biafra, and of East Timorese passed did
not elicit widespread condemnation or international moral outrage. Where interventions were
conducted, these were always done so on a unilateral basis, and the humanitarian credentials
presented by the interventions were consistently rejected; so much so that India, Vietnam and
Tanzania framed their justifications for intervention in East Pakistan/Bangladesh (1971),
Cambodia (1978 – 1979) and Uganda (1979) respectively within the predominant norms of self-
defence, military retaliation or Cold War politics (or a combination of the three). Indeed, even
India and Tanzania, which had both initially attempted to frame their interventions within a logic of
appropriateness based on humanitarian grounds and human rights norms soon abandoned these
efforts and repositioned their justifications based on a normative discourse of self-defence
(Wheeler, 2000[a]; Finnemore, 2003; Cotton, 2001; Rytter, 2001; Howard, 2008; Berdal and
Leifer, 1996).
State practice and the discourse surrounding this practice throughout the Cold War strongly
indicated a restrictionist approach to the principle of interventions on humanitarian grounds.
Indeed, the norms of state sovereignty and non-intervention were periodically reinforced
throughout the Cold War. In 1965 the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the
Inadmissibility of Intervention which denied the legal recognition of intervention on any grounds.
In 1970 the General Assembly, without holding a vote, adopted the Declaration on the Principles
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, which
accepted that any use of force between states not explicitly allowed for in the UN Charter was
incompatible with international law and reaffirmed that:
no state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the
internal or external affairs of any other state (in Rytter, 2001: 139).
In the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE
– now Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE]), the then 35 participating
states, including the Soviet Union and the United States, adopted a Declaration on Principles
which, on the principle of the non-use of force, referring to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, argued
that
no consideration may be invoked to serve to warrant resort to the threat or use of force in contravention to this
principle (in Rytter, 2001: 140).
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In 1986 the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in its Nicaragua Case, investigated whether any
legal exceptions to the non-intervention norm existed. The case was brought before the court by
Nicaragua against the United States of America, the former arguing that by supporting armed
movements and mining its ports, the United States was acting in contravention of international
law. In its judgement the Court found no support in state practice for a customary right of
intervention. The Court further argued that establishing such a right would require a “fundamental
modification of the customary law principle of non-intervention” (International Court of Justice,
1986). In its judgement the Court drew on the findings of the International Law Commission (ILC),
which had previously established that the prohibitions on the use of force contained in the UN
Charter had the character of jus cogens, that is, a norm which is accepted and recognised by
states as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character (Wheeler, 2000[a]: 45).
Notably, the findings of the Court should not be weighted too heavily, as it did not consider
interventions in cases of mass human rights violations. Nonetheless, in 1987 the trend of
reinforcing traditional interpretations of the norms of state sovereignty and non-intervention
continued with the adoption by the General Assembly of the Declaration on the Enhancement of
the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in International
Relations, which affirmed that:
no consideration of whatever nature may be invoked to warrant resorting to the threat or use of force in violation
of the Charter (United Nations General Assembly Resolution 42/22, 1987).
As Martha Finnemore notes, the critical feature of international society throughout the Cold War
for the development of a norm of intervention on humanitarian grounds was the nature of
sovereignty under the Cold War spheres of influence system, translating into a general
acceptance during the Cold War and the struggle for ideological supremacy that sovereignty in
international society was strongly tied to territorial integrity. A firm transition from a
conceptualisation of the ruler serving as the embodiment of the state (l’etat,c’est moi) in the 18th
century to physically demarcated territory serving as the state had been made since the Second
World War, and had become firmly entrenched during the Cold War period. This was a process
strongly reinforced through the collective experience of decolonisation, in which states in the
global South were granted or fought for their independence and territorial sovereignty; something
that was keenly defended during the Cold War, or at least hawked to the highest bidder in the
ideological warfare that characterised this period in history. Governments could rise and fall,
ethnic compositions could shift with migration, but territorial boundaries remained fixed, and could
not be violated under any circumstances. This norm became reinforced and indeed entrenched in
declarative terms both in state discourse and in state behaviour during this time (Finnemore,
2003: 126).
3.3 Humanitarian Claims in the Post-Cold War Era:
Constructing Normative Frames for Intervention
Yet immediately following the end of the Cold War, threats to international peace and security
started to take on different forms, and were interpreted in new ways. The response to these were
both complex and, in many instances, new. The UN, quickly realising that traditional forms of
peacekeeping were proving insufficient, moved towards multi-dimensional Peace Support
Operations (PSOs). Outside of the UN system an increasing array of regional security
arrangements sprung up. Humanitarian emergencies were of course no new phenomenon, and,
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as previously demonstrated, had existed well before the Cold War had started, and had persisted
during the bi-polar era. However, what soon became markedly different was how states
responded to these emergencies. The first noticeable shift occurred with a small intervention by
states in Northern Iraq in 1991. Although a limited intervention, the intervention did open debate
on the legality and legitimacy of interventions conducted on humanitarian grounds. (Wheeler,
200[a]; Connaughton, 2001; Rytter, 2001; Seybolt, 2007). While the discourse surrounding this
intervention was extremely contentious in 1991, it was markedly less so in 1992, when states
contemplated an intervention in Somalia. When dealing with the unfolding humanitarian
emergency in Northern Iraq one year prior, members of the UN Security Council had emphasised
their opposition to the use of force solely on humanitarian grounds, and authorised the Council to
intervene in the emergency based on concerns of regional insecurity, emphasising that the limited
intervention be authorised on the basis of restoring and maintaining international peace and
security. However, in the case of Somalia, states were prepared to authorise a Chapter VII
intervention based explicitly on stated humanitarian concerns. The intervention was
groundbreaking also in that the members of the Security Council for the first time assigned to
themselves a moral responsibility to intervene on behalf of the victims of famine and civil strife
(Connaughton, 2001; Laitin, 2004; Wheeler, 2000[a]; Kissinger, 1992; Lewis and Mayall, 1996;
Finnemore, 1996[b]; Melvern, 2001; Seybolt, 2007; Barnett, 1997).
While the failure to act in a timely manner during the Rwandan genocide of 1994 badly damaged
the UN and left many observers sceptical of the weight of humanitarian normative claims in
international society, states at large appear to have taken lessons both from the failure of action
in Somalia, and from the failure of inaction in Rwanda. While the non-intervention in Rwanda in
one manner reflects the decline of normative claims to the necessity and legitimacy of
interventions on humanitarian grounds, in another it speaks to the strength of humanitarian
claims. The Security Council sat in endless sessions numerous times each day to deliberate on
events in Rwanda, and was unable to attain consensus on the way forward. The Africa Group at
the UN pushed hard for an armed intervention, something it had not previously done. And
sovereignty norms were never invoked to rule out the possibility of an intervention in Rwanda.
Thus, the non-intervention in Rwanda could be attributed to a decline in the power of normative
claims legitimising humanitarian interventions as much as it could to a misplaced desire on the
part of states to uphold the reputation of the UN in an era in which its relevance was increasingly
becoming questioned. Thus, despite the lack of an intervention, the genocide in Rwanda firmly
entrenched discourse surrounding interventions on humanitarian grounds within international
society, and subsequent evaluations of events in Rwanda consistently argued that states had
failed by not intervening when they could have, and not that states had been right not to
intervene. The genocide in Rwanda would serve, then, to fundamentally alter the weighting of
normative claims to sovereignty, human rights and humanitarian interventions (Barnett, 1997;
Melvern, 2001; Hintjens, 1999; Khadiagala, 2004; Connaughton, 2001; Feil, 1998; Finnemore,
2003; Wheeler, 2000[a]; De Heusch, 1995; Jones, 1995; O’Halloran, 1995; Annan, 1999; United
Nations Press Briefing, 2005)
While the intervention by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Kosovo in 1999 served
to polarise the Security Council, it did bring discourse surrounding the normative, legal and moral
dimensions of interventions on humanitarian grounds to the fore once more, and reinforced a
developing notion of the legitimacy of interventions conducted on humanitarian grounds in
international society (Papasotiriou, 2002: 42; Wheeler, 2000[a]; Rytter, 2001; Herring, 2000;
Turner, 2003; Ainsley and Brown, 2005; Auerswald, 2004; Redd, 2005; Cook, 1999; Blair, 1999;
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Connaughton, 2001; Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000; Bellamy, 2005;
Non-Aligned Movement, 2000) UN Secretary General Kofi Annan sought to draw lessons both
from the Kosovo conflict, and from the debates surrounding humanitarian intervention which the
NATO intervention had sparked. In his address to the 54th session of the General Assembly in
September 1999, Annan reflected on the prospects for human security and humanitarian
intervention in the coming century. Annan recalled the failures of the Security Council to act both
in Rwanda and in Kosovo, and challenged UN member states to:
find common ground in upholding the principles of the Charter, and acting in defence of our common humanity.
If the collective conscience of humanity… cannot find in the United Nations its greatest tribune, there is a grave
danger that it will look elsewhere for peace and for justice (in International Commission on Interventionism and
State Sovereignty, 2001: 2).
Annan had recognised the inherent danger posed by interventions on humanitarian grounds to
the prevailing systems of international organisation. If states could not find a response to both the
legal and the moral challenges posed by humanitarian crises, and multilateral bodies such as the
Security Council were unable to respond to these challenges in a decisive manner, then either
threats to international peace and security would continue to rise or the Security Council would
increasingly find itself bypassed by unilateral action or collective intervention on the part of willing
states. Both options however threatened to fundamentally undermine the UN and international
society as it had come to be known.
The international intervention in East Timor in 1999 highlighted that attitudes towards
interventions on humanitarian grounds had evolved somewhat (Cotton, 2001; Wheeler and
Dunne, 2001; Dee, 2001; Connaughton, 2001; Bell, 2000; Seybolt, 2007). On one level, the
legitimacy of the intervention was less contested than were both its legality and the means of
implementation. It was broadly agreed that a response of some form was required, and, as the
levels of violence escalated, discussion quickly turned from whether or not to intervene towards
the method of intervention. It was apparent, in particular following the Kosovo intervention, that
Western nations could not intervene in East Timor without the consent of the Security Council.
Russia, China and most Asian governments however argued that Security Council consent would
only be forthcoming if the Indonesian government requested an intervention. Through a range of
mechanisms, Indonesian consent for the intervention was secured, and, following authorisation
by the Security Council, the intervention forces were rapidly mustered and deployed. Taylor
Seybolt argues that, while the issue may have been framed under the notion of ‘consent’, this
was in fact a reflection of the understanding that no humanitarian action could be mounted in the
absence of political engagement, which had been learned through previous international
engagements in Somalia and Kosovo in particular (2007: 92). While in the case of East Timor the
consent of the Indonesian government could be secured, it was recognised that in future cases of
humanitarian emergency such consent might not be forthcoming, and that states would be faced
with dangerous choices under such circumstances. Recognising these tensions, UN Secretary
General Kofi Annan wrote:
the tragedy of East Timor, coming so soon after that of Kosovo, has focused attention once again on the need
for timely intervention by states when death and suffering are being inflicted on large numbers of people, and
when the state nominally in charge is unable or unwilling to stop it (in Connaughton, 2001: 244).
Kofi Annan, writing after the rapid succession of interventions in Kosovo and East Timor in 1999,
and reflecting on the string of interventions which had been conducted throughout the 1990s, as
well as those which had not been conducted, concisely captured both the debate on humanitarian
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interventions and the challenges these posed to international society as a whole at the turn of the
21st century. Annan well understood that states, acting in defence of human rights and
formulating comprehensive responses to complex conflicts in the maintenance of international
peace and security were no longer able to act in an indifferent manner in situations of mass
human atrocity. Sovereignty, as Annan had argued previously, was no longer, and perhaps had
never been, such an inviolable concept, and claims to the exclusive nature of sovereignty could
no longer justifiably be utilised to excuse the gravest of human rights violations. Yet at the same
time, Annan also recognised that the concept of state sovereignty, and particularly the norms of
non-intervention and the non-use of force, remained as salient as ever, particularly among
developing countries. The stakes were high. Undermining the sovereignty norm risked
undermining the basis of international organisation. Yet allowing atrocity crimes to continue and
to pose increasingly graver threats to international peace and security similarly risked
undermining the UN and the basis of international organisation. A useful approach for the way
forward was urgently required, as international society could no longer continue to operate in the
realm of legal and moral ambiguity.
Annan had indeed well captured the developments of the 1990s in relation to the changing
discourse surrounding interventions on humanitarian grounds. Individually, none of the
interventions conducted served to fundamentally alter the discourse and the legal or moral
underpinnings of a norm of intervention on humanitarian grounds. Thus, no intervention can
correctly be labelled as representing a “tipping point”, following which interventions on
humanitarian grounds were framed in revised discourse, or in which the norms of sovereignty,
human rights and non-intervention were re-posited in a new logic of appropriateness. Yet each
intervention brought with it unique developments, which served to alter the discourse surrounding
state behaviour. The legitimisation of the intervention in Iraq brought with it the concept that
humanitarian emergencies could be reviewed by the Security Council, and that the Council could
authorise some form of action in response to these. The intervention in Somalia advanced this
notion, and entrenched the concept that humanitarian crises could represent threats to
international peace and security. The non-intervention in Rwanda reminded states that they could
not justifiably avoid action or the responsibility for taking such action, while the NATO intervention
in Kosovo affirmed the dangers posed to the UN and the foundations of international order of
unilateral or collective responses to humanitarian emergencies outside of the framework of
traditional and rigid interpretations of the UN Charter. The intervention in East Timor perhaps
witnessed a coming together of all of these developing normative strands, and added to the
discourse the notion of responsibility; the responsibility of governments to uphold human rights
standards and to ensure the adequate protection of their civilian population.
It is clear therefore that the legitimacy of interventions conducted on humanitarian grounds was
coming increasingly under review. The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, for example,
presented legal argumentation in favour of interventions on humanitarian grounds, if conducted in
accordance with certain criteria. As the legitimacy of such interventions was advanced, the notion
of responsibility was inserted. African states, for example, argued during the Rwandan genocide
that the Security Council was vested with a responsibility of intervention (Melvern, 2001: 109 and
Khadiagala, 2004: 78). In East Timor, Kofi Annan expanded on this concept, threatening the
Indonesian government that if it would not live up to its responsibilities towards it citizens, then
states acting collectively would. It is therefore quite clear that a normative discourse surrounding
threats to peace and security, the role of human rights, state sovereignty, interventions and
appropriate standards of behaviour related to all of these changed significantly, framed within a
new logic of appropriateness.
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An important development in this regard came shortly after the Rwandan genocide and before the
Kosovo intervention when, in 1996, Sudanese diplomat and scholar Francis Deng and his
colleagues at the Brookings Institution, working on the question of how to provide better
protection to internally displaced persons IDPs) during times of conflict, developed the concept of
‘sovereignty as responsibility’. The argument advanced by Deng and his colleagues was that
neither sovereignty as an institution nor the myths by which it had endured were any longer
appropriate to prevalent global conditions, and that notions of sovereignty and of the state
required deeper interrogation. Advancing a notion of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’, it was argued
that, in order to be legitimate, sovereignty must demonstrate responsibility. Thus, governments, to
be able to legitimately make sovereignty claims, were required to also demonstrate sovereign
responsibility towards their populations, acting in a manner which both advanced and protected
their welfare. Where governments failed to exercise this responsibility, it was argued, states could
legitimately choose to intervene to provide the necessary remedial action. Thus, the normative
principles of sovereignty, responsibility and accountability contained both internal and external
dimensions.
The internal dimension related to the degree to which governments were responsive to the needs
of their people and were accountable to the body politic. The external dimension in turn related to
the degree to which states cooperated with other states to maintain the international order and to
provide assistance when a state failed in its responsibilities towards its citizens. Sovereignty
therefore referred not only to the inviolability of the state but also to the ability of the state to carry
out its functions. States held the right to inviolability as long as they were responsive to the needs
and wellbeing of their population. Where a responsible state was unable to provide for its
population, it was required to request the assistance of other states. Failing this, Deng and his
colleagues argued, the right to inviolability was ceded, and states were legitimately empowered to
impose on the culprit state actions in response to the needs of the population which had not been
able to escape conflict zones. Therefore, at the level of international organisation, sovereignty
became a pooled function, to be protected when exercised responsibly and to be shared when
assistance was required. Sovereignty therefore, it was advanced, constituted a dual right and
responsibility; a right of non-interference constituted on the basis of responsibility, both inwards
and outwards (Deng et. al. 1996).
Although an important development, the sovereignty as responsibility concept did not impact on
the intervention debate meaningfully until five years after its development. However, the concept
did contribute to a growing body of work on what the pillars of the post-Cold War era should be.
Increasingly, the UN came to be employed as a mechanism to foster international order founded
on non-threat based principles, and the role of the organisation as a contributor to global security
was reconsidered and expanded. Within this context, the concept of ‘international security’ came
to be increasingly investigated. During the Cold War, the UN embodied a state-centred
conceptualisation of international security which had focused exclusively on inter-state conflict. As
the organisation found itself, unpreparedly, dealing with intra-state conflicts, the definition of
international security began to shift from states towards individuals and peoples. Increasingly,
therefore, the concept of ‘human security’ emerged, which recognised that the security of
individuals and peoples came before the security of the state, and that the state often
represented not a source of security, but of insecurity. Former UN Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali had recognised this trend early on, and frequently urged the UN to stress the
human foundations of security, arguing that the organisation should be as concerned with the
security of peoples and individuals as it was with the security of states (Barnett, 1997: 566). The
Canadian Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, appeared to concur with Boutros-Ghali, arguing:
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The crisis in Kosovo, and the Alliance’s response to it, is a concrete expression of this human security dynamic
at work […] The concept of human security establishes a new measure for judging the success or failure of
national and international security politics, namely: do these policies improve the protection of civilians from
state-sponsored aggression and civil, especially ethnic, conflict (in Newman, 2001: 244)?
Drawing on the experiences gained from the intervention in Iraq, the UN had appeared
increasingly to grapple with this concept, and the early days of the Somali intervention, as one
observer recalls, generated excitement within the corridors of the Secretariat. An insider account
reveals that many UN officials recalled a sense of excitement and exhilaration during the early
post-Cold War period, as, not only had they become unshackled from the Cold War, but their
activism was now directed towards helping people rather than helping states. One UN official
argued at the time that there were greater rewards from helping the victims of political turmoil
than helping its instigators (in Barnett, 1997: 567). Whilst some member states feared that the UN
was increasingly infringing on sovereignty norms, others championed the more ambitious agenda
and cosmopolitan outlook that seemed to suggest a UN that was on the verge of fulfilling its
initial, but long-delayed, promise (Barnett, 1997: 567).
This coupling of the internal-external nexus between human rights and international peace and
security considerations also became institutionalised in other international organisations such as
the European Union (EU) and the OSCE throughout the 1990s, as well as in the foreign policies
of several states. As Finnemore noted, by the turn of the 21st century, international security could
barely be said to exist without human rights protections (2003: 136). On the basis of these
changing normative structures of international organisation, Finnemore concluded that, in the
struggle between the principles of humanitarianism, sovereignty, non-interventionism and the
non-use of force, the balance appeared to have shifted since the end of the Cold War, and that
humanitarian claims now frequently trumped sovereignty claims. States might of course still not
respond to humanitarian appeals, yet they no longer displayed reluctance due to a fear that
interventions on humanitarian grounds would be denounced system-wide as illegitimate. On the
contrary, Finnemore argued, contemporary intervention norms did more than merely ‘allow’ for
humanitarian intervention; they actually required intervention on humanitarian grounds (2003: 79).
Similarly, since the end of the Cold War, argues another observer, a greater acceptance had
developed on the part of state actors that humanitarian intervention may be morally justifiable in
extreme cases (Rytter, 2001: 144). Wheeler went further in his analysis, arguing that the apparent
development of the norm of intervention on humanitarian grounds, despite its limitations and
imperfections, was testimony to a humanity that cared more, not less, for the suffering in its midst,
and a humanity that would do more, and not less, to end it (2000[a]: 283). Wheeler’s hopes were
echoed by British Prime Minister Tony Blair in 2001, when he promised publicly that, if Rwanda
happened again, Britain would not walk away as it had done many times before, and insisted that
states held a moral duty to provide whatever forms of assistance were required whenever these
were required to prevent future genocide (Bellamy, 2005: 31).
Yet despite the expansion of discourse surrounding intervention on humanitarian grounds in the
1990s, and despite the hopes of politicians and academics alike that on this basis future atrocity
crimes would be prevented or reacted to meaningfully, the fundamental tensions between the
norms of sovereignty and human rights, and all the legal and moral quagmires these tensions
entailed, had not yet been resolved. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, recognising the inherent
dangers, had touched on this theme numerous times before. In June 1998 for example, Annan
had reflected on the challenges posed to the sovereignty norm in the modern age:
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State frontiers, ladies and gentlemen, should no longer be seen as watertight protection for war criminals or
mass murderers. The fact that a conflict is ‘internal’ does not give the parties any right to disregard the most
basic rules of human conduct. Besides, most ‘internal’ conflicts do not stay internal for long. They soon ‘spill
over’ into neighbouring countries (in Connaughton, 2001: 74).
Arguing that conflicts crossed sovereignty lines, and therefore responses to conflicts could not
necessarily be designed on the basis of traditional sovereignty lines, Annan, in his speech at the
opening of the 54th General Assembly in September 1999 made reference to a “developing
international norm” in favour of intervention to protect civilians from “wholesale slaughter and
suffering and violence” (in Newman, 2001: 244). Annan’s comments sparked controversy, and
the General Assembly entered into a wide-ranging debate on the legitimacy and legality of
interventions on humanitarian grounds. Many, though mostly Western, governments argued that
human rights considerations could indeed form a legitimate basis for the Security Council to
authorise the threat and use of force. Many developing countries, supported by China and
Russia, agreed that human rights considerations were important in the maintenance of
international peace and security, but that the sovereignty norm could not be weakened on the
basis of these (Wheeler, 2000[a]: 286). No middle ground could be found during these debates,
and UN members agreed to disagree on the matter. Annan however was not satisfied, and in his
Millennium Report to the General Assembly in September 2000 once more raised the issue.
Recognising the pressing need for clarity, Annan posed a challenge to member states:
If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a
Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our
common humanity (in International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001: 2)?
The Secretary General was pushing member states to find common ground on interventions
conducted on humanitarian grounds, one of the core challenges facing the UN and the structures
of international organisation in the post-Cold War era. International society could no longer afford
to be polarised on the question, as this polarisation threatened to impact on the Security Council,
on the international peace and security architecture, on human rights norms and frameworks, and
on the norm of state sovereignty itself.
3.4 The Emergence of the Responsibility to Protect:
Shifting the Sands of Normative Debate
In an attempt to respond to the challenge Kofi Annan had posed to states, the Canadian
government launched the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
(ICISS). At the United Nations Millennium Summit in September 2000, Canadian Prime Minister
Jean Chrétien announced that the ICISS would be established to address the moral, legal,
operational and political questions involved in developing broader international support for a new
framework legitimising interventions conducted on humanitarian grounds (ICISS, 2001: viii). The
Commission’s mandate, broadly speaking, was to build a broader understanding of the problem
of reconciling intervention for human protection purposes and sovereignty and, more specifically,
to develop a global political consensus on how to move from polemics towards action in response
to humanitarian emergencies (ICISS, 2001: 2).
The report of the Commission, released in December 2001 and titled The Responsibility to
Protect from the outset argued that sovereignty was more than merely a functional principle in
international relations, and that consequently sovereignty and the accompanying notion that all
50
states are equal under international law constituted the very basis upon which the UN was
founded (ICISS, 2001: 7). However, the report also noted that state sovereignty did not include
any normative claims to the unlimited power of a state to do as it pleased with its own citizenry.
Rather, the Commission argued, sovereignty constituted not as much an inviolable right as an
inviolable dual responsibility. Externally, every state was required to respect the sovereignty of
other states to, in turn, have its own sovereignty respected. Internally, states were required to
respect the dignity and the basic rights of all the people residing within the bounds of that state. In
international and in internal human rights covenants, in UN practice, and in state practice itself,
the Commission argued, sovereignty was increasingly being understood as a recognition of this
dual responsibility; both towards other states and towards citizens. Sovereignty as responsibility,
therefore, had become the bare minimum content of good international citizenship (ICISS, 2001:
8). The Commission, aligning itself closely to and expanding upon Deng’s notion of ‘sovereignty
as responsibility’, thus embraced a fundamental shift in the understanding of state sovereignty
from an inherent right towards an inherent responsibility. States, in this thinking, could no longer
claim their rights to sovereignty on the basis of their very existence, as had been possible in the
Westphalian notion, but rather, would be recognised and respected as sovereign states
conditional upon their adherence to this dual responsibility; responsibility both inwards and
outwards.
Thinking of sovereignty in this manner, which was increasingly being recognised in state practice,
the Commission argued, had a threefold significance. First, it implied that state authorities were
responsible for the functions required to protect the safety and lives of citizens, and for the
promotion of their welfare. Second, it suggested that national political authorities were both
responsible to their own citizens internally and to international society at large, through the UN
and through regional and sub-regional organisations. Third, the agents of the state were
responsible for their actions and inaction, and thus could be held accountable for their acts of
commission and omission (ICISS, 2001: 13). The Commission therefore shifted the focus of the
sovereignty debate from a focus on the state as the central actor to a focus on the individual
holding rights and requiring protection as the central actor. The sovereignty of the state therefore
was presented as being contingent on the ability and willingness of that state to protect the
sovereignty of the individual.
With this definition of sovereignty in mind, the Commission set out to clearly define its
understanding of the concept of intervention. Recognising that the term had broad scope, the
Commission clarified the type of intervention under discussion as:
actions taken against a state or its leaders, without its or their consent, for purposes which are claimed to be
humanitarian or protective (ICISS, 2001: 8).
These types of actions would, according to the understanding of the Commission, apart from
military intervention as a last resort include all forms of preventive measures and coercive
intervention measures (including but not limited to the use of sanctions and criminal
prosecutions). Coercive measures would be constituted in two forms; first their threatened use as
a preventive measure, designed to avoid the need for military intervention; and second, their
actual use as a reactive measure should coercive measures fail (ICISS, 2001: 8). Having
established its understanding of the notions of sovereignty and of intervention, based on an
assessment of international relations discourse and state practice post-Cold War, the
Commission turned its attention to the critical question of when intervention on a humanitarian
basis within international society could be justifiable. Intervention, the Commission found, was
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justified according to six criteria, identified as those of (1) just cause, (2) right intention, (3) last
resort, (4) proportional means, (5) reasonable prospects and (6) right authority.
Just cause for an intervention was established under two conditions; either (1) the large scale
loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which was the product of (a)
deliberate state action, (b) state neglect or inability to act, or (c) a failed state situation, or (2)
large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’, actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced
expulsion, acts of terror or rape, must be ongoing if an intervention was to be justified (ICISS,
2001: 32). Importantly, the Commission did highlight the legitimacy of anticipatory measures
should one of the above considerations be apprehended. Without the possibility of legitimate
anticipatory action, the Commission argued, states would find themselves in the ‘morally
untenable’ situation of having to wait until genocide had actually begun before being able to
prevent it (ICISS, 2001: 33). Right intention denoted to the Commission the necessity that an
intervention should be based solely on claims of humanitarian action designed to prevent the
large scale loss of life, and that no intervention would be justifiable if its intent, solely or
additionally, was to alter territorial borders (internal or external), to attain regime change, or to
advance the claims of a group to self-determination. To ensure that interventions were based on
right intent, the Commission argued strongly in favour of collective action above unilateral
responses. The Commission in addition argued that intervention (staggered from the non-use of
force ultimately to the use of force if necessary) should always be the last resort of states; once
all other measures had been exhausted or deemed likely to fail (ICISS, 2001: 35 - 36).
The use of proportional means highlighted the emphasis the Commission placed on the
requirement that the means employed to address a humanitarian crisis should always be
commensurate to the scale of the crisis and with the end to be attained. Similarly, the importance
of reasonable prospects of success was stressed; an intervention should have a reasonable
prospect of averting further atrocities from taking place if it was to be meaningfully conducted. If
an intervention was likely to further inflame a situation, the Commission argued, it may in certain
cases be better to take no action at all. Finally, the Commission argued that the right authority to
authorise humanitarian interventions was primarily vested with the UN Security Council. However,
recognising the political realities dominating the working of the Council, the Commission also
made allowance for action to be authorised by the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace
Resolution. The UN, as the embodiment of interaction between states, was found by the
Commission to be the only international body vested with the authoritative power to authorise
interventions which could be seen as infringing upon the sovereignty of its member states. Yet
the Commission also conceded that deadlock in the UN would severely hinder the provision of
assistance where it was required, and, in cases where the UN was found unable to react to
humanitarian crises, interventions on humanitarian grounds could be conducted without the
authority of the Security Council by coalitions of the willing, if all other above criteria had been
satisfied.
Finally, the Commission stressed the staggered nature of intervention that was inherent in the
principle of the responsibility to protect. The responsibility to protect was a responsibility first to
help prevent humanitarian emergencies from occurring, second to react to these once they had
occurred, and third to assist to rebuild once crises had taken place. Prevention was broadly
understood by the Commission as the need to support good governance, the rule of law, human
rights and development in conflict-prone areas. Failing this, it was incumbent upon states to
assist with conflict prevention measures, including fact-finding, mediation, support to peace
processes and other peacemaking mechanisms. Reaction was defined in a staggered way by the
52
Commission. Should prevention measures fail, the Commission foresaw first the non-use of force
to put a halt to atrocities taking place, including the use of diplomatic measures, dialogue, and
sanctions. Should non-forceful measures fail to put a halt to atrocities, the Commission foresaw
the use of force as a last resort to stop atrocity crimes from taking place. Once a humanitarian
crisis had ended, the Commission stressed the importance of continued engagement through
support to post-conflict reconstruction. Rebuilding was defined broadly as a holistic post-conflict
peacebuilding process which cumulatively would assist in ensuring preventative peacebuilding
was designed to prevent humanitarian crises in future. Thus, the responsibility to protect made
use of existing UN responses to conflict situations along the peacemaking – peacekeeping –
peacebuilding continuum, as had been outlined in Boutros Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace,
published a decade earlier.
The responsibility to protect, through the use of semantics, combined several elements of the
discourses surrounding state sovereignty, human rights, peace and security and intervention in
international society. In essence, the Commission attempted to frame the responsibility to protect
in a manner that drew on all three founding principles of the UN; respect for state sovereignty, the
universal inviolability of basic human rights, and the maintenance of international peace and
security. By framing state sovereignty within the sovereignty as responsibility debate, the
Commission sought to balance the norms of state sovereignty and human rights as contingent
upon one another, as opposed to posited against one another.
The importance of language in shaping the responsibility to protect concept, and the linkages to
already existing norms, should not be underestimated. The Commission will have taken note of
Kofi Annan’s view that it was not the deficiencies of the UN Charter which had brought about the
tension between state sovereignty and the need for humanitarian intervention, but rather the
difficulties UN member states faced in applying the principles of the Charter in a new era (in
Tanguy, 2003: 141). Indeed, Annan had stressed that sovereignty could no longer “be used as a
shield for gross violations of human rights” (in Bellamy, 2006: 35), and it was in this light that the
Commission made use of the sovereignty as responsibility notion within the responsibility to
protect.
Changing the language of the debate, and the normative context within which intervention was
understood, was important to the Commission, and the importance of language in shaping state
behaviour was well acknowledged by Lloyd Axworthy, Gareth Evans and Ramesh Thakur, three
of the ICISS Commissioners (Axworthy et al. 2005: 9). Yet the responsibility to protect was
framed in such a manner that not only enabled intervention on genuine humanitarian grounds, but
also constrained intervention on non-humanitarian grounds. The same language that was utilised
to enable intervention was also employed to constrain potential abuse. Conscious that many
would view the report as a weakening of the general prohibition on the use of force enshrined in
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and of comments during the consultation phase that the
responsibility to protect would be subject to abuse by states pursuing their own agendas and
therefore constituted “law-making by the Western elite”, the Commission was careful in its
selection of criteria for intervention and argued that these constituted an important barrier to
abuse. As one observer noted, by establishing a common framework that intervening states
would utilise to justify their interventions and other states would utilise to evaluate the merit of
those interventions, the responsibility to protect actually made it more difficult for states to abuse
humanitarian claims when intervening (Bellamy, 2006: 147).
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The report of the Commission therefore served to change the nature, the content and the focus of
the intervention debate. Whereas before sovereignty and human rights violations had been
juxtaposed against one another, and interventions had been conducted either by tackling head on
(and usually unsuccessfully so) the sovereignty concept, or by circumventing the UN altogether,
the report of the Commission offered a normative framework that re-assessed sovereignty
concerns in relation to the changing international normative context of the post-Cold War period,
and inextricably linked state sovereignty, human rights and the maintenance of international
peace and security in one new norm: that of the responsibility to protect.
The changing normative order that emerged with the end of the Cold War, the conduct of an
increasing number of interventions on humanitarian grounds in the immediate post-Cold War era,
the elevation of human security concerns, and the re-evaluation of the role of the UN at the end of
the 20th century commensurate with the peace and security challenges being faced at the time
therefore all contributed to the framing of threats and challenges to international peace and
security in a manner which enabled the responsibility to protect norm to emerge when it did at the
turn of the 21st century. Indeed, the norms entrepreneurs were careful to frame the responsibility
to protect within the context of existing norms of state sovereignty, human rights and non-
intervention, but to centre the responsibility to protect norm among these through the use of the
sovereignty as responsibility principle. This chapter has outlined the manner in which it was
possible for the responsibility to protect norm to emerge in international society when it did. The
following chapter will assess the further development and entrenchment of the norm, through
application of the norm life-cycle approach, in an attempt to generate insights to the questions
both of how norms develop in international society, as well as to how the responsibility to protect
norm continued to develop. Chapters 5 and 6 will then assess the manner in which the
responsibility to protect norm was applied in response to the conflicts in Darfur from 2003
onwards, in an attempt to generate insight into whether the norm contributed to the formulation of
effective responses to the kinds of conflict situations it was designed for. On the basis of these
findings, chapter 7 will then assess how future responses to conflicts characterised by atrocity
crimes in Africa may be formulated, and what role the responsibility to protect norm may play.
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Chapter 4
-
The Responsibility to Protect:
Assessing the Emergence and Development of a Norm
4.1 Introduction
The release of the report on the responsibility to protect sparked heated debate in foreign policy
circles, and generated both a wide following and an equally wide chasm of dissent. Yet despite
misgivings by observers, the responsibility to protect rapidly became entrenched in political
discourse from December 2001 onwards. Increasingly taken on board by a wider range of states,
and ardently supported by its entrepreneurs and by advocates, the responsibility to protect rapidly
gained ground in international society in foreign policy circles, among non-governmental
organisations, and in academia. Yet many states equally expressed their concerns about, or their
rejection of, the concept.
This chapter will explore the development of the responsibility to protect from its initial emergence
in 2001 through its increasing entrenchment in international society. The chapter will also assess
how the responsibility to protect norm related to simultaneous normative developments related to
the maintenance of peace and security internationally, and in particular on the African continent.
At the same time as the responsibility to protect norm was being developed and entrenched in
international society, in particular at the level of the UN, African states had embarked on their own
undertaking to strengthen their ability to prevent and respond to conflict situations, in particular
the violent conflict situations which had been so prevalent on the continent since the end of the
Cold War and which had so often witnessed the commission of atrocity crimes. From the mid-
1990s onwards, African states embarked on an initiative to transform the OAU, the continental
body established during the period of decolonisation to articulate and defend the interests of
African states, into the AU, an organisation designed to be more responsive to the changing
needs of the continent and its peoples. Entrenching the concept of human security, African states
sought to empower the AU and the relevant sub-regional bodies with a powerful mandate for
peace and security, creating interlocking security structures designed to prevent and manage
conflict situations. Thus, whilst the responsibility to protect was being entrenched in international
society, the African continent was creating a security mechanism which looked set to edge the
continent away from state and regime security towards human security, and which was
empowered to advance and defend notions of human security when so required. The salience of
the responsibility to protect norm at the international level, and the concomitant development of
empowered peace and security organs at the continental level, it was assumed by many, would
ensure that powerful notions of human security, as opposed to previously dominant notions of
state security, would prevail, and that Kofi Annan’s clarion call of ‘never again’ might finally ring
true.
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4.2 Entrenching the Responsibility to Protect in Political Discourse
The report of the ICISS upon its release in December 2001 was received most favourably by
Canada, the initial sponsor and advocate of the ICISS, and found a favourable reception among
the governments of France, Germany and Japan, as well as in the United Kingdom, though
received with some hesitation there as to the prescriptive nature of the responsibility to protect.
All of these countries had been exploring the potential of developing criteria to guide decision-
making within international society for interventions on humanitarian grounds, particularly since
the NATO intervention in Kosovo, and found the notion of the responsibility to protect
commensurate with the criteria of intervention quite useful. Other early advocates of the norm
included Argentina, Australia, Colombia, Croatia, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Rwanda,
Sweden South Africa and Tanzania. South Korea also expressed its support for the norm, but
argued that the UN should create clear modalities of implementation to limit the extent to which
the norm could be invoked to override sovereignty; in essence arguing for greater clarity as to the
means by which sovereignty was considered transferred from the host state to states (Bellamy,
2005: 36 and 2006: 151).
Yet while many Western, and some sub-Saharan African and Latin American countries appear to
have welcomed the report at an early stage, others particularly in the developing world were more
cautious. Russia had a mixed response to the report, agreeing in principle that states were
responsible both internally and externally, but remaining opposed to the notion that sovereignty
could be rendered violable. China argued that no intervention in the affairs of a sovereign state
could be rendered justifiable within international society. Beijing argued that China’s rejection of
the notion of humanitarian intervention, which had been clearly expressed during the ICISS
roundtable discussions in Beijing in June 2001, had not been taken into account by the
Commission or incorporated in the final report, and that Western perspectives had dominated the
findings of the report and the creation of the responsibility to protect (MacFarlane et. al. 2004:
982).
Whilst the reception of the report was mixed at the state level, non-state actors generally
applauded it, and many international NGOs, including the World Federalist Movement (WFM),
Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the International Crisis Group (ICG) became vocal advocates of
the report, engaging in lobbying activities both domestically and at the level of international
organisations to ensure continued dialogue on the norm was taking place. Coalitions of civil
society organisations also sprung up, aiming to exert pressure on states to adopt a normative
framework of intervention on humanitarian grounds, centred around the responsibility to protect,
that would assist in the prevention of future genocide. At the level of the UN too much public
support for the norm was expressed, particularly by Kofi Annan, who led the organisation in
ardent support of the responsibility to protect. Yet despite these efforts, the regional disparities
which had emerged continued to dominate debate. Early in 2002, at a regional forum on military
intervention hosted by the Fund for Peace in South America, delegates adopted the language of
the responsibility to protect in their outcomes document and explicitly accepted the responsibility
of governments to protect civilians from atrocities. Yet a similar conference in East Asia revealed
that governments and regional organisations still firmly clung to the norms of sovereignty and
non-interference in internal affairs, and support for the responsibility to protect was not
forthcoming (MacFarlane et al. 2005: 982).
These regional disparities were felt at several levels. When the UN Security Council, at its annual
informal retreat in May 2002, met with ICISS co-chairs Gareth Evans and Mohammed Sahnoun
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to discuss the report, almost all of the permanent members expressed disquiet with the notion of
formalising criteria to guide intervention, but for very different reasons. The United States was
opposed to the establishment of strict criteria as it did not wish to offer pre-commitments to
engage its military forces in areas where it had no national interest to advance, and was also
reluctant to restrain its right of when and where to utilise force. Russia was not opposed to the
responsibility to protect as such, but insisted that no action should be taken without prior Security
Council authorisation, warning that the norm risked undermining the UN Charter if the Security
Council was bypassed. China similarly insisted that all matters relating to the use of force be
deferred to the Security Council, in accordance with the UN Charter. This central focus on the
Security Council was rejected by the United States, the United Kingdom and France, all of which
argued that a deadlock in the Security Council could constrain action from being taken where
most required. France and the United Kingdom, two of the more vocal advocates of the ICISS
report, however expressed their own misgivings about the responsibility to protect, arguing that
the formulation and acceptance of criteria to govern intervention on humanitarian grounds would
not bring about the political will and consensus required to undertake interventions when required
(Bellamy, 2005: 36 and 2006: 151 - 152). Taking this point further, according to the British and
French Ambassadors, there was widespread agreement during the retreat that, if new situations
emerged, such as in Burundi or the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the five permanent
members and the broader Council would lack the political will to deliver troops, and would restrict
themselves to condemnatory resolutions (MacFarlane et. al. 2004: 983).
At an Asia-Pacific forum hosted to discuss the ICISS report in August 2002, fears were again
raised that action by states without the explicit authorisation of the Security Council could set a
dangerous precedent, and risked undermining the UN and the stability of international society
(MacFarlane et. al. 2004: 983). These fears were not without justification, and states in the Asia-
Pacific region probably bore in mind the un-authorised NATO intervention in Kosovo three years
earlier when they met to deliberate the ICISS report. Yet it was also the scaling up of the
American-led War on Terror which heightened Asian sensitivities around the notion of
intervention on humanitarian grounds. The release of the ICISS report in December 2001 could
perhaps not have come at a worse time, coming as it did three months after terrorist attacks on
the United States in September 2001 and the American invasion of Afghanistan in October of the
same year. Also damaging to the debate was the fact that the American administration under
President George W. Bush felt obliged to argue that the invasion of Afghanistan would serve to
improve the humanitarian situation in the country and to end wide-spread human rights abuses
there (Bellamy, 2005: 37). This rhetorical connection between the War on Terror and
interventions conducted on humanitarian grounds, a clear abuse of humanitarian and human
rights language, nonetheless served to heighten not just Asian but also Southern fears around
humanitarian interventions serving as a smoke-screen for the assertion of Western power. Yet if
the American-led invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent militarisation of foreign policy in the
United States and the United Kingdom served to raise fears around humanitarian justifications for
interventions in international society, the American-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 dealt a
near-fatal blow to the responsibility to protect.
As Bellamy has argued, the weight given to the humanitarian case for the war in Iraq by the
political leaders of all the major troop contributors (Australia, the United States and the United
Kingdom) in their public justifications, despite the formal legal justification being based on pre-
existing Security Council Resolutions, impacted negatively on the development of the
responsibility to protect. Indeed, although the humanitarian argument for the invasion was well, as
Bellamy demonstrates, was generally widely rejected. Whereas in the Kosovo case NATO could
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rely on a moral consensus among liberal states, and in Afghanistan no states seriously
challenged the intervention, in Iraq there was no consensus, with liberal states such as Canada,
Germany and France publicly opposing the war (Bellamy, 2005: 37). Yet despite such opposition,
the use of humanitarian justifications for the invasion of Iraq damaged notions of justifiable
intervention on humanitarian grounds. John Reid, the Chairperson of the Labour Party in the
United Kingdom, justified the invasion as a “product of the belief in international responsibilities as
well as rights.” Arguing that the invasion, as unwelcome as it was in certain quarters, was a
necessity, Reid noted:
We do not only have rights to defend in the world, but we also have responsibilities to discharge; we are, in a
sense, our brother’s keeper globally (quoted in Kampfner, 2003).
Yet such language was seen as an abuse of the responsibility to protect principles by many.
David Clark, a former special adviser to the British Foreign Office, for example argued:
Iraq has wrecked our case for humanitarian wars. As long as US power remains in the hands of the Republican
right, it will be impossible to build a consensus on the left behind the idea that it can be a power for good. Those
who continue to insist that it can, risk discrediting the concept of humanitarian intervention (Clark, 2003: 16).
Former ICISS co-Chair Gareth Evans echoed this sentiment, arguing one year after the invasion
that the “poorly and inconsistently argued humanitarian justification” for the war in Iraq almost:
choked at birth what many were hoping was an emerging new norm justifying intervention on the basis of the
principle of responsibility to protect (Evans, 2004: 63).
Evans was certainly conscious of a shift in support away from the responsibility to protect, notable
not only in the global South, but also among states which had initially been more supportive of
interventions conducted on humanitarian grounds. At a forum of social democratic political
leaders in July 2004, heads of state rejected a draft communiqué prepared by British Prime
Minister Tony Blair due to a paragraph which advocated that the responsibility to protect should
override sovereignty in supreme humanitarian emergencies. Argentina, Chile and Germany in
particular objected to the inclusion of this paragraph, and on their recommendation it was omitted
from the final communiqué. Germany had in the past been particularly supportive of the ICISS
agenda and the responsibility to protect, yet as German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder later
explained, the draft communiqué was rejected because of fears that any doctrine of unauthorised
humanitarian intervention would be used by the United States and the United Kingdom to justify
the war in Iraq (MacFarlane et al. 2004: 984 and Bellamy, 2005: 39).
Despite this apparent backlash, there remained those that argued that the war in Iraq may not
have been as detrimental to intervention on humanitarian grounds as initially thought. Ramesh
Thakur, a former ICISS Commissioner, argued that the moral consensus around the responsibility
to protect was likely to be strengthened in the wake of Iraq as states came to realise that it
provided both enabling and constraining language. Thus, Thakur hoped, the responsibility to
protect would increasingly be discovered as a means whereby to oppose the intervention in Iraq
as illegitimate. According to Thakur then, attaining consensus on criteria for intervention would
make it more, not less, difficult for states to abuse humanitarian language for their interventions
(Bellamy, 2005: 40).
Cognisant of the concerns raised, particularly by the global South, in the wake of the Iraq war Kofi
Annan nevertheless urged for the debate to continue, and urged states to take stronger action in
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the face of human atrocity. In April 2004, Annan addressed the Human Rights Commission in
Geneva, Switzerland, commemorating the tenth anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda, and
expressing his support for the responsibility to protect announced his intent to launch a UN action
plan to prevent future acts of genocide. The plan, mirrored on the responsibility to protect and
existing UN conflict management approaches, consisted of five related pillars: the prevention of
armed conflicts; the protection of civilians in armed conflicts; the strengthening of local judicial
systems to end impunity; better information analysis and early warning; and swift and decisive
action, including military intervention (United Nations, 2004).
The Secretary General’s support for the responsibility to protect was further advanced later that
year by the release of the report of the United Nations High Level Panel and Treats, Challenges
and Change (the High Level Panel) which strongly endorsed the responsibility to protect as a
norm in international society and urged UN member states to formally adopt the norm. Kofi
Annan’s March 2005 report on UN reform, In Larger Freedom – Towards Development, Security
and Human Rights for All, drafted as a discussion document in the build-up to the UN Millennium
Review Summit of September 2005, focused discussion back on the UN as the central
mechanism through which to implement the responsibility to protect however. Annan argued that
the lessons of the past had revealed that no principle, not even sovereignty, could be allowed to
shield genocide, crimes against humanity and mass human suffering. Annan argued however
that, despite a deluge of declarations, states had failed to act consistently and effectively in
humanitarian emergencies. Annan therefore urged UN members to embrace the responsibility to
protect, arguing that the time had come for governments to be held accountable both to their
citizens and to each other (Annan, 2005: 34 – 35). Reflecting on the sensitive nature of the
subject, Annan nonetheless agreed with the findings of the ICISS and the High Level Panel, and
recommended that member states during the Millennium Summit:
Embrace the ‘responsibility to protect’ as a basis for collective action against genocide, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity, and agree to act on this responsibility, recognising that this responsibility lies first and
foremost with each individual state, whose duty it is to protect its population, but that if national authorities are
unwilling or unable to protect their citizens, then the responsibility shifts to the international community to use
diplomatic, humanitarian and other methods to help protect civilian populations, and that if such methods
appear insufficient the Security Council may out of necessity decide to take action under the Charter, including
enforcement action, if so required (Annan, 2005: 59).
Whilst the support provided by the report of the Secretary General did provide further momentum
to the responsibility to protect, there was still resistance. The NAM, for example, still largely
rejected the norm. Speaking on behalf of the NAM, the Malaysian government argued that the
responsibility to protect represented a reincarnation of the traditional debate on intervention on
humanitarian grounds, for which there was no basis in international law. Tanzania however
dissented from this position, and directly challenged the NAM on it. India on the other hand
agreed with NAM, arguing that the Security Council was already sufficiently empowered to act in
humanitarian emergencies, observing that the failure of the Council to act in the past had been
caused not by a lack of authority but by a lack of political will. The Group of 77 (a developing
country bloc) was unable to reach a joint position, but did call for the ICISS report to be revised,
emphasising the need for territorial integrity and sovereignty to be more clearly recognised,
though not providing clear guidelines as to what was meant by these terms or how they were to
be incorporated into the report (Bellamy, 2006: 152).
Addressing these and other concerns, the AU Summit meeting in Nigeria in January 2005 set up
a committee of 15 member states to elaborate a common African position on UN reform. African
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Ministers of Foreign Affairs, meeting in Swaziland on 8 March 2005 at the 7th Extraordinary
Summit of the AU crafted a common African response to the report of the High-Level Panel. The
outcomes document from this meeting later came to be known as the Ezulwini Consensus, which
was approved by the Executive Committee of the AU, and was the only common regional
response to the report of the High-Level Panel. The document also served as the basis of the
common African position on UN reform, a key topic to be discussed at the opening of the General
Assembly in New York later that year. The Ezulwini Consensus considered a number of areas of
UN reform aimed at making the organisation more effective, efficient and relevant to the
challenges encountered on the African continent in the 21st century. Included in the document
was a strong endorsement the responsibility to protect as a norm which states should adopt and
take ownership of (African Union, 2005[a] and Adebajo and Scanlon, 2006: 3).
Many observers heralded the Ezulwini Consensus as an important break with the past as African
states had collectively and publicly come out in support of the responsibility to protect, and had
argued that states should adopt and take ownership of this emerging norm. Indeed, at one level,
the Ezulwini Consensus did represent an important step for a continent consisting of states which
had historically been known to oppose a weakening of the traditional sovereignty concept, and
which had proven opposed to interference in the affairs of other states in the region. For African
states to thus support the findings of the report of the High-Level Panel, and to call for the
adoption and operationalisation of the responsibility to protect, therefore did constitute an
important step in the development of human security norms in Africa. Yet the importance of the
support provided to the responsibility to protect in the Ezulwini Consensus should not be over-
estimated. The responsibility to protect, as an emerging norm in international society, was
endorsed by African states as one component among many in a common African position on UN
reform. It was therefore endorsed together with calls for reform of the Security Council, the
General Assembly, ECOSOC and other bodies, intended to make the UN more democratic and to
enable it to better address the concerns of the African continent in the 21st century. Endorsement
for the responsibility to protect was therefore provided in unison with calls for the reform of the
Security Council (either providing Africa with the veto, or abolishing the veto right altogether),
which would serve to ensure that the norm could not be subject to abuse by powerful states.
Should Africa feel that the West would abuse the norm, the thinking went, the region would be in
a position to block such moves in a reformed Security Council. The responsibility to protect was
therefore not endorsed by African states in isolation, but in tandem with anticipation of Security
Council reform. Nevertheless, the Ezulwini Consensus did represent the first instance in which
African states collectively endorsed the responsibility to protect and called for it to be entrenched
in international society.
The endorsement, coming as it did six months before the opening of the 60th General Assembly
session represented an important milestone in the development of the norm. Building on this, and
with the support of African countries, in June 2005 Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the NAM
requested the Coordinating Bureau to consider the implications of the responsibility to protect
with regards to changing notions of non-interference, non-intervention, territorial integrity and
national sovereignty (Luck, 2009: 18). That same month, China’s official position paper on UN
reform endorsed, at least in part, the principles underpinning the responsibility to protect. The
Chinese position was that each state shouldered the primary responsibility to protect its own
population, and that when a massive humanitarian crisis occurred, it was the legitimate concern
of other states to ease and defuse the crisis. The position paper however argued that Security
Council authorisation was a prerequisite for intervention, and that this understanding should form
the core of the responsibility to protect (Thakur and Weiss, 2009: 38).
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Within the context of these developments, the 60th session of the General Assembly commenced
in New York in September 2005, with the opening session used to host the World Summit,
designed both to mark the 60th anniversary of the organisation and to allow member states to
take bold decisions on the reform of the organisation and on its work in the areas of peace and
security, human rights, and development. As Bellamy has argued, advocates of the responsibility
to protect, making the most of the opportunity, decided to attempt to accomplish one or both of
two things at the Summit. First, they wanted to persuade the General Assembly to support the
responsibility to protect in the final outcomes document. Second, they set out to persuade the
Security Council to adopt a resolution committing members to (a) act whenever the just cause
thresholds of the responsibility to protect had been crossed, (b) submit its decisions to public
deliberation on the use of force based on the precautionary principles, and (c) withhold the use or
threat of the veto in humanitarian emergencies other than in situations where the vital national
interests of members were clearly at stake. Yet as Bellamy notes, responsibility to protect
advocates had to overcome two quite distinct challenges. The first concern related to the
concerns of the permanent five members of the Security Council that criteria for intervention
would constrain their freedom to use force in the maintenance of international peace and security.
Second, the concern among the global South in particular (although also among some developed
countries since the invasion of Iraq) that criteria for intervention would be abused by the powerful
to justify armed interventions against the weak that were anything but humanitarian (Bellamy,
2006: 153). In addition, sovereignty concerns were bound to influence debate on the
responsibility to protect during the World Summit.
4.3 From Emergence to Entrenchment:
The 2005 United Nations World Summit
In the build-up to the September 2005 Summit, Kofi Annan felt confident enough that the
responsibility to protect had gained sufficient ground among UN members since its inception that
the General Assembly would be able to include an endorsement of the responsibility to protect in
the outcomes document. The Secretariat was therefore instructed to include references to the
responsibility to protect in the draft outcomes document, which was circulated ahead of the
Summit. These references, not surprisingly, became the subject of increasingly heated debate as
the Summit approached.
Western states were probably the most vocal in their support for the norm, and in arguing that
states should, through the General Assembly, endorse the responsibility to protect in the Summit
outcomes document. Accordingly, the norm was strongly endorsed particularly by Armenia,
Australia, Cyprus, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Monaco, New Zealand,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom in the General Assembly. Canadian
Prime Minister Paul Martin was unwavering in his nation’s support for the responsibility to protect,
arguing:
Clearly, we need expanded guidelines for Security Council action to make clear our responsibilities to act
decisively to prevent humanity’s attack on humanity. The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ is one such guideline. It
seeks rules to protect the innocent against appalling assaults on their life and dignity. It does not bless unilateral
action. To the contrary, it stands for clear, multilaterally-agreed criteria on what states should do when civilians
are at risk. It is a powerful norm of international behaviour. And this week, we have taken a very important step
to that end. We are proud that [the responsibility to protect] has Canadian lineage, [and] that it is now a principle
for all the world (International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, 2005).
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Despite initial concerns that African states would shy away from debate in the General Assembly,
drawing on the Ezulwini Consensus some African nations were more vocal in their support for the
norm than had initially been anticipated. Both South Africa and Tanzania publicly endorsed the
norm, and were at the forefront of efforts to ensure the African bloc in the General Assembly
supported the inclusion of the responsibility to protect in the outcomes document. Supporting
South African and Tanzanian diplomatic efforts, Botswanan Preisdent Festus Mogae argued
before the General Assembly that:
we can no longer afford to stand back if a country fails to protect its citizens against grave human rights abuses.
In this respect, we embrace the concept of the ‘responsibility to protect’ (International Coalition for the
Responsibility to Protect, 2005).
Mauritius similarly expressed its support, with Prime Minister Navichandra Ramgoolam arguing
that his country endorsed the responsibility to protect:
as a norm of collective action in cases of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity
(International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, 2005).
Rwanda was even more vocal, with President Paul Kagame arguing that responses to atrocity
crimes should never again be found wanting:
Let us resolve to take collective action in a timely and decisive manner. Let us also commit to put in place early
warning mechanisms and ensure that preventive interventions are the rule, rather than the exception
(International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, 2005).
Yet not all states were in favour of the General Assembly endorsing the norm in the outcomes
document. Opposition came mostly from developing countries, joined by China and Russia, which
refused to concede limitations to sovereignty and to acknowledge a right of intervention in
international society. Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, for instance, argued that developing
countries should not allow “a handful of countries” to “reinterpret with impunity” the principles of
the international legal system (International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, 2005).
Among African states, both Egypt and Zimbabwe were opposed to the norm, with Zimbabwean
President Robert Mugabe arguing:
The vision that we must present for a future United Nations should not be one filled with vague concepts that
provide an opportunity for those states that seek to interfere in the internal affairs of other states. Concepts such
as humanitarian intervention or responsibility to protect need careful scrutiny in order to test the motives of their
proponents. We need to avoid situations where a few countries, by virtue of their privileged positions, dictate the
agenda for everybody else. We have witnessed instances where the sovereignty and territorial integrity of small
and weak countries have been violated by the mighty and powerful, in defiance of agreed rules of procedures
and the provisions of the United Nations Charter (in Mwanasali, 2006: 93).
Following numerous rounds of debate consensus was finally attained. Yet this consensus was not
arrived at easily. As Bellamy notes, whilst there was broad support for the importance of setting a
high just cause threshold, that host states had a primary responsibility to protect their citizens,
and that the five permanent members of the Security Council should not voluntarily limit their use
of the veto right, disagreement existed in many other areas, including on the level and nature of
state obligation in responsibility to protect situations, and the relationship between the UN and
regional organisations when the norm was invoked. Three key issues however split states during
the World Summit; the right authority for intervention, the use of criteria, and the point at which
the responsibility to protect was transferred from the host state to other states. Based on the
compromises conceded by both advocates and opponents of the norm, the responsibility to
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protect was included in the final outcomes document of the World Summit in September 2005.
Paragraphs 138 through 140 of the World Summit Outcomes Document, adopted by the General
Assembly as a Resolution, read as follows:
Responsibility to Protect Populations from Genocide, War Crimes, Ethnic Cleansing and Crimes against
Humanity
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through
appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. States should, as
appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an
early warning capability.
139. States, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other
peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely
and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-
case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate
and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing
in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and
appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.
140. We fully support the mission of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide.
This endorsement by the General Assembly was a major milestone in the development of the
norm in international society and served to fundamentally alter the intervention debate. Whilst the
responsibility to protect, as endorsed by the General Assembly, represents an alteration, and a
weaker interpretation, of the responsibility to protect as conceptualised and advocated for by the
ICISS, it nevertheless represented a fundamental alteration to the norm of state sovereignty in
several ways. First, states accepted that they had a fundamental responsibility to protect their
citizens from war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and genocide. The concept
of state sovereignty was therefore shifted from a dialogue based on the rights of the state (non-
intervention, the use of force and territorial integrity in the Weberian sense) to one based on the
responsibilities of the state (internal and external). Second, states accepted that they were
responsible to assist other states in meeting these responsibilities through the provision of
assistance. Third, states recognised that, in situations of ‘manifest state failure’, it was the
responsibility of other states to react to situations of war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic
cleansing and genocide. Fourth, should peaceful means prove inadequate, the Security Council,
acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, was provided with the authority to use force to put an end
to atrocity crimes. Whilst the importance of human rights had been elevated in the peace, security
and development nexus over the years, and the Security Council had itself recognised
humanitarian emergencies as constituting a fundamental threat to international peace and
security, authorising the Security Council to use force in situations of atrocity crimes represented
a major weakening of the traditional norm of non-interference in the internal affairs of states. This
shift, arguably, represented the most important change to the sovereignty norm that the
responsibility to protect affected.
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Despite the endorsement of the norm by the General Assembly being heralded as a success by
many observers, its dilution from the original ICISS report brought with it several challenges. First,
the abandonment of the use of criteria severely weakened the implementation of the
responsibility to protect, as it would be close to impossible to tell when responsibility shifted from
a host state to other states, and when the threshold for different kinds of action by had been
reached. Second, reducing the responsibilities of states from an ‘obligation’ to a ‘responsibility’
lowered the level of responsibility external actors held when decisive action was required in a
humanitarian crisis. Third, the levels of responsibility, as outlined by the ICISS report, were not
clearly dealt with during the World Summit. Whilst the Security Council was mandated with the
authority to authorise interventions, and the role of regional organisations was mentioned through
a reference to Chapter VIII of the Charter when it came to non-forceful means of intervention, the
modalities of interaction between the state in question, regional organisations and the Security
Council were left vague. This, in an era where regional and sub-regional organisations were
increasingly taking on greater peace and security mandates and responsibilities could greatly
confuse the implementation of the responsibility to protect, or lead to a situation where
responsibility for action was shifted between stakeholders due to varying interpretations of who
held responsibility for action.
Fourth, the responsibility to protect, as agreed upon in the outcomes document, represented a
merging of the responsibilities to prevent, react and rebuild into one concept. References to the
responsibilities of states to assist in the prevention of atrocity crimes are made in the outcomes
document, as are references to the responsibilities of states to build capacity to assist in the
prevention of conflicts. Yet through the merger of these concepts into one responsibility to
protect, without a clear delineation between what the responsibility to protect, to react and to
rebuild entailed, risked blurring the concept, and of placing a heavy emphasis on the reaction
component alone. States may have felt that the responsibility to prevent was well covered by
existing UN capabilities in the fields of early warning, mediation and conflict prevention, and that
the responsibility to rebuild would be addressed by the newly-created Peacebuilding Commission
(called for in the same outcomes document). Yet through watering down these notions, the
General Assembly appears to have concentrated on endorsing a responsibility to react more than
a holistic responsibility to protect.
Finally, as French and British diplomats had already cautioned during a Security Council retreat
three years prior, an endorsement of the responsibility to protect by the UN would not yield the
necessary political will to actually implement that responsibility when required. Indeed, the
endorsement by the General Assembly provided no insight into how political will was to be
generated when required, and through its focus on providing the Security Council with the sole
mandate to authorise interventions, appears to have ignored the political realities by which the
workings of that Council had been characterised since its founding in 1945.
With these concerns in mind, many observers, while warmly welcoming the endorsement of the
norm, also wondered whether the compromises which had been reached in attaining this
endorsement did not risk undermining the norm itself. Indeed, many observers dubbed the
version of the responsibility to protect endorsed by the General Assembly ‘responsibility to protect
– light’ (Luck, 2009: 20). The impact that the norm, now endorsed by the General Assembly,
would have on international society was, despite past successes, now in doubt. As one observer
remarked:
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To what extent, then, will the outcome document help prevent future Rwandas and Kosovos? The answer is:
very little (Bellamy, 2006: 169).
Despite the misgivings of some observers, it is clear that the responsibility to protect norm
underwent relatively rapid development since its emergence in 2001 to being endorsed by the
General Assembly, though in a revised manner, in September 2005. Drawing on the norm life
cycle approach, it could usefully be argued that the norm emerged from 2001 to 2005, and that in
September 2005, following endorsement by the UN, it entered into a cascade phase. Yet how is
this emergence phase to be understood?
The norm was ‘created’ by the report of the ICISS, released in December 2001, although the
norm functioned more as meta-norm, serving as an umbrella concept for several normative
frameworks and operational components. The responsibility to protect norm, as highlighted
elsewhere throughout this study, drew heavily on existing norms and concepts, including historic
normative human rights frameworks, the sovereignty norm, and norms related to humanitarian
law. The concept of intervention on humanitarian grounds was of course drawn on, as was the
notion of sovereignty as responsibility. Building on this normative discourse, the responsibility to
protect was framed in a logic of appropriateness employing a deductive approach, based on a
rights- and responsibility-based approach to human security. Thus, the norm was framed as the
logical outcome of changes in international society, of state behaviour, and of the discourse
surrounding state behaviour since the end of the Cold War. The norm was thus perhaps not
‘created’, but rather forged from a Liberal and idealist analysis of the status quo in international
society. Yet the norm had now been inserted into international relations discourse.
From early 2002 onwards, the new norm was championed by norm entrepreneurs, both at the
level of state actors and non-state actors. States such as Canada, Sweden, Norway, South Africa
and Tanzania championed the norm publicly and exerted diplomatic efforts behind the scenes to
generate momentum around the responsibility to protect. Similarly, non-state actors played both
public and private roles in generating support, and the importance of the personal efforts of
individuals such as Kofi Annan, Gareth Evans, Ramesh Thakur and Paul Martin, as well as the
collective efforts of organisations such as the ICG, the WFM and, later, the International Coalition
for the Responsibility to Protect should not be underestimated. Indeed, collectively, these efforts
ensured that the norm was receiving the attention of decision-makers at the highest levels.
Increasingly, Finnemore and Sikkink’s so-called ‘critical states’ (a critical state being one without
which the achievement of the substance of the norm goal is compromised) came to take the norm
on board, and to advocate either certain components or the emerging norm in its entirety. With
the support of both developed and developing countries, countries from the global north and the
global south, and the big powers, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as
regional powers, such as South Africa, Tanzania and Australia, the norm quickly gained ground
not only within multilateral institutions, but at regional and sub-regional levels as well. Processes
of contestation occurred here as well. Russia and China remained opposed to a right of unilateral
intervention, though not necessarily to the sovereignty as responsibility component of the norm,
or to interventions on a humanitarian basis. Through this discourse, the emerging norm was
framed in a logic of appropriateness which drew legitimacy from past state behaviour and which
was presented as the status quo of international society. On this basis, the responsibility to
protect was framed in discourse which highlighted the responsibilities of the state, and not any
longer the rights of the state. As this logic of appropriateness was developed, so too were the
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cognitive frames underpinning it, drawing heavily on human rights, humanitarian law and human
security discourse.
Following a period of norm contestation, and overcoming the impact of the American-led invasion
of Iraq, the responsibility to protect, having developed in legitimacy as an emerging norm in
international society, was institutionalised through the provision of an institutional platform by the
UN. Kofi Annan in 2004 endorsed the responsibility to protect through his Action Plan to Prevent
Genocide, as did the report of the High Level Panel in 2004 and the In Larger Freedom report of
2005. Indeed, in response to the Secretary General’s report on UN reform, the AU crafted a
common position on the responsibility to protect through the endorsement of the Ezulwini
Consensus, the only regional response to the proposals of the Secretary General and the first
regional endorsement of the norm. Emerging from these developments, the responsibility to
protect received the endorsement of the General Assembly in September 2005, serving both to
legitimise the norm, and to codify it in the international legal system. Kofi Annan was later to refer
to this as one of his “most precious achievements” (in Thakur and Weiss, 2009: 25). It therefore
appears as though the responsibility to protect norm emerged quite rapidly, from being forged in
late 2001 to being endorsed and codified by the UN in late 2005.
4.4 From Summit to Substance: Cascading the Responsibility to Protect Norm
Typically, norms take time to become entrenched in international society. The emergence and
development of a new norm is usually a drawn out process, and, once a new norm has become
accepted and endorsed, it must usually contend with other pre-existing norms before it finds a
place in state discourse and practice within international society. The length of time required for a
norm to move from emergence to acceptance and utilisation, termed by Finnemore and Sikkink in
the norm life cycle concept as ‘cascade’, is dependent on a variety of factors, including, but not
limited to, the nature of the norm content, the limits of application of the norm, the origin of the
norm, and the degree to which the norm encroaches on other pre-existent norms. The
responsibility to protect norm, as argued above, had already undergone processes of alteration
due to criticism directed at the legitimisation of interventions conducted on humanitarian grounds
in an international system which did not recognise the legitimacy of such forms of intervention,
the encroachment on state sovereignty which the norm entailed, and the perceived ‘Western’
nature of the norm. The norm, as endorsed by the General Assembly in 2005, therefore
represented a variation of the norm which had already taken into account the concerns of
member states, and was therefore more acceptable at large. The new norm, it would then be
expected, should cascade relatively quickly and enter into use by the UN, by regional
organisations, and by states themselves, as a process of norm contestation had already been
witnessed. Yet further challenges to the development of the norm could be found in the areas of
indeterminacy, application, contextual relevance, and operationalisation.
First, the challenge of indeterminacy means that a norm, once it has developed from the
‘emergence’ to the ‘cascade’ phases of the life cycle, can no longer be shaped by its
entrepreneurs alone. Rather, it is shaped and interpreted by whoever chooses to utilise the norm.
The norm therefore becomes open to interpretation by anyone wishing to utilise it. Thus, states
arguing before the Security Council that a responsibility to protect in a particular situation where
atrocity crimes were being committed existed could be opposed by states arguing that the
responsibility to protect lay not with other states, but with the responsible state, as a situation of
manifest failure had not yet taken occurred.
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Second, simply because a norm has been recognised by states does not guarantee that it will be
applied in the correct instances, and not misapplied in incorrect instances, either purposefully or
in error. Therefore, even once a norm has been endorsed, there is nothing which forces states to
adhere to the norm, or to enforce adherence by others. Thus, the application of the responsibility
to protect, particularly immediately following on its endorsement by the World Summit, would in
large part determine its future development. Should the United States, for example, make use of
the responsibility to protect to advocate an armed intervention along the lines of argumentation
presented in defence of the Iraq war the norm would certainly face a rapid decline. Similarly,
should a situation of supreme humanitarian emergency arise, and the responsibility to protect
was not invoked, then the relevance and usefulness of the norm would be in doubt.
Third, norms are developed and applied within a system of social relevance, be this at the
international, the regional, the national or the local level. The contextual relevance of the norm
therefore both influences its initial acceptance and endorsement as well as its use later on. If a
norm is contextually no longer relevant, or circumvented due to context-specific factors, that norm
could be rendered weakened, or, in extreme cases, even quite useless. For example, the
Security Council was mandated as the sole entity which could authorise interventions under the
responsibility to protect norm. Yet many African states felt that the AU, with its newly established
peace and security architecture, should play a central role in peace and security matters on the
continent. In an effort to reach a compromise, African states dropped their proposal in favour of
granting the Security Council the sole responsibility to authorise armed interventions. Should an
intervention under the responsibility to protect norm however in future be authorised by the AU
Peace and Security Council, without the consent of the UN Security Council, this would impact on
the responsibility to protect norm and its usefulness in guiding and regulating state behaviour in
international society.
Finally, the operationalisation of the norm, once it has become accepted, poses challenges.
Simply because a norm has been accepted does not necessarily mean that it can be easily
invoked by those states supporting it. As noted by some diplomats during a Security Council
retreat in 2002, the responsibility to protect norm would not succeed in mustering the political will,
and the financial and other resources required, to prevent or react to situations of mass atrocity
crimes. The UN, as well as regional organisations such as the EU and NATO, had already for
years been struggling to maintain their existing peace support operations, and to secure the
financial and personnel commitments from member states to meet existing mandates. A
commitment to the responsibility to protect by member states, therefore, would by no means
ensure a similar commitment to carry the costs of bearing that responsibility.
Despite these concerns, the true test of whether the norm would further develop and cascade in
international society lay in its application. Should the now endorsed responsibility to protect norm
find fertile ground, and enter into state discourse and practice, then it could be considered as
having found a firm place in international society. Norm usage by states here can imply one of
two things; either that states made reference to the responsibility to protect norm in arguing for
intervention, of whatever kind, on grounds of war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic
cleansing and genocide, or that states argued against intervention by utilising or making
reference to the responsibility to protect norm. The strength of the norm would be decided not by
the number of interventions authorised by the Security Council on the basis of the responsibility to
protect, but rather by the degree to which states made use of responsibility to protect language,
both in support of and in opposition to interventions in situations of atrocity crimes. It is therefore
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through an analysis of state practice and the discourse surrounding that practice as of September
2005 that the further development, relevance and salience of the responsibility to protect norm
can be better understood.
In April 2006 the UN Security Council for the first time invoked the responsibility to protect in a
resolution on the protection of civilians in armed conflict. Resolution 1674 reaffirmed paragraphs
138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcomes Document, reminded states of their responsibilities
both internally and externally, and urged states to assist other states in meeting their
responsibilities, whilst reaffirming the role of the Security Council as outlined in the UN Charter
(United Nations Security Council Resolution 1674, 2005). Resolution 1674 served as a
reinforcement of the responsibility to protect norm as outlined in the World Summit Outcomes
document. Supporters of the norm, as Gareth Evans notes, were pleased with this development,
exclaiming that:
the evolution of the ‘responsibility to protect’ concept from a gleam in a commission’s eye to what now might be
described as a broadly accepted international norm is an extremely encouraging story (Evans, 2006: 10).
Yet despite the enthusiasm of some supporters, the responsibility to protect could not yet be
described as a ‘broadly accepted international norm’, and required further investigation and,
perhaps more importantly, application. On 28 June 2006 the Security Council held its first open
debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, based on Resolution 1674. The
representative of the United Kingdom, Sir Emyr Jones Parry, argued that the Council held:
a shared responsibility to protect populations from large scale abuses and, in particular, from crimes against
humanity, including the prospect of genocide (in International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect,
2006[a]).
During the ensuing debate it was an African country, Ghana, which most prominently reaffirmed
the role of the responsibility to protect for the protection of civilians in armed conflict. Ghanaian
Permanent Representative Leslie Kojo argued:
It has generally been recognised, and rightly so, that the primary responsibility for the protection of civilians in
armed conflict rests with their governments. By the tenets of international humanitarian law and resolutions of
the Security Council, this responsibility has also been extended to non-state actors, especially belligerent
groups involved in the conflicts. (...) Based on my government’s firm conviction on human rights, we hold the
view that in the event of the failure by both governments and armed groups to abide by their commitments
under international humanitarian law, conventions and agreements, it behoves the United Nations to intervene
and protect innocent populations against such crimes as genocide, ethnic cleansing and other gross human
rights violations (in International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, 2009[c]).
Ghana was clearly attempting to link the responsibility to protect with the protection of civilians in
armed conflict, making the latter the operational arm of the responsibility to protect. Perhaps
agreeing with Ambassador Kojo, the Security Council met on 31 August to adopt Resolution 1706
on Sudan, reaffirming both Resolution 1674 on the protection of civilians in armed conflict and the
responsibility to protect norm as outlined in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit
Outcomes Document. On 8 January 2007 newly-appointed UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon,
in his first address to the Security Council, referred to the Council’s responsibility to protect the
victims of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. In addition, the Secretary-General
noted important achievements which could be built upon to help address peace and security
challenges in the current era, including the newly created Human Rights Council and the
responsibility to protect norm (United Nations News Centre, 2007).
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Later that same month, members of the Security Council again inserted references to the
responsibility to protect into a draft resolution on Burma (Myanmar), yet this draft was vetoed by
both China and Russia on 12 January 2007. Both countries argued that the situation in Burma
(Myanmar) did not pose a threat to regional or international peace and security, and therefore
should be treated as an internal matter. Conceding that large scale human rights violations were
taking place, and that the humanitarian situation was worsening, China and Russia argued that
more appropriate bodies, such as the newly-formed Human Rights Council, should address the
situation. On 30 April 2007 the Security Council again made reference to the responsibility to
protect in Resolution 1755, which extended the UN peacekeeping operation in Sudan (United
Nations Mission in Sudan - UNMIS) to Darfur and expressed grave concerns over the
deteriorating humanitarian situation there. The Resolution again reaffirmed the World Summit
Outcomes Document, as well as Resolution 1674 (United Nations Security Council Resolution
1755, 2007).
On 29 May 2007 another significant step was taken towards entrenching the norm when Ban Ki
Moon announced the appointment of Francis Deng, former Sudanese diplomat and the author of
the sovereignty as responsibility concept, as the Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide,
replacing Juan Mendez of Argentina. Deng took up this new post on 01 August 2007. On 31
January 2008 the Secretary General, addressing the AU Summit, stated that he was fully
committed to implementing the decisions made by African states during the 2005 World Summit,
and that he would spare no effort in operationalising the responsibility to protect (Evans, 2008:
51). Less than a month later, the Secretary General appointed Edward Luck as his Special
Adviser Focusing on the Responsibility to Protect on 21 February 2008. The Secretary General
faced stiff opposition to this move, particularly from the 5th Committee of the General Assembly
(the budget committee, which denied funding for the new post) and from member states, which
agreed to the move only once the title had been revised from its previous incarnation of ‘Special
Advisor on the Responsibility to Protect’ (International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect:
2009 [a]). With the appointment of Luck as Special Advisor, Ban Ki Moon demonstrated a
commitment both to entrenching and to operationalising the responsibility to protect norm within
the UN. Shortly after Luck’s appointment, the Secretary General commissioned a report outlining
recommendations on implementing the responsibility to protect, and on turning policy into practice
within the UN system, and tasked Luck to explore the conceptual, institutional and political
dimensions of the norm for the UN. This was the first comprehensive step that the Secretariat of
had taken related to the responsibility to protect since its endorsement by the General Assembly
in 2005. Lending some divine support, Pope Benedict XVI placed his weight behind the norm,
when in his address to the UN General Assembly in April 2008 he asserted:
Recognition of the unity of the human family, and attention to the innate dignity of every man and woman, today
find renewed emphasis in the principle of the responsibility to protect. […] This principle has to invoke the idea
of the person as image of the Creator (in Thakur and Weiss, 2009: 22 – 23).
Strengthening his commitment to the operationalisation of the norm Ban Ki Moon delivered a
speech at the Responsible Sovereignty: International Cooperation for a Changed World
conference in Berlin, Germany, on 15 July 2008, intended to clarify the responsibility to protect. In
his speech, Ban argued that the norm did not represent a new incarnation of humanitarian
intervention, but that it represented a positive and affirmative concept of sovereignty as
responsibility as developed by Francis Deng. Outlining a three-pillared approach, Ban argued that
the responsibility to protect affirmed the legal obligations of states to protect their populations
from atrocity crimes, underscored the commitment of states in international society to assist other
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states to meet these obligations, and reaffirmed the responsibility of states to respond in a timely
and decisive manner to protect populations at risk. Ban further argued that the current conception
of the norm was both narrow and deep:
Its scope is narrow, focused solely on the four crimes and violations agreed by the world leaders in 2005.
Extending the principle to cover other calamities, such as HIV/aids, climate change or responses to natural
disasters, would undermine the 2005 consensus and stretch the concept beyond recognition or operational
utility. At the same time, our response should be deep, utilising the whole prevention and protection toolkit
available to the United Nations System, to its regional, sub-regional and civil society partners and, not least, to
the Members States themselves (Ban, 2008).
The Secretary General also used the speech to deflate criticism that the norm represented an
essentially Western concept which had been forced on developing countries, arguing that the
foundations for the norm had been created by Francis Deng, and the development of which had
been driven by two prominent Africans: Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan (Ban, 2008).
Through this speech, the Secretary General attempted to achieve three things. First, Ban
attempted to reinforce the notion that the responsibility to protect was an established and
accepted norm. The challenge now lay not in gaining acceptance for the norm, but in
operationalising it by turning policy into practice. Second, Ban put in place the three pillars of
operationalisation of the norm, which would re-appear in his report on the same topic a few
months later. Third, Ban attempted to widen the norm to more closely resemble its initial format.
Much of the debate preceding the 2005 World Summit had centred on whether or not a right of
armed intervention existed, and during the Summit debate tended to centre on where the right to
authorise armed intervention resided. Following the World Summit, debate within and outside of
the UN centred on when an armed intervention might be considered legitimate, and debate in the
Security Council had focused on linking the responsibility to protect to the protection of civilians in
armed combat. Thus, the focus on the armed intervention component of the responsibility to
protect had detracted from the responsibilities to prevent and rebuild, turning the concept from the
responsibility to protect into the responsibility to react.
By focusing his speech on a three-pillared approach, and by highlighting the importance of states’
acceptance of their responsibility to protect populations from atrocity crimes through a range of
responses under Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the Charter as the implementation of the third pillar,
Ban reinforced an understanding of the norm as a wide-ranging responsibility, involving not
individual responses but a systematic approach at the domestic, regional and international levels
to prevent and react to atrocity crimes. Ban’s speech therefore was important in reinforcing a
more holistic understanding of the responsibility to protect than had perhaps been developed
since the 2005 World Summit.
Building on this, the Secretary General released his report titled Implementing the Responsibility
to Protect on 12 January 2009. The report, broadly speaking, was a re-iteration of the three-
pillared approach which Ban had outlined in his Berlin speech in July 2008, focusing on a tiered
approach towards the responsibility to protect. Overall however, the report focused not on
revisiting the responsibility to protect debates of the past, but on the means of concretising and
operationalising the norm within the UN and international society more broadly. As argued by the
report, the Secretary General felt that the best means of discouraging states or groups of states
from misusing the norm for inappropriate purposes lay in fully developing UN strategies,
processes, tools and practices for the implementation of the norm (United Nations General
Assembly Report A/63/677, 2009: 1). Emphasising the three-pillared approach, the Secretary
General elaborated on the operational means of reinforcing and supporting the protection
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responsibilities of the state, international assistance and capacity-building towards supporting
states in meeting their responsibility to protect, and the delivery of timely and decisive responses
when required. In elaborating on the operationalisation of the norm, the Secretary General
embedded the responsibility to protect within existing UN and regional and sub-regional conflict
management responses, arguing that the responsibility to protect should be constituted in
strengthened conflict analysis, early warning, mediation, conflict prevention, peacekeeping and
peacebuilding responses if it was to be an effective norm for preventing and reacting to atrocity
crimes. Ban also used the report to call for a review of the voluntary restriction of veto use by the
permanent members of the Security Council, of the creation of criteria to guide the
implementation of the norm by the Security Council, and of collaboration between the UN and
regional bodies. All of these were of course matters outstanding from the 2005 World Summit,
and the Secretary General used the opportunity to urge member states to again drive discussions
on these, to him critical, areas of contention forward.
Following the release of the report, the General Assembly convened its first debate on the
responsibility to protect on 23 July 2009, which continued on 24 and 28 July 2009. This debate
led to the adoption of Resolution 63/308 on 7 October 2009, the first Resolution adopted by the
UN solely on the topic of the responsibility to protect (United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 63/308: 2009). The Resolution, in all its brevity, did no more than to affirm the
continued consideration of the responsibility to protect by the General Assembly, but it was the
clearest affirmation of the responsibility to protect as a norm in international society since the
2005 World Summit. The fact that the General Assembly agreed to a resolution simply affirming
the responsibility to protect and the need for further debate on the norm also provides an
indication of the degree to which the norm had cascaded since 2005, not just in the West, but
also among developing countries. The draft resolution was sponsored by Guatemala, and co-
sponsored by 67 Member States, including Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Fiji, Haiti, India,
Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Papua New-Guinea, Peru, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago and
Uruguay. Among African states the resolution was co-sponsored by Benin, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Madagascar, Rwanda, Swaziland, and Tanzania
(International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, 2009[b]).
Yet not all states were pleased with the adoption of the Resolution, and, following the vote,
Venezuela, Cuba, Syria, Sudan, Iran, Ecuador and Nicaragua took the floor. All stressed that the
resolution was a procedural one which did not commit the General Assembly to implementing the
responsibility to protect norm. Further, these states argued that the norm could be abused by
powerful states to interfere in the affairs of weaker ones. The Iranian representative went further,
stating that states remained far from having achieved a consensual understanding of the
responsibility to protect, let alone the emergence of such an authoritative norm, and that the
failure of the UN to respond effectively to atrocity crimes in the past had not been the result of the
absence of a normative framework, but due to the failure of the Security Council to act when
required. Sudanese representative argued that no consensus existed as to the applicability of the
norm to current political realities (International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, 2009[b]).
Yet Sudan was the only state to argue that the norm was poorly aligned to existing political
realities, and indeed the only African state to feel the need to explain its rejection of the norm.
Apart from these states, no other nations felt the need to argue against the adoption of the
resolution, which was adopted unanimously.
It is apparent that the responsibility to protect norm ‘cascaded’ in international society between
2005 and 2010 relatively rapidly, becoming further codified, institutionalised and entrenched in
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international organisation. Indeed, the norm was included in several Security Council resolutions,
strengthening the jus cogens and customary law value of the responsibility to protect. Certainly,
contestation also characterised this phase of the norm’s development, witnessed in particular by
the Chinese and Russian veto of the draft resolution on Burma (Myanmar), and the opposition of
the 5th Committee to the appointment of a Special Advisor on the Responsibility to Protect. Yet,
increasingly, this opposition appears to have diminished, resulting in the unanimous adoption of
General Assembly Resolution 63/308 on the responsibility to protect norm in October 2009. The
perceived opposition towards the norm on the part of the global South also failed to materialise. It
was feared in particular that African states, apparently strong supporters of traditional
interpretations of the sovereignty norm, would prove reluctant to support the entrenchment of the
responsibility to protect in international society. Yet, as Paul Williams has demonstrated, between
2005 and early 2009, seven African states (Burkina Faso, Congo, Ghana, Libya, South Africa,
Tanzania and Uganda) had sat as non-permanent members of the Security Council, and a further
eight (Angola, Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal and Sudan) had participated in
the Council’s debates on the responsibility to protect. Of these, it was only Sudan that was
explicitly opposed to the responsibility to protect, and even then Sudan was supportive of some
components of the norm (Williams, 2009: 403).
The norm therefore appears to have cascaded at the level of the UN quite quickly, and became
an increasingly fixed feature in political discourse. Indeed, notions of intervention on humanitarian
grounds, which had previously been used to focus discussions on responses to humanitarian
emergencies, appear to have become replaced by responsibility to protect discourse, with
humanitarian intervention increasingly coming to refer to acts of humanitarianism, and no longer
interventions on humanitarian grounds. Taking the above into account, and from a norm
development perspective, it could then be argued that the responsibility to protect had become a
relatively salient norm in international society within a short space of time.
At the same time as the norm appeared to be gaining ground in the UN, another development
was taking place in Africa which would impact on the development trajectory of the responsibility
to protect norm. At the turn of the 20th century, African states transformed the OAU into the AU,
and under the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) developed a
robust interventionist framework for the maintenance of peace and security on the continent. As
will be explored below, this development held important consequences for the future formulation
of responses to threats to international peace and security, and for the conduct of interventions
designed to halt the commission of atrocity crimes in Africa.
4.5 The Evolving African Peace and Security Architecture:
Institutionalising the Responsibility to Protect?
The transition from the Organisation of African Unity to the African Union in 2002 represented a
turning point on the African continent. The OAU, which had been launched in 1963, had operated
on the basis of four principles, namely (1) that imperialism represented a principal obstacle to
African unity, and that the continent should work to address its own challenges, (2) that the
sovereign equality of states was an inviolable norm, and that the OAU and African states should
work on the basis of consensus, (3) that intervention in the affairs of member states was
unacceptable, and (4) on the basis of uti possideitis, that state borders were inviolable (Williams,
2007: 265). The OAU was therefore created on the basis of the needs of its member states at the
time, and within the dynamics of the Cold War and of the period of decolonization. The
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organisation’s security culture was reflective of this, and while the Charter reinforced state
security (and by default, regime security), broader notions of collective security were sidelined. As
John Akokpari notes, the establishment of the OAU barely improved the fortunes of human rights
in Africa. On the contrary, in addition to sanctioning the continent’s arbitrary and hastily
demarcated boundaries, the OAU adopted principles which left human rights questions at the
discretion of its member states (Akokpari, 2008[b]: 2).
Increasingly, as debates around good governance, transparency, human rights and
democratization intensified throughout the 1990s, so too were these debates linked to efforts
aimed at conflict prevention on the continent. During the Harare summit in June 1997 and again
the Algiers summit in July 1999, debate came to centre on whether or not the OAU should be
vested with a right of intervention in the international affairs of member states to protect human
rights and constitutional order. Increasingly, consensus was being established that the OAU
notions of sovereignty and non-interference should be revised, infused with a more nuanced
understanding of sovereignty which was more akin to the notion of sovereignty as responsibility
(Mwanasali, 2006: 90). Following the Algiers Summit in July 1999, it was Libyan leader Muamar
Gadaffi who called for an extraordinary summit at the level of Heads of State and Government to
discuss ways and means of making the OAU more effective and relevant to the continent. Thus,
in Sirte on 9 September 1999 Gadaffi presented his grandiose vision of a United States of Africa,
complete with a unified defence capability, a single currency and a powerful central leadership.
Following heated exchanges in Libya, member states agreed to a process of transitioning the
OAU into the African Union, of negotiating a new Constitutive Act, and of strengthening the scope
and mandate of the organisation (Baimu and Sturman, 2003: 38). By July 2000, discussions on
the work of the new AU had been completed, and during the Lomé summit that month the
Constitutive Act of the African Union was adopted. The intention was to launch the AU at another
extraordinary summit in Libya in 2001, yet at the Lusaka summit in 2001 it was decided that
South Africa should host the inauguration, given the role the country had played in drafting the
Constitutive Act, and the emphasis which had been placed in the Act on the advancement of
human rights, democracy and good governance. As the newest member of the OAU, South
African President Thabo Mbeki travelled to Libya to seek Gadaffi’s blessing to have the African
Union launched in South Africa, in exchange for accepting Libya into the New African Partnership
for African Development (NEPAD) (Baimu and Sturman, 2003: 38). It was thus that the AU was
inaugurated in Durban, South Africa, in June 2002, replacing the OAU 39 years after its founding.
The Constitutive Act tasked the AU with a range of objectives related to the political, social and
economic integration of the African continent, the promotion and advancement of human rights,
regional integration, good governance, sustainable development, and the promotion and defence
of common African positions in international society. Yet the radical departures from the OAU
were to be seen in the strength of the peace and security mandate vested in the African Union.
Already as the transition from the OAU to the AU was being prepared, it became evident that the
former principles of non-intervention and sovereign inviolability were coming under assault.
Through the late 1990s, the OAU began to play a key role in mediation efforts in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. In 1997, the OAU requested ECOWAS to intervene militarily in Sierra
Leone following a coup in that country. The intervention again was conducted without UN
Security Council authorisation, and once more took the UN by surprise, although, as previously,
the intervention was later praised by the Security Council (Sarkin, 2008: 46 - 49). In 1999, the
OAU intervened in what would later turn out to be the first of many crises in Côte d’Ivoire
(Mwanasali, 2008: 50). In 2000, in contrast to its earlier silence on the matter, the OAU helped
broker a peace deal between Ethiopia and Eritrea following a two-year revival of the armed
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conflict between the two countries. That same year, the OAU also adopted the Declaration
Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government (Sarkin, 2008: 46
- 49).
Traditional interpretations of the principles of non-intervention and state sovereignty, which had
underpinned the workings of the OAU for four decades, were increasingly coming under assault.
During the discussions leading up to the adoption of the Constitutive Act in July 2000, negotiating
teams had reflected on the inadequacies of the OAU’s peace and security arrangements, and
had generally come to a shared acceptance that the African Union should work to ensure the
protection of civilians in conflict situations, and in particular from war crimes, crimes against
humanity and genocide – atrocities which had haunted the continent even through the 1990s.
Interestingly, it was also during the Lomé summit that the OAU’s Panel on the Rwandan
Genocide presented its report, which contained scathing criticism of the OAU, the United Nations
and states at large. The release of the report focussed discussion in Lomé on two issues in
particular; the authorisation of interventions in situations where atrocity crimes are committed and
the need to add the preservation of political stability, in particular in a post-conflict setting, to
legitimation for interventions. It was therefore decided in Lomé that interventions conducted by
the new AU in the most extreme of circumstances should be authorised at the highest political
level, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, and that the preservation of political
stability constituted a legitimate reason for intervention (a decision which was incorporated into
the Constitutive Act at the Maputo summit in 2003) (Mwanasali, 2006: 92). The AU, it seemed,
was going to provide a far more interventionist peace and security architecture than its
predecessor had. When the organisation was launched in 2002, the Constitutive Act clearly
reflected this.
Article 3(b) of the Constitutive Act articulates that a primary objective of the Union is to defend the
sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its member states, yet Article 3(f) clearly
states that a further primary objective of the Union is the promotion of peace, security and stability
on the continent, while Article 3(h) mandates the Union to promote and protect human and
people’s rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights and other
relevant international human rights instruments. The principles by which the Union would operate
to reconcile these, perhaps at first glance somewhat contradictory, objectives were laid out in
Article 4 of the Constitutive Act. Article 4(a) upholds the sovereign equality and interdependence
among member states, while Article 4(f) prohibits the use of force or threat of use of force among
member states, and Article 4(g) prevents the interference by member states in the affairs of one
another. However, Article 4(h) provides the Union with the right of intervention in a member state,
pursuant to a decision at the level of Assembly of Heads of State and Government, in respect of
grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. Article 4(j)
further provides member states with the right to request the Union to restore peace and security
in other member states. Therefore, while member states were prohibited from interfering in each
other’s affairs, the Union was vested with full rights of intervention on behalf of member states,
where this was authorised by the Assembly. Article 4(m) mandates the Union to uphold respect
for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance, while Article 4(o)
mandates the Union to respect the sanctity of human life, and to condemn and reject impunity,
political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities (African Union, 200: 4 – 6).
Importantly, the Constitutive Act was not framed as narrowly as the UN Charter, and the definition
of intervention is not restricted to the use of force. Indeed, the definition is left open, and therefore
has both in theory and in practice come to include early warning measures, mediation efforts, the
74
use of good offices, sanctions, the deployment of peace support operations, post-conflict efforts,
and other non-forcible and forcible measures. While the scope of the intervention mandate would
come to be refined in later years, the most remarkable of achievements had already been made;
the AU Constitutive Act allowed for intervention on the part of the Union without the consent of
the host government. This development, as Tim Murithi and Angela Ndinga-Muvumba have
argued, placed notions of human security at the very centre of the African Union (2008: 7).
Mwanasali goes further, arguing that this development constituted a “normative revolution” in the
history of the continent (2006: 92).
To operationalise this new interventionist peace and security regime, the 1st ordinary session of
the Assembly of the AU, meeting in Durban on 9 July 2002, adopted the Protocol Relating to the
Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. The Protocol allowed for
the creation of what has commonly been referred to as the African Peace and Security
Architecture, the operational organs of the Union’s peace and security framework. In essence, the
Protocol mandated the establishment of the Peace and Security Council, as well as its supporting
structures. The Peace and Security Council would replace the defunct Central Organ of the
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution established in 1993, and would
be the central standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of
conflicts, supported by collective arrangements to facilitate timely and efficient responses to
conflict and crisis situations in Africa. The Protocol set out the entry points, determined the
modalities for action and identified the institutional arrangements that would support the work of
the Council in the fulfilment of its responsibilities for conflict prevention and management in
Africa. The Council was however one of several organs mandated with a peace and security role.
Indeed, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Executive Council of the African
Union, the Pan-African Parliament, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, the Panel
of the Wise, the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee were all mandated with
roles in the maintenance of peace and security. In addition, the regional economic communities
were mandated with conflict prevention, human rights protection, and in some cases, such as
SADC and ECOWAS, with explicit peace and security responsibilities (Sarkin, 2008: 58).
Yet the Peace and Security Council would be the central mechanism in the maintenance of peace
and security on the African continent. The launch of the Council in 2004 was described by some
observers as a “momentous event” in the articulation of the doctrine of non-indifference on the
African continent (Mwanasali, 2008: 44). At its first formal session in May 2004, the Peace and
Security Council reaffirmed the commitment of African leaders to the “promotion of a stable,
secure, peaceful and developed Africa” and the “desire to assume a greater role in the
maintenance of peace and security in Africa”. Political leaders were quick to emphasise that a
new era of non-indifference was dawning, which they hailed a radical departure from the OAU
policy of non-interference, which had crippled it and made it powerless to prevent violent conflicts
from consuming the continent (Mwanasali, 2008: 41). The first Chairperson of the AU
Commission, Alpha Omar Konaré, liked to refer to the doctrine of non-indifference as ingérence
courtoise (courteous interference), and argued that the Union was empowered both with a legal
basis and powerful guiding normative principles that would legitimise intrusion in the affairs of
member states (Mwanasali, 2008: 42). The interventionist stance of the AU appeared to have
solid backing, and already during its first year of existence, the Peace and Security Council would
come to hold more sessions than its defunct predecessor, the Central Organ of the Mechanism
for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (established in 1993), had held in its ten
years of existence (Mwanasali, 2008: 44). In 2004, with the Panel of the Wise and the Pan-
African Parliament established, the Common African Defence and Security Policy adopted and
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the African Standby Force rapidly being developed, it appeared certain that the African Union
would come to play a far more prominent role in peace and security on the African continent in
the years to come.
One challenge left open-ended in the initial discussions on the Constitutive Act would however
likely come to the fore very quickly. Both the Constitutive Act and the Peace and Security
Protocol took note of and reaffirmed the provisions of the UN Charter, in particular Chapter VIII as
related to the role of regional arrangements in the maintenance of international peace and
security. Yet in both documents, the AU is empowered to authorise interventions without explicit
clarification on whether prior Security Council authorisation is required or not. Ben Kioko noted
that when this matter was addressed in negotiations, the requirement for Security Council
authorisation was dismissed, reflecting a deep sense of frustration with the slow pace of reform of
the international order and with instances in which states were perceived to have failed the
African continent (Kioko, 2003: 821). Indeed, as Kioko argued, African leaders displayed
themselves willing to:
[...] push the frontiers of collective stability and security to the limit without any regard for legal niceties such as
the authorisation of the Security Council” (Kioko, 2003: 821).
Mwanasali similarly argued that the recognition that the Security Council had failed in its
responsibilities towards the African continent ran so deep that member states decided, through
the African Union, to acquire the greatest degree of self-sufficiency possible in matters of peace
and security (2008: 55).
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter authorizes regional arrangements to deal with matters of peace
and security in their regions. This is subject to two conditions; first that no enforcement action is
taken without the Security Council’s authorization, and second that the Security Council is at all
times informed of the activities undertaken or contemplated by regional organizations in the
maintenance of regional peace and security. When the matter needed to be addressed, in
particular in the build-up to the 2005 UN World Summit where it was perceived that an
opportunity for genuine reform of the United Nations had presented itself, the AU articulated its
position on Security Council authorisation for intervention. In the Ezulwini Consensus, African
states argued that while the UN should not abdicate its responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security, and that regional organisations should intervene when
necessary with the approval of the Security Council, under certain circumstances where urgent
action was required, it would be sufficient for approval to be granted post-facto. The reasoning
provided was that:
Since the General Assembly and the Security Council are often far from the scenes of conflicts and may not be
in a position to undertake effectively a proper appreciation of the nature and development of conflict situations,
it is imperative that regional organizations, in areas of proximity to conflicts, are empowered to take actions in
this regard (African Union, 2005[a]: 6).
Through empowering itself to intervene in the affairs of member states, in particular in respect of
grave circumstances including war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and
genocide, the AU adopted the most interventionist collaborative security arrangement in the
world. In particular its right of intervention, rested on notions of sovereignty as responsibility, were
revolutionary given that they were negotiated before the ICISS was launched, and well before the
notion of responsibility to protect first appeared in international discourse. Many commentators
argued that the AU was the first organisation to give meaning to the responsibility to protect norm,
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despite the fact that no legal document of the Union has made reference to the concept
(Mwanasali, 2006: 95). As Mwanasali argued, it would be reasonable to assert that, even in the
absence of a specific reference by the AU to the responsibility to protect before the Ezulwini
Consensus, the Constitutive Act and the Peace and Security Protocol provided a sufficient legal
basis for the AU to operationalise the responsibility to protect norm (2006: 95). Others saw an
even closer alignment between the peace and security architecture of the continent and the
responsibility to protect. Williams, for example, argued that the Union’s security architecture was
in many ways being built around the ideas set out in the responsibility to protect, and was
arguably the first region in the world to institutionalise the ideas in a systematic manner,
representing the closest institutional embodiment of the responsibility to protect’s three-pillar
structure, as laid out by the UN in 2009 (2009: 399 - 400). Kwesi Aning and Samuel Atuobi
similarly argue that the African peace and security architecture embodies norms and principles
which mirror the responsibility to protect (2009: 92).
4.6 Prospects for Dealing with Conflicts Characterised by Atrocity Crimes in Africa
As demonstrated above, the AU was provided with a powerful mandate by its member states to
prevent and respond in particular to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. To many
observers, it appeared as though the AU had become the first multilateral organisation to truly
embrace the responsibility to protect norm and to operationalise it through the Union’s peace and
security structures (Aning and Atuobi, 2009). Given the relatively rapid emergence and cascade
of the responsibility to protect norm in the UN, and the concomitant development of a strongly
interventionist AU mandated in particular to prevent and respond to conflicts characterised by
atrocity crimes, the assumption that interventions conducted on humanitarian grounds in Africa,
either by the AU or the UN, or by the two organisations working in unison, would receive greater
attention could easily be drawn. Indeed, given the entrenchment of the responsibility to protect
norm in the UN and its mirroring in the AU, the assumption that responsibility to protect discourse
would increasingly come to inform the formulation and conduct of interventions on humanitarian
grounds could easily be drawn. Indeed, the conceptual underpinnings of the responsibility to
protect seemed to resonate well across the African continent. During the UN Security Council
debate on the responsibility to protect held on 9 December 2005, Benin, Rwanda and Tanzania
all provided strong support to the norm. The Rwandan representative drew on his country’s own
traumatic past, before arguing forcefully that international “business as usual” was inadequate
and could no longer prevail, arguing that the use of Chapter VII action where states failed to live
up to their sovereign responsibilities was not only justified but indeed required. The representative
from Benin ventured further, arguing that the collective responsibility to protect was the basis for
the creation of the AUI, and that its structures concerned with the maintenance of peace and
security represented an embodiment of the responsibility to protect norm (Williams, 2007: 275 -
276). Similarly, the new Commissioner for Peace and Security in the AU, Said Djinnit, argued
that:
Africans cannot watch the tragedies developing in the continent and say it is the UN’s responsibility or
somebody else’s responsibility. We cannot as Africans remain indifferent to the tragedy of our people (in
Williams, 2007: 276).
Both the development and the entrenchment of the responsibility to protect in the international
system, in particular at the level of the UN, and the apparent positive resonance of the norm
across the African continent appeared to indicate that the norm would play a role in the
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formulation of international interventions on humanitarian grounds, in particular in conflict
situations characterised by the commission of atrocity crimes. Indeed, the endorsement of the
responsibility to protect norm by the UN and the development of a strongly interventionist peace
and security regime in Africa commensurate to the content claims of the responsibility to protect
norm itself appeared to indicate that the norm had become relatively salient in a short space of
time.
The challenge with this observation, however, is that its utility must be clarified. Arguing that a
norm appears to be salient does not shed sufficient light on the impact that this norm can or could
be expected to have in international organisation. Rather, the relevance of this norm salience
must be explored further. As highlighted elsewhere in this study, it is clear that norms do not
determine behaviour, and the existence of a norm does not guarantee that states will adhere to
the prescriptive, enabling or constraining components of the norm. Thus, norms do not determine
behaviour, nor can they serve as a framework through which to predict behaviour at an actor or
system level. Norms do however influence the behaviour of actors, through their enabling or
constraining components tied to cognitive frameworks or a logic of appropriateness. Therefore,
norms either enable or constrain actor behaviour; enabling new forms of behaviour which were
not previously possible, or constraining forms of behaviour which were previously admissible, on
the basis of appeals to a reframed logic of appropriateness. If a norm is relatively salient, in that it
has emerged, developed, become institutionalised and codified, and has attained a general level
of acceptance as a norm, then it could be expected that evidence of the impact of the norm
should be witnessed in the international system through state practice and the discourse
surrounding that practice. Here, reference to the norm would either be made to justify the actions
of states in the international system, or states would argue that the norm did not apply to a certain
type of action, or actions which violated the norm would be justified as a necessary violation of an
acknowledged norm. Therefore, a fair dialectical expectation of a salient norm would be to
witness this norm featuring in the international system, not necessarily in that states either comply
with or act in contravention to the norm, but that the norm features in actor discourse surrounding
state practice.
With regards to the responsibility to protect norm, and extrapolating from the above analysis, it
could be argued that, given the rapid development, entrenchment, institutionalisation and
codification of the norm, it would play a prominent role in state discourse and practice in cases of
war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and genocide. Naturally, the norm
development process must be taken into account, and it should be anticipated that the norm
would play a more prominent role as its salience increased in the international system. Overall,
however, in cases where the norm should apply, based on an assessment of the norm content, it
should reasonably be expected that responsibility to protect discourse would feature in actor
discourse. Therefore, as the strength of the norm increased over time, it should be expected that
the norm would come to feature in discourse surrounding state behaviour in response to
humanitarian emergencies, and that state action (or inaction) would be justified within the same
logic of appropriateness as that which governs the norm. Here, then, it could be expected that
responses to future humanitarian emergencies should not witness debate on whether or not a
right of intervention existed, or whether a humanitarian emergency was to be considered an
internal matter or a matter of international peace and security. Rather, it would be expected that
dialogue surrounding a humanitarian emergency would be framed within the discourse of the
responsibility to protect. Therefore, in a humanitarian emergency, a dialectical expectation of the
responsibility to protect norm would be that states, in deliberating on and designing their
responses, would use the responsibility to protect norm as a framework, as a reference point, or
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as a socially weighted argument in favour of, or in opposition to, a course of action. In essence,
and in its most simple form, it could be reasonably expected that the responsibility to protect norm
would impact on state behaviour, evidenced through discourse analysis, in cases of war crimes,
crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and genocide. This is not to argue that the
responsibility to protect would actually succeed in attaining the substance of its content goal
(ensuring the prevention of and meaningful reaction to atrocity crimes), but certainly that it would
impact on state behaviour, or be of relevance in decision-making, in these situations. If a norm is
salient, which as argued above the responsibility to protect was rapidly becoming, then this
dialectical expectation should hold.
Thus far, this study has focussed on generating an understanding of how norms develop in the
international system, and has applied this understanding to tracking the emergence and
development of the responsibility to protect norm in international society. The findings thus far
indicate that the norm emerged from 2001 to 2005, and from 2005 onwards entered into what has
been labelled the cascade phase of norm development. While much of this norm development
was centred around the UN as an institutional platform, the transition from the OAU to the AU,
and the development of a strongly interventionist peace and security regime, appears to have
reinforced the responsibility to protect norm, and much of the security thinking underpinning the
AU was commensurate with the principles underpinning the responsibility to protect norm. The
dialectical expectation therefore would be that the norm would increasingly be of relevant to
decision-making on intervention on humanitarian grounds, and would feature in discourse
surrounding state practice.
However, as will be demonstrated throughout the remainder of this study, a major discrepancy
quickly emerged with regards to the responsibility to protect norm. At the same time as the norm
emerged, developed, became institutionalised, was further codified, and became increasingly
entrenched in international society, a humanitarian crisis began to unfold in the Darfur region of
Sudan. The conflicts in the Darfur region quickly came to test not only the resolve of the AU and
the UN, but also came to test the utility of the responsibility to protect norm itself. Chapter 5 will
assess the manner in which the norm was applied in response to the conflicts in Darfur from 2003
to 2005, the same time period in which the norm was in the emergence phase of development.
Chapter 6 will in turn assess the manner in which the norm was applied to the Darfur conflicts
over the period 2005 through 2010, the same time period in which the norm was in the cascade
phase of development. This assessment will be conducted in an attempt to gain insight into
whether the responsibility to protect norm contributed to the formulation of effective responses to
the kinds of conflict situations it was designed for. Building on this analysis, chapter 7 will assess
how future responses to conflicts characterised by atrocity crimes in Africa may be formulated,
and what role the responsibility to protect norm may play in future.
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Chapter 5
–
Whose Responsibility to Protect? Responses to the Darfur Conflicts from 2003 – 2005
5.1 Introduction
While a general sense of optimism accompanied the launch of the AU and the new peace and
security architecture of the continent, few member states or Commission staff could anticipate
that the organisation would at its very creation come to face a conflict that would shake it to its
core, and force it to confront every normative contradiction embedded within its founding
documents, and which would come to define the African understanding of and approach to the
responsibility to protect. As the Peace and Security Council was inaugurated in Addis Ababa in
May 2004, accompanied by a ceremony in which fifteen African leaders released white doves as
messengers of peace and symbols of the determination to bring an end to decades of misery,
pain and suffering inflicted on the African people, one of the worst conflicts the African continent
has witnessed was already raging in Darfur, in the Western regions of Sudan. The conflict would
be the first to be addressed by the new Peace and Security Council, and would prove to confound
it and the work of the AU for years to come. Indeed, the conflict in Darfur would at times pit the
AU and the UN directly against one another, and would test whether the responsibility to protect,
increasingly embedded in the work of both organisations, held any relevance at all when it came
to responding to the worst of atrocity crimes on the African continent.
This chapter will track international responses, in particular at the level of the UN and the AU, to
the conflicts in Darfur between 2003 and 2005, focussing in particular on the role played by the
responsibility to protect norm, in its emergence phase, to assess whether the norm at this early
stage in its development proved of relevance or benefit when responses to the Darfur conflicts
were being formulated.
5.2 Delving into Darfur: Sailing into the Perfect Storm
Darfur increasingly came to dominate political discourse from 2003 onwards, yet the origins of the
conflicts, and the dynamics which sustained them, are rooted in the history of Darfur and of
Sudan itself. Darfur had remained an independent sultanate until 1916, when it was forcefully
incorporated into Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. While initially a centre of power in colonial Sudan,
Sudanese independence in 1956 initiated a spiral of marginalization, neglect and impoverishment
for Darfur, with Khartoum focused increasingly on developing northern Sudan and waging war
against renegade elements in the South (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 134). The rise of the
theocratic state in 1989, dominated by riverian elites from Northern Sudan and from Khartoum,
brought further repression and an intensification of the North-South conflict, pursued more
vigorously and violently by the new military regime in Khartoum. The period also witnessed an
intensification of conflict between Khartoum and peripheral areas of Sudan. Indeed, the 1990s
were a decade when Sudanese state was confronted with the emergence of armed movements
in the West, East and Centre, while the armed movements of the South had fought Khartoum into
a stalemate from which it was not likely to be able to extract itself through the use of traditional
military means (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 32). As Khartoum focussed its attention on finding a
negotiated end to the North-South conflict, several opposition movements, some armed, others
political in nature, rapidly sprung up in Darfur, the largest of which were the Justice and Equality
Movement (JEM) and the Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM). Khartoum however from the
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outset refused to engage with the JEM and the SLM on a political level, and the movements
turned increasingly to the use of armed insurrection. From 2000 onwards, intermittent conflict
commenced between the armed movements and the police and armed forces in Darfur. Yet the
armed movements mostly focused their efforts on attacking police stations, small garrisons and
administrative facilities, and the conflict did not draw the attention of Khartoum, which left the
regional administrative authorities to deal with the ‘tribal’ conflict.
Khartoum had assumed by the end of 2002 that the small insurrection in Darfur had been nipped
in the bud, and was at the time largely unprepared for the emergence of a military threat in the
West, with most of its forces deployed in the South. Yet by early 2003 the armed movements had
rapidly gained ground, threatening to take control of Darfur from Khartoum (Flint and de Waal,
2008: 121). In Khartoum’s calculation, the stakes were high, as the conflict had the potential of
destabilizing the central government at a time when its attention was focused on regaining
international legitimacy through the North-South peace process, where it was negotiating from a
position of strength (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 151). Khartoum was however not able to utilize
the regular armed forces in quelling the uprising, due to the high number of Darfuri soldiers
serving in the national army, and the need to maintain a robust military presence in the South.
Thus, Khartoum resorted to the use of a counter-insurgency campaign in Darfur, modelled on
similar campaigns which had been conducted in South Sudan and in the Nuba Mountains in
previous years (Clough, 2005: 3). The government armed and deployed the Janjaweed, tribal
groups supplied with weapons and promises of financial reward in return for engaging the armed
movements on Khartoum’s behalf. The Janjaweed, working alongside the intelligence services,
the regular armed forces and the national police, quickly unleashed a reign of terror in Darfur,
fighting not only the SLM and the JEM directly, but focusing their destructive power on the
communities from which the armed movements had emerged, and which provided shelter and
supplies to them. Khartoum thus focused both on engaging the movements directly, and on
destroying the communities which enabled them operate. A brutal conflict ensued, characterized
by millions of displacements, hundreds of thousands of combatant and non-combatant deaths, a
scorched earth policy on the part of the government, rape, mutilation, aerial bombing of villages
and communities, forced starvation, mass killings, and the commission of war crimes and crimes
against humanity, perpetrated on all sides.
Yet when Darfur first erupted onto the international stage in mid-2003, the attention of the world’s
foreign policy-makers was not focussed on Sudan. Indeed, international attention was squarely
focussed on conflicts in Iraq and, to a lesser extent at the time, in Afghanistan. What little
attention was directed towards Sudan was focused squarely on the Naivasha peace process in
Kenya, which held the potential of finally bringing an end to the North-South conflict. Thus policy-
makers in Western capitals tended to ignore the emerging Darfur conflict as a distraction from
broader efforts aimed at bringing peace to Sudan. Khartoum exploited this opening, quickly
escalating the conflict in Darfur both through regular but mostly through irregular military means,
and attempted to isolate Darfur from international attention, imposing tight travel restrictions to the
region, even for Sudanese citizens (Clough, 2005: 3). Both the UN and non-governmental
organizations thus found themselves having to travel to Chad to assess the situation in Darfur.
The American Embassy in Khartoum began to include reports of ethnic cleansing in its internal
cables to Washington, but these had little impact, and policy-makers in Washington were not
particularly interested in a further complication in their Sudan policy (Flint and de Waal, 2008:
169).
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During the summer of 2003, an increasing number of representatives from Darfur arrived in
Khartoum, pleading with the UN for protection from the Janjaweed and government forces. By
September, the UN Resident Coordinator, Mukesh Kapila, sent a report detailing atrocities in
Darfur to New York and requested guidance. Yet the Security Council and the troika of Norway,
the United States and the United Kingdom, who were leading the North-South mediation efforts,
feared that engaging Khartoum on Darfur would stall progress in the Naivasha negotiations, as
the SPLM and Khartoum had already reached a ceasefire agreement in October 2002, and
diplomats believed that a final settlement was only weeks or months away (Traub, 2010: 5-6).
Darfur was therefore not prioritized. Kapila could also not elicit much interest among diplomats in
Khartoum, and in October 2003 travelled to Washington and European capitals, briefing officials
there on the deteriorating humanitarian situation and the string of atrocities taking place, and
urging for Darfur to be placed on the agenda of the Security Council. No interest was forthcoming
however (Traub, 2010: 6). On 30 November, the UN office in Khartoum issued a briefing to New
York estimating that 600,000 Darfuris had been displaced, and that the humanitarian situation in
Darfur could soon emerge as the worst humanitarian crisis in Africa. The report recommended
strong international pressure be placed on Khartoum to control the militias. The report again fell
on deaf ears however (Traub, 2010: 6-7). Yet by December Kapila’s reports had gained some
traction, and Jan Egeland, the UN’s chief humanitarian coordinator, and Kofi Annan within days of
one another convened press conferences stating that Darfur had already become the worst
humanitarian crisis in the world (Traub, 2010: 7). The Security Council however refused to take
up the matter.
Increasingly, the conflict was spiralling out of control, with the armed movements engaged in
continued acts of defiance against government forces, and the government responding with
increasingly brutal acts of retaliation against the movements and the civilian population. Despite
efforts to keep Darfur off the international agenda, pressure from non-governmental organizations
and humanitarian agencies, the obstruction of humanitarian efforts on the part of the Sudanese
government, and the rapidly escalating numbers of displaced persons raised a crescendo of
condemnation, which swiftly led to accusations that genocide was being committed in Darfur
(Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 152). Making the most of these developments, JEM members began
to portray the conflict in Darfur as genocide by early 2004, both within and outside of Sudan,
calculating that a successful portrayal of the conflict as genocide would serve to delegitimise the
government in Khartoum, would contribute to fostering regime change, and perhaps would even
forestall independence in the South (Flint and de Waal, 2008: 101). Labelling the conflict as
‘genocide’ however did not gain much traction at the time, and Western policy-makers were keen
to steer away from any such portrayals of what was keenly portrayed at the time to be nothing
more than a humanitarian emergency.
By early 2004 Jan Egeland was urging the Security Council to place Darfur on its agenda.
Egeland was convinced that ethnic cleansing was taking place, but the United States and the
United Kingdom, together with Norway, blocked any moves to have Darfur placed on the agenda
of the Council. Egeland’s efforts also received no support from the UN Department of Political
Affairs (UN DPA), which was focused entirely on the North-South Naivasha process (MacKinnon,
2010: 83 and Traub, 2010: 7 - 8). Egeland would later complain that the three members of the
troika were “obsessed with getting a North-South agreement” (in Williams, 2010; 206). Some UN
officials did attempt to get member states to take a stance on Darfur, but even the Secretariat
itself was divided on the matter. One UN political affairs officer stationed in Khartoum noted:
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We kept sending these reports to headquarters, and then there was a terrible silence. We were under great
pressure from Sudanese Government, and we received no political guidance (in Traub, 2010: 8).
The AU was at the time also not prepared to address the situation in Darfur. At the Second
Extraordinary Assembly of the Union, meeting in Libya from 27 – 28 February 2004, no mention
was made of Darfur, although a one-page Resolution was adopted on the humanitarian situation
in Haiti (African Union, 2004[c]).
As international attention began to focus on the ever-increasing numbers of refugees and IDPs
emerging from Darfur and on swelling evidence that widespread and systematic violations of
human rights were occurring, it became evident that some form of policy response was required.
By mid-2004, the US-British-Norwegian troika that was supporting the Naivasha process came to
understand that some form of response needed to be formulated. Two options were considered
by the troika. The first was to deal with Darfur as part of the North-South peace process, and to
enlarge Naivasha to become a more inclusive inter-Sudanese peace process. Should this fail, the
troika would consider at the very least stabilising Darfur before concluding the Naivasha process.
The second option was to proceed with the Naivasha process until its completion, and then to
focus attention on Darfur. The latter option was favoured, and the troika focused on pressing
ahead with the negotiations along the North-South axis. As one observer notes, this decision was
based on considerations of both timing and of feasibility. Neither the SPLM nor Naivasha partners
were keen on having the North-South process held hostage by an unpredictable conflict in Darfur,
and thus the conflicts were separated from one another, to be dealt with in sequence (De Waal,
2007: 1040 - 1041). As another observer further notes, there was also a real fear that a
discussion on Darfur would cause the government in Khartoum to pull out of the Naivasha talks,
and set back progress in one of Sudan’s many conflicts (Clough, 2005: 4).
Khartoum was therefore left to deal with the situation in Darfur as it saw fit, as long as it was
cooperating in the Naivasha process. Yet as James Traub argues, both diplomats and activists
quickly became convinced that Khartoum was using the Naivasha process to pursue its conflict in
Darfur unhindered, and one deadline after another was missed in Naivasha, prolonging the
negotiations. At the same time, the SPLM quickly came to view the SLM and the JEM as proxy
forces of its own, weakening Khartoum at the bargaining table both politically and militarily and
draining the government’s attention and resources from the North-South conflict (Traub, 2010: 8).
The SPLM thus also began to support the armed movements in Darfur, in an effort to strengthen
its own bargaining position. The pace of negotiations in Naivasha thus slowed down, with both
parties focused on Darfur in the struggle for political power in Sudan. Yet the partners adhered to
the decision that Darfur be dealt with purely as a humanitarian problem, and continued to
pressure for the politics of the broader Sudan conflict to be negotiated in Naivasha, to the
exclusion of the movements in Darfur (Seymour, 2010: 59 – 60).
5.3 Dancing with the Devil: Whose Responsibility to Protect Whom?
Sensing that the UN was not keen to have Darfur on its agenda, and perhaps sensing an
opportunity to legitimate itself, the AU appointed a Special Representative to Darfur, and
Ambassador Baba Gana Kingibe was quick to hold consultations with the Government of Sudan
in Khartoum to ensure that the AU would be recognized as having the lead role in any future
responses to the Darfur conflicts (Badescu and Bergholm, 2010: 101). At the same time,
frustrated by the unwillingness of the UN to formulate a response, Mukesh Kapila on 21 March
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2004 arranged an interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in which he
described the violence in Darfur as “an organized attempt to do away with a group of people”, and
compared the situation there with the early stages of the Rwandan genocide. Kapila’s comments
infuriated UN officials, and the ensuing fallout ensured that international attention was focused
increasingly on Darfur.
By 31 March 2004 negotiations aimed at establishing a humanitarian ceasefire agreement for
Darfur commenced in N’djamena, Chad. Sudanese authorities, considering the Darfur matter an
internal one, refused the presence of outside parties, except for the AU, as long as the AU
recognized the Darfur conflict to be an internal matter of Sudan (African Union, 2004[d]. By 01
April the EU had called for the imposition of a no-fly zone over Darfur, to be policed by the UN,
and diplomats and UN officials in New York were scrambling to find a consolidated position on
Darfur (Traub, 2010: 9). On 02 April Jan Egeland was finally able to use the German presidency
of the Security Council to deliver a general briefing, and inserted an update on the critical nature
of the situation in Darfur. The proposed presidential statement included language condemning the
parties to the conflict, but through the efforts of China, Algeria and Pakistan this was watered
down to language which called on the parties concerned to fully cooperate in order to address the
grave situation prevailing in the region (Traub, 2010: 9).
On 07 April, Kofi Annan, with a sense of increasing urgency, used his speech to the Human
Rights Commission to commemorate the 10 year anniversary of the Rwandan genocide to
highlight that the unfolding events in Darfur left him with a deep sense of foreboding. He
concluded:
Whatever term is used to describe the situation [in Darfur], the international community cannot stand idle. […]
States must be prepared to take appropriate action. By “action” in such situations I mean a continuum of steps,
which may include military action (Annan, 2004).
Following Annan’s statement, the Commission dispatched a fact-finding team to Darfur, which
reported a “disturbing pattern” of disregard for basic principles of human rights and humanitarian
law, for which the armed forces of Sudan and the Janjaweed were found to be responsible. The
report of the Human Rights Commission, released on 07 May 2004, concluded that a reign of
organized terror was being orchestrated in Darfur, and that the government and its proxy agents
were guilty of widespread crimes. Before the Commission could vote on a resolution however, its
content was leaked to the press. Both Pakistan and Sudan condemned the leak and called for an
immediate inquiry, and, unwilling to force the issue and concerned that a strongly worded
resolution would be rejected by the Commission’s African and Asian members, European
members softened the draft resolution they were preparing. The redrafted resolution thanked the
Sudanese government for having allowed the fact-finding team to visit the country, without
making mention of the outcomes of the mission. It was passed with fifty votes in favour, with the
United States, Australia and the Ukraine voting against the resolution (Bellamy, 2005: 41). Two
weeks later, Sudan was elected as a full member of the Commission (causing the United States
to walk out in protest), but the High Commissioner on Human Rights quickly moved to issue a
statement strongly condemning the large-scale violations in Darfur, demanding that those
responsible be held accountable (Scanlon, 2006: 136). Kofi Annan also began to press Sudan’s
Ambassador to the UN to allow humanitarian access to Darfur, and Khartoum responded by
easing some restrictions on the movement of aid workers, on a temporary basis (Traub, 2010: 9-
11).
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While the UN struggled to find either a position on Darfur or a mechanism for engagement, the
AU moved swiftly. The Peace and Security Council had already been briefed on the escalating
situation at the end of March 2004, and by the end of that month Alpha Omar Konaré, the
Chairperson of the Commission, had dispatched a delegation to N’djamena in Chad, were
dialogue between the SLM, JEM and the Government of Sudan was being convened by the
Chadian Government. On 08 April 2004, and with AU support, the N’djamena Humanitarian
Ceasefire Agreement (HCA) was signed between the Government of Sudan, the SLM and the
JEM. On 13 April the Peace and Security Council commended the parties to the conflict for
having signed the HCA, and requested the Government of Sudan to implement its commitments
in line with the agreement, and bring to justice those responsible for violations of human rights, “in
line with the AU’s expressed commitment to fight impunity” (African Union, 2004[e]: 3).
During May, the parties to the ceasefire signed a further agreement in Addis Ababa on the
implementation modalities of the N’djamena agreement, and acknowledged the AU as the
primary international partner and the operational arm of the ceasefire agreement (Iyob and
Khadiagala, 2006: 153). That same month, the Peace and Security Council was officially
launched in Addis Ababa. Sudan was one of the inaugural members, serving a two-year term.
Despite its engagement on Darfur, in its communiqué on conflict situations in Africa, the Council
made only passing reference to the peace process between the Government of Sudan and the
SPLM, with no mention of Darfur. The Council did however note that:
With the tenth anniversary of the commemoration of the Rwandan Genocide of 1994, still fresh in our minds, we
insist that the findings and recommendations of the International Panel of Eminent Personalities, as contained
in their report Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, must serve as the basis for ensuring that the ultimate crime
of genocide shall never again deface this continent (African Union, 2004[f]: 3).
The report, commissioned by the OAU following the Rwanda genocide, had heavily criticized the
UN, the OAU and the international community at large for failing to prevent and intervene in the
Rwandan genocide, and the OAU had subsequently committed to never again allow genocide to
take place on the African continent. The Peace and Security Council, in its inaugural
communiqué, moved to reaffirm this commitment, yet at the same time failed to even include the
events in Darfur in its review of conflict situations in Africa. In a separate meeting, the Council did
move to review the situation in Darfur, and called on the Government of Sudan to ensure the
protection of the civilian population. The Council further requested the AU Commission on Human
and Peoples Rights to dispatch a mission to Darfur to investigate reports of human rights
violations, and to report back to the Council (African Union, 2004[g]).
By late May, the Peace and Security Council approved the establishment of a Ceasefire
Commission in support of the HCA, and the AU dispatched a small team of observers to Darfur to
monitor compliance with the ceasefire agreement, which commenced operations on 09 June
2004 under the banner of the African Union Mission to Sudan (AMIS). What was not entirely clear
at the time, as Henry Anyidoho argues, was why the AU began by only deploying an observer
mission when reports at the time had extensively detailed the plight of displaced persons and
shown that refugees were pouring into Chad’s Abeche region (2006: 150). Yet the AU had
received the consent of the Sudanese government for the deployment of an observer mission
only, and would not have been able to deploy a mission with a mandate which reached beyond
the confines of the ceasefire agreement. AMIS thus consisted of 60 monitors and 305 protection
troops from Rwanda and Nigeria mandated to protect the monitoring team and to provide security
to IDPs receiving humanitarian assistance, within the means and areas of operation of the
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mission (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 154). Confusion soon set in however. The United States,
which had taken the lead on the humanitarian response and which was playing an important role
in the North-South negotiations, began taking initiatives without consulting partners, the EU
jealously guarded its role as deputy head of the Ceasefire Commission, and a tangle of
responsibilities often saw the UN become a competitor as opposed to a coordinator (Flint and de
Waal, 2008: 172). Within this context, the AU sought to monitor a ceasefire agreement which had
no tangible impact on the conflict on the ground, contributing to further confusion.
Confusion also arose as to the role of the force itself. Rwandan President Paul Kagame stated
that his troops would use force to protect civilians if necessary, and although the AU had
indicated in a communiqué to the Security Council that its forces would indeed fulfil this role,
some AU members quietly expressed reservations. The Sudanese government itself rejected
Kagame’s interpretation of the mandate. Sudanese Foreign Affairs Minister Abdelwahad Najeb
insisted that the mission of the force was very clearly limited to the protection of the deployed
monitors:
As far as the [protection of the civilians is] concerned, this is the clear responsibility of the government of Sudan
(in Bellamy, 2005: 44).
Thus when Nigeria deployed the first of its troops, President Obasanjo insisted that his forces
would only protect AU observers and operate only with the consent of the Sudanese government
(Bellamy, 2005: 44). This sense of confusion was exacerbated once mission personnel had been
deployed, as the security situation in Darfur proved to have been grossly underestimated. As the
mission was deploying, the conflict rapidly escalated in ferocity, yet the AU had intended only to
deploy a small observer mission which could facilitate the maintenance of political dialogue, on
the assumption that all parties would respect the ceasefire agreement (Anyidoho, 2006: 149). On
the ground, AMIS operations were constrained by the Sudanese authorities, which, amongst
others, prevented AU helicopters from flying by denying them fuel, and limited the areas where
AMIS personnel could operate, arguing that the mission was an observer mission, and not a
peacekeeping mission (Bellamy, 2005: 44).
Whilst the mandate of AMIS was limited, and its operations constrained, the mission did achieve
some initial success in Darfur by creatively exceeding its mandate where possible, without
incurring public scrutiny (De Waal, 2007: 1041). Yet the ceasefire agreement did not hold, with
the Government violating the agreement shortly after its signing, and internal differences between
the SLM and JEM surfacing, splitting each of the movements. With the fragmentation of the
movements, Khartoum and its allies quickly regained the political and military initiative and
continued to pursue a military victory over the movements (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 153).
While the N’djamena Agreement had made reference to the responsibility of the Government of
Sudan to disarm the Janjaweed, Khartoum moved to strengthen the militia through the provision
of arms and material.
While AMIS continued struggling to deploy in Darfur, the UN Security Council passed Resolution
1547 on 11 June 2004, expressing its willingness to authorize a peace operation to oversee the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the agreement which was slowly emerging from the
North-South negotiations in Naivasha. Fearing that the Resolution might spark a debate on
Darfur, some Council members were quick to reaffirm Sudanese sovereignty, and expressed
deep scepticism about the notion of interventions on humanitarian grounds (Bellamy, 2005: 41).
Pakistan, for example, reminded the Council:
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Sudan is an important member of the African Union, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference and the United
Nations. As a United Nations Member State, Sudan has all the rights and privileges incumbent under the United
Nations Charter, including to sovereignty, political independence, unity and territorial integrity – the principles
that form the basis of international relations (United Nations United Nations Security Council Official Records,
2004[a : 4).
While the Council debated the emerging CPA and the role of the UN in support of this agreement,
Pakistan, China and Russia argued that the scale of human suffering in Darfur was insufficient to
provoke serious reflection on whether Sudan was fulfilling its responsibilities towards its
population, and the United States, the United Kingdom and France proved reluctant to force the
issue in the Council (Bellamy, 2005: 42). Germany however noted that peace in Sudan was
indivisible, and required an end to widespread human rights violations. The United States, keen
to avoid becoming entangled in Darfur and happy to let the AU take the lead, highlighted a range
of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, before asserting its firm support
for the AU initiatives to end the conflict (United Nations Security Council Official Records, 2004[a]:
4).
Germany, a non-permanent member of the Security Council at the time, following the passage of
Resolution 1547 informally began to propose the deployment of a UN operation to Darfur, yet
support for this was not widespread outside of the Nordic countries, and although the Nordic
countries offered troops for such a deployment, no other countries did. The notion was quickly,
and quietly, dropped. Yet while no solutions could be found at the political level, calls for action
grew louder in other fora. The New York Times ran a series of articles exposing the massive
human rights abuses taking place in Darfur, and called for action on the part of the United States,
incurring severe criticism from Sudanese Embassy in Washington in the process. Non-
governmental organizations such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the
International Crisis Group also began to actively lobby for action in Darfur (Bellamy, 2005: 41). In
the United States advocacy groups were perhaps the most active, and in response to mounting
pressure from lobby groups and increasing levels of interest on the part of the American
Congress, the American State Department in May 2004 launched an investigation into whether
the atrocities being committed in Darfur constituted acts of genocide (Bellamy, 2005: 47).
Kofi Annan, sensing that the mounting pressure might create an opening for engagement,
travelled to Darfur and met with al Bashir in Khartoum, where a joint communiqué was signed,
committing the Sudanese government to removing all obstacles to humanitarian efforts, to ending
impunity for human rights abuses, to disarming the Janjaweed, and to resuming political dialogue
on Darfur. A Joint Implementation Mechanism (JIM) was established, jointly headed by the UN
representative to Sudan, Jan Pronk, and Sudanese government, tasked with monitoring
compliance with the agreement. Yet Annan’s aircraft had barely left Sudanese airspace before
aerial bombing in Darfur resumed. Annan later conceded that he had not been able to
meaningfully engage with Sudanese government as the Security Council had not mandated him
to warn Sudanese authorities of the consequences of inaction (Traub, 2010: 12). Pronk, seeking
guidance from New York, received instructions from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations
(UN DPKO) not to push for a greater role in Darfur beyond his two mandated areas of overseeing
humanitarian efforts and providing good offices on behalf of the Secretary General (MacKinnon,
2010: 86).
Reporting to the Peace and Security Council on the situation in Darfur on 4 July 2004, Konaré
noted that he remained “very concerned” about the abuses of international humanitarian law and
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the continued human rights violations in Darfur, and again appealed to the Government of Sudan
to ensure the protection of the civilian population and to disarm the Janjaweed. Konaré also
reported that the AU Commission was working to ensure the rapid deployment of the observer
mission to Darfur, and requested international assistance to ensure that the mission could meet
its mandate as soon as possible (African Union, 2004[h]). Sudan, a member of the Council from
2004 to 2006, was not pleased that the matter had been brought before the Council. Given the
Council’s consensus-based style of decision-making, Sudan was able to play a powerful role in
the debates of the Council. Reacting to the report of the Chairperson the Council did move to
reiterate its “serious concerns” over the situation in Darfur and the need to bring to justice those
responsible for human rights violations. However, the Council argued that, despite the gravity of
the crisis, the situation in Darfur could not be defined as genocide, and called on the Government
of Sudan to assist in ensuring the protection of civilians and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian
assistance. Sudan also worked to ensure that international attention on Darfur be as limited as
possible, and was instrumental in urging the Council to assert the primacy of the AU in dealing
with the crisis in Darfur. The Council thus stressed that:
the African Union should continue to lead the efforts to address the crisis in Darfur and that states should
continue to support these efforts (African Union, 2004[i]: 1).
Noting the rapid deterioration of the situation, the AU at its Assembly of Heads of State and
Government in Addis Ababa from 06 to 08 July 2004 registered its “serious concern about the
humanitarian crisis”, but went on again to state that “even though the humanitarian situation in
Darfur is serious, it cannot be defined as a genocide” (African Union, 2004[b]: para. 2). That same
month, negotiations between the Government of Sudan and the armed movements were
convened under the auspices of the AU in Addis Ababa, before being moved to Abuja, Nigeria, in
August 2004 under the auspices of the Nigerian Chairmanship of the AU. Yet the negotiations
were centred primarily around securing an enhanced ceasefire and humanitarian agreement, and
did not relate to a broader political process, let alone to the CPA negotiations underway at the
time (Seymour, 2010: 61).
From 15 to 17 July 2004, the AU again convened a meeting for representatives of the
Government of Sudan, the SLA and the JEM in Addis Ababa, this time to deliberate on the
conditions necessary for the establishment of a comprehensive political settlement on the crisis in
Darfur. Acknowledging the serious humanitarian conditions unfolding in Darfur, AU mediators
nonetheless argued that the conflict was a political one, and that a political dialogue which would
address the root causes of the conflict needed to be established (African Union, 2004[j]). This
position was reinforced on 27 July by the Peace and Security Council, which welcomed the
support of the UN Security Council, but stressed that the AU should continue to lead efforts to
resolve the crisis in Darfur, and called on the parties to the conflict to enter into a political
dialogue (African Union, 2004[k]).
Members of the UN Security Council however began to view the situation in a more serious light,
and with progress on the North-South negotiations seemingly secured, the United States, with the
backing of the United Kingdom, now moved to introduce a draft Security Council resolution
threatening the imposition of sanctions against Sudan should the Janjaweed not be disarmed. Yet
China, Russia, Pakistan, Algeria, Angola, the Philippines and Brazil objected. France, which was
expanding its commercial interests in Sudan, provided a mixed reaction to the notion of
sanctions. The resolution was therefore amended, and Resolution 1556 of 30 July determined
that the situation in Sudan constituted a threat to international peace and security and demanded
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the Government of Sudan disarm the Janjaweed and bring to justice those who had violated
international humanitarian law, but made no reference to the threat of sanctions in case of non-
compliance (United Nations Security Council 1556, 2006). The debate preceding the passage of
Resolution 1556 (which was passed with thirteen votes, and from which China and Pakistan
abstained) was heated, and witnessed the first infusion of responsibility to protect discourse into
the debate of the Security Council on Darfur. The Philippines, whilst opposed to sanctions and
other coercive measures, argued that Sudan had failed in its duty to protect its citizens, and that
some form of international action was warranted. The Philippine Ambassador stated that:
Sovereignty also entails the responsibility of a State to protect its people. If it is unable or unwilling to do so,
states has the responsibility to help that Sate achieve such capacity and as such will, in extreme necessity,
assume such responsibility itself (United Nations United Nations Security Council Official Records, 2004[b]: 10
– 11).
The United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and Spain concurred, similarly invoking
responsibility to protect language. None, however, suggested that the responsibility to protect
ought to cede from the Government of Sudan to the Security Council. Rather, all argued that the
AU now bore primary responsibility for action, should Sudan fail in meeting its responsibilities
towards it citizens. China, Pakistan and Sudan, participating in the debate, rejected this notion
however, and Brazil and Russia proved reluctant to legitimize the responsibility to protect
discourse. Pakistan in turn argued that it did not believe that the threat or imposition of sanctions
against Sudan was advisable (Bellamy, 2005: 42). The Sudanese Ambassador had stronger
words, inquiring whether Sudan:
…would have been safe from the hammer of the Security Council even if there had been no crisis in Darfur, and
whether the Darfur humanitarian crisis might not be a Trojan horse? Has this lofty humanitarian objective been
adopted and embraced by other people who are advocating a hidden agenda (United Nations United Nations
Security Council Official Records, 2004[b]: 13)?
While the Resolution did not include the threat of sanctions or other coercive measures in case of
non-compliance, it did impose a ban on the sale of weapons to all non-governmental entities and
individuals in Darfur, but not, following Chinese insistence, on the government which was
supplying the Janjaweed with arms (Holslag, 2007: 7). Whilst Khartoum agreed to this move, the
Janjaweed were not disarmed, and on the contrary received greater material support than before,
whilst the Security Council failed to follow up on its request of disarmament, or to take action
against Khartoum for supplying the Janjaweed with arms. In reality however, as one observer
notes, Khartoum was in all likelihood not capable of disarming the Janjaweed at this point in time
in any case, without risking turning it into an armed movement operating against the government
(De Waal, 2007: 1041).
Following the passage of Resolution 1556, the United States pressed ahead to gain support for
the use of sanctions against Sudan, including for an arms embargo against the Sudanese
government and for a travel ban on senior officials. Yet support for sanctions was scant, with
Pakistan remaining opposed on the grounds that they would not attain fruitful engagement with
Khartoum, and the Arab League issuing a statement voicing its opposition to sanctions under any
circumstances. Russia and China remained opposed to sanctions, mostly on grounds of their own
economic interests, as Russia was selling arms to Sudan and China was both selling arms to
Khartoum and exporting Sudanese oil. The United Kingdom, sensing the lack of support for a
sanctions regime, quickly distanced itself from the American position. A senior Foreign and
Commonwealth Office official told reporters that the United Kingdom was opposed to sanctions
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on two grounds. First, the threat of sanctions could undermine the Naivasha process, which
diplomats felt was now only weeks away from conclusion. Second, making direct reference to the
responsibility to protect, the United Kingdom believed that the most suitable manner in which
security could be delivered to the people of Darfur was to encourage the actor with the primary
responsibility, the Government of Sudan, to assume its responsibilities. Sanctions, it was argued,
would not prove useful in supporting the government to take on this responsibility (Bellamy, 2005:
45).
While members of the Security Council proved reluctant to provide a unified position on whose
responsibility it was to ensure the protection of the people of Darfur (with members alternating
between that responsibility residing with Government of Sudan, the Security Council or the AU),
the situation on the ground deteriorated, with combat-related deaths and displacements
increasingly on the rise, and the humanitarian situation spiralling out of control, while AMIS
officials struggled to get the mission up and running. The AU Commission therefore proposed a
plan for the conversion of AMIS into a fully-fledged peacekeeping operation that would protect
civilians, neutralize the Janjaweed, and facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance. Yet
Khartoum opposed the deployment of a larger force with an expanded mandate (Iyob and
Khadiagala, 2006: 154). When the AU subsequently proposed the deployment of a UN operation,
Khartoum was even more opposed, arguing that it would strongly resist a UN deployment and
any efforts on the part of the Security Council to deploy an international force, threatening to use
force against any UN peacekeepers deployed in Darfur (Bellamy, 2005: 43). As the violence
began to sweep into the IDP camps, the Security Council in August 2004 demanded that
Khartoum take a series of steps to ensure the security of those in the camps, but when Khartoum
stalled on the matter, the Council dropped its demands once more (De Waal, 2007: 1041). The
Peace and Security Council, not to be outdone, again reiterated that the AU should be in the lead
on efforts aimed at addressing the Darfur crisis, and called on states to focus their support on the
Abuja negotiations (African Union, 2004[l]).
That same month, Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, in his capacity as Chairperson of the
AU, hosted the Government of Sudan, the SLM and the JEM in Abuja for a series of political
negotiations aimed at laying the groundwork for a larger negotiation process for Darfur, the first
dialogue since the collapse of the N’djamena ceasefire agreement of April 2004 (Iyob and
Khadiagala, 2006: 154). While the negotiations were underway, the Security Council adopted
sanctions against those who might obstruct the peace process, yet follow-up was weak, and it
took a year for the sanctions to be instituted, and then only against four individuals; a low-ranking
commander in the Sudanese air force, a Janjaweed commander and two mid-ranking leaders in
the armed movements (Grono, 2006: 626). By the end of August, as the Abuja dialogue was
collapsing, Kofi Annan submitted his report on Resolution 1556 to the Security Council, in which
he concluded that the Government of Sudan had not met its obligations to stop attacks against
civilians and to ensure their protection, calling for the rapid expansion of AMIS to enforce the
protection of civilians (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 155). The Council was unsure of how to
proceed however, and disagreement raged on whether the responsibility for protection of civilians
rested with the Government of Sudan or with AMIS.
By September 2004 both American President George Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell,
based on the findings of a State Department report and following a unanimous vote in the United
States Congress, publicly stated that genocide had been committed, and was ongoing, in Darfur
(Bellamy, 2005 : 31). This was no insignificant statement. As Marisa Katz remarked later, never
before since the signing of the Genocide Convention had one government officially accused
90
another of committing the act of genocide (2006: 20). Some commentators were left angry
however. Gareth Evans, a former ICISS commissioner and director of the International Crisis
Group, for example, argued:
it is hard to judge which is morally worse: not using the ‘g’ word because you don’t want to act (as with the
Clinton administration on Rwanda in 1994), or (as now) using the ‘g’ word but still not acting (Evans, 2006: 5).
Despite these criticisms, the United States in September 2004 began to lobby in the Security
Council for stronger measures, and in mid-September circulated a draft resolution labelling Sudan
in material breach of Resolution 1556, and in line with Annan’s recommendation, calling for an
expanded AU presence. The draft resolution also called for international over-flights to monitor
the situation, moves to prosecute those responsible for acts of genocide, a no-fly zone for
Sudanese military aircraft, and targeted sanctions against the ruling elite in Khartoum (Bellamy,
2005: 46). As the draft resolution was being circulated in New York, the Peace and Security
Council meeting in Addis Ababa on 17 September called for a focussed commitment on the
negotiation process and to work with determination towards a lasting and comprehensive political
settlement to the conflict in Darfur, as opposed to the use of coercive measures, and reiterated its
call for the need for the AU to play the leading role on Darfur (African Union, 2004[m]). Yet these
calls had only limited impact in New York. Resolution 1564, adopted by the Security Council a
day later on 18 September, contained some coercive language, but in a weakened format, and
the Resolution did not find Sudan to be in breach of Resolution 1556, nor did it impose measures
on the government or criticize it. The Resolution did however establish an International
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (ICID), mandated to investigate allegations of violations of
human rights and international humanitarian law (United Nations Security Council Resolution
1564, 2004). The Commission would be led by an Italian judge, and included commissioners from
Egypt, Ghana and South Africa (African Union, 2004[n]: 16). Algeria, China, Russia and Pakistan
abstained from the vote (Clough, 2005: 5).
Explaining its abstention after the vote, Algeria argued that, although the intrusive measures
which had been proposed in the American draft which represented “unacceptable assaults” on
Sudanese sovereignty had been removed, the Resolution remained problematic as it failed to
recognize Sudan’s cooperation with the AU and the UN, and did not recognize the role to be
played by the AU. Russia, China and Pakistan explained their abstentions in light of what they
viewed as the improving situation in Darfur, and while Brazil voted in favour of the Resolution, it
raised concerns over the excessive use of Chapter VII, which it feared ran the risk of misleading
all parties concerned (Bellamy, 2005: 47). Yet not all members of the Council agreed. The
Philippines once more argued that, should a state prove unwilling or unable to protect its citizens,
the Security Council held both the moral and legal authority to enable that State to assume its
responsibilities. Romania endorsed this view and argued that the Council had not fulfilled its
responsibilities and international obligations towards the people of Darfur (United Nations United
Nations Security Council Official Records, 2004[c]: 12). The United Kingdom however, whilst
noting the ceasefire violations by all parties to the conflict, reiterated its view that the ultimate
responsibility to protect the people of Sudan lay with the government, and that the armed groups
operating in Darfur also held a responsibility to protect the people of Darfur (United Nations
United Nations Security Council Official Records, 2004[c]: 10).
By late September Jan Pronk, the UN representative to Sudan, reported that the situation in
Darfur was deteriorating further, and that government compliance with Resolution 1556 and 1564
was receding (Bellamy, 2005: 48). On 27 September 2004 the Special Representative of the
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Secretary- General on Internally Displaced Persons, Francis Deng (later the Special
Representative on the Prevention of Genocide) presented his report on his visit to Sudan to the
Commission on Human Rights of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC – Third
Commission) of the UN. In his report, Deng argued that although the Government of Sudan
probably lacked both the capacity and the will to disarm the Janjaweed, it nonetheless retained
the primary responsibility for doing so. Deng further noted that the government had expressed its
strong preference for cooperation with the AU as opposed to the UN, and was fearful of direct
international involvement in Darfur to the extent that it would probably resist it, by direct or indirect
means. Concluding that international intervention in Darfur would only serve to complicate and
aggravate the crisis, Deng argued that the best way forward would be to encourage the AU to
increase its presence in the region, in collaboration with the Government of Sudan (ECOSOC –
Commission on Human Rights, 2004: paras. 22 – 36).
Several African nations endorsed this approach, and an African mini-summit on Darfur in Libya
on 17 October 2004 led by Libya and Egypt reaffirmed a commitment to preserve Sudanese
sovereignty, expressly rejecting “any foreign intervention by any country whatsoever in this pure
[sic] African issue” (African Mini-Summit on Darfur, 2004). This echoed an earlier rejection of
foreign intervention in Sudan by the SPLM, which was now informally operating as the
government in the South of Sudan. A spokesperson for the movement, Farouk Abu Eissa,
insisted that his organisation was:
against foreign military intervention in Darfur. We have before us the case of Iraq. We do not want a similar
situation to develop in Darfur, or Sudan (in Bellamy, 2005: 48).
It had become increasingly clear to members of the Security Council in favour of a stronger
response to the worsening situation in Darfur that both a UN force and action on the part of the
predominant powers had become unfeasible. On the guidance of Annan’s report to the Council,
and following the report presented by Francis Deng to ECOSOC, it became increasingly clear
that the only form of response possible was through an expanded AU presence, despite
Khartoum’s reluctance to accept anything other than a limited monitoring mission to Darfur. An
AU-led assessment team was therefore dispatched to Darfur, including representatives of the UN,
the EU and the United States, to assess the modalities for an expanded mission. The report of
the mission outlined possibilities for an expanded AU presence, and in October 2004 the United
Nations Assistance Cell for Darfur Operations was established in Addis Ababa. The cell, working
closely with the EU, the United States and Canada, began to support the AU Darfur Integrated
Task Force (DITF) in planning for an expanded AMIS (Anyidoho, 2006: 155).
On 20 October 2004 Konaré again reported to the Peace and Security Council on the situation in
Darfur. The Chairperson noted that the commission of atrocities was ongoing, and that the
Government of Sudan had not met its obligations to stop attacks against civilians, to disarm the
militias, or to stop the culture of impunity in Darfur (African Union, 2004[n]). The Peace and
Security Council authorized the expansion of AMIS on the same day to 3,320 personnel,
including 670 observers, a protection force of 1703, 815 civilian police and 132 substantive
civilian personnel, mandated to monitor camps for the displaced, militia attacks against civilians,
the government disarmament of militias, and the cessation of hostilities by all parties to the
conflict. AMIS however, at Khartoum’s insistence, remained a monitoring mission, although with a
larger personnel component (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 155). The Peace and Security Council
did however include a limited protection mandate, tasking AMIS with the protection of civilians:
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whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within resources and capability, it being
understood that the protection of the civilian population is the responsibility of the Government of Sudan
(African Union, 2004[o]: 2).
Despite the growing list of atrocities, and the report of the Chairperson of the Commission of non-
compliance on the part of the Government of Sudan, the Council called for flexibility in working
towards “a lasting and comprehensive political settlement to the conflict in Darfur” (African Union,
2004[o]: 4). Rwandan and Nigerian reinforcements began arriving in Darfur a week later, assisted
by the United States airforce which provided the airlift, but, as one observer notes, the mission
remained unable to do much more than report cease-fire violations (Bellamy, 2005: 44). A UN
support cell was also integrated into the Peace and Security Directorate of the AU Commission to
provide logistical and planning support to AMIS, but this did not yield results on the ground in the
short term (MacKinnon, 2010: 75). The mission was later expanded to include 6170 military
personnel and 1560 civilian police, and renamed AMIS II. The expanded mission however
remained plagued with challenges, and was unable to do much more than report on the growing
number of violations taking place in Darfur. Key posts in the DITF remained vacant in Addis
Ababa, agreements between the AU and troop contributing countries were challenging to
complete, and AU members by and large remained reluctant to send troops to participate in AMIS
II. Rwanda, Nigeria, Senegal, Gambia, Kenya and South Africa were the main contributors of
troops, while Rwanda and Nigeria provided the bulk of the protection force. The deployment of
AMIS II was however slow, and created gaps for the warring factions to continue the conflict
unabated (Anyidoho, 2006: 157).
As AMIS II was deploying, mediation efforts continued. The Libyan Government, which had been
engaging with the armed factions for some time, convinced the JEM and the SLM to return to the
Abuja negotiations. In November 2004, the Abuja negotiations resumed, at the same time that
there was a complete breakdown in relations between the parties and fighting on the ground
escalated. On 09 November AU mediators obtained a minor agreement, with Khartoum agreeing
to neutralize and disarm the Janjaweed and other armed groups it was supporting, to abide by
the provisions of the N’djamena ceasefire agreement, to prevent all attacks and other forms of
violence against civilians and to protect the rights of displaced persons. In a major concession,
Khartoum also agreed to ban military flights over Darfur. Yet the agreement represented a
reiteration of the N’djamena agreement, and quickly failed. Within hours of the agreement being
signed in Abuja, Sudanese armed forces were reported to have attacked the El Geer camp for
displaced persons near Nyala in Southern Darfur. Towards the end of that year, the government
mounted a heavy offensive against the JEM and the SLM, seriously weakening both movements.
As Iyob and Khadiagala argued, these attacks demonstrated that in the absence of a political
process to deal with the escalating problems, the negotiations in Abuja were not going to break
new ground (2006: 155). Yet with the signing of the North-South CPA close at hand, Western
powers were reluctant to put pressure on Khartoum in Abuja. Indeed, the Security Council moved
only to endorse the Abuja negotiations, under AU auspices, and to insist that the responsibility to
protect civilians lay with the Government of Sudan, or with AMIS.
The Abuja negotiations however proved challenging for the AU, and subsequently received
widespread criticism. For one, as argued by de Waal, the Abuja negotiations were focused on
obtaining a text which was acceptable to the parties, without the benefit of an expert security
assessment on the ground. At another level, the parties proved reluctant to negotiate in any
serious manner, viewing the negotiations as a continuation of the military conflict on the ground,
and the mediation team and the international partners present did not welcome any process that
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brought additional complexities to the mediation effort, such as the inclusion of civil society in the
negotiations. The Government of Sudan also repeatedly refused AU requests to attach additional
military advisers to the mediation team, and the AU proved reluctant to press the government on
the matter, as the confrontation with the government delegation and the additional advice of the
military experts would have slowed down a negotiation process which was operating under
extremely tight timeframes. Of those security advisers who were present, many left in frustration,
while others complained that their expertise were not being utilized. Many of Darfur’s now
numerous armed movements were not represented in Abuja, with the Arab militias excluded on
the assumption that they were represented by the government delegation, and other armed
groups either barred from the negotiations altogether or allowed observer status only (De Waal,
207: 1048). One adviser closely associated with the Abuja negotiations argued further that the AU
mediation team was simply unable to meaningfully direct the process, preferring to tell anecdotes
in the hotel bar than push the parties towards an agreement (Interview 1, 2009). Differences
between the AU and the UN on how to approach the mediation, while initially trivial, increasingly
came to undermine the negotiation process. While the UN favoured a phased approach, the AU
was aiming for a comprehensive agreement, as the parties had already signed previous
agreements, which the AU believed would provide the basis for a final settlement (Bah, 2010: 9)
Increasingly, these differences between the AU and the UN would come to be exploited by those
party to the negotiations, playing states off against one another, and exploiting these delays to
make military headway on the ground in Darfur. While the Abuja negotiations failed to make
progress on resolving the conflict, they did increasingly highlight that the notion of inserting an
international peacekeeping force which could impose the will of states in Darfur, by force if
needed, was “naïve, impractical and dangerous” (De Waal, 2007: 1051). But ‘deadline diplomacy’
proved powerful.
The United States, Britain, Canada and the EU, who were funding the Abuja negotiations,
repeatedly threatened to withhold their financial support if the parties failed to reach agreement,
in the hope that an accelerated political settlement would pave the way for a transition from AMIS
to a UN operation in Darfur. Laurie Nathan, an advisor to the AU mediation team in Abuja, argued
that the deadline diplomacy approach proved far too “simplistic, vacuous and rigid” for the
complexities of Darfur, arguing that the external pressures fixed in place a process and trajectory
in which neither the mediator nor the parties had any confidence, but from which little deviation
was possible (in Bah, 2010: 10). ‘Drive-by diplomacy’, with American diplomats parachuting in
and out of Abuja to ensure that deadlines were being adhered to, also did not curry favour with
the parties to the mediation, nor with the AU mediation team, which viewed this as an arrogant
effort designed to “push a deal down their throats” (Stedjan and Thomas-Jensen, 2010: 170).
Despite its obvious failings, the Abuja process rumbled along towards attaining a peace
agreement; any peace agreement.
Pushing for a swift conclusion to the Naivasha peace process before the Darfur issue could derail
it, the Security Council held a special session in Nairobi, Kenya, from 18 to 19 November 2004.
The purpose of the special session was to put pressure on the Government of Sudan and the
SPLM to conclude negotiations in Naivasha, with no mention of Darfur. Senior representatives of
the SPLM and the Government of Sudan signed a memorandum of understanding in Nairobi
committing themselves to a final settlement. In return, Resolution 1574, adopted unanimously
during this session of the Council, failed to include any specific criticism of the Government of
Sudan for failing to meet the demands of Resolutions 1556 and 1564, and instead called on the
UN and the World Bank to provide immediate development assistance and debt relief to Sudan.
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The Resolution did recall that the primary responsibility for the protection of civilians lay with the
Government of Sudan, but failed to outline any measures to assist the government in meeting this
responsibility, or measures to be taken should the government fail in meeting this responsibility
(United Nations Security Council Resolution 1574, 2004). Pressure to ensure that a final
settlement for the North-South dispute would be attained was exerted elsewhere in the UN
system as well. Five days after the signing of the memorandum of understanding in Nairobi, the
General Assembly’s Third Committee, responsible for human rights, adjourned for the year
without having debated Sudan once. The South African representative, representing the AU,
worked to ensure that Sudan would be kept off the agenda, accusing the West of using “double
standards” by singling out developing countries for criticism, declaring:
the Africa Group regrets the abuses of a multinational organization like the United Nations to settle disputes on
human rights (quoted in Traub, 2010: 18).
The Pan-African Parliament, recently inaugurated, moved on this criticism, and in an effort to
highlight the relevance of the new African peace and security institutions, sent a mission to Darfur
from 19 November to 3 December, consulting with the parties to the conflict and generating a set
of recommendations for the way forward. In particular, the parliamentary delegation
recommended that the mandate of AMIS be enhanced, and that its structures be developed to
better enable it to attain this mandate. The delegation also recommended that the question of
justice be addressed in Darfur, and that the AU consider mechanisms, including through working
with the International Criminal Court, to address impunity and seek justice in Darfur (Salla, 2007:
21). The recommendations were subsequently conveyed to the AU Commission, but were buried
(Mbete, 2008: 310).
One month later, on 20 December, the AMIS leadership complained that government forces had
attacked villages in Darfur using aircraft, and two days later Kofi Annan acknowledged that the
peacekeeping strategy for Darfur was not working, and that AMIS had failed to protect civilians
and to prevent the crisis from deteriorating (Bellamy, 2005: 44). As one observer noted, the
decisions taken by the Security Council in Nairobi had called into the question the commitment of
Council members to follow through on earlier resolutions on Darfur, and did not bring into sight
any hope for an end to the suffering of the people of Darfur (Clough, 2005: 1).
Flint and de Waal argue that Darfur during 2004 was a firestorm of violent displacement, man-
made famine and obstruction of relief. While an international humanitarian relief operation slowly
gained momentum, the commission of atrocity crimes had continued unabated, with the
Government of Sudan doing everything in its power to deal with the insurgency in the manner it
knew best; through the indiscriminate use of outright force, while simultaneously doing everything
in its power to black out all news from the region, isolating Darfur from the outside world (Flint and
de Waal, 2008: 147). Journalists in Sudan were prohibited from mentioning human rights abuses
in Darfur, and independent newspapers that violated this prohibition were soon suspended. Al
Jazeera, the most-watched television station in the Arab world, had already been closed down in
Sudan after it became the first station in the world to report the atrocities in Darfur. The Sudanese
Parliament was barred from discussing Darfur (Flint and de Waal, 2005: 115).
By the beginning of 2005, almost 2 million people had been driven into camps for the internally
displaced, while a further 200,000 had sought refuge across the border in Chad. The conflict,
however, showed no signs of coming to an end. On the contrary, it was clear that the conflict
could only escalate (Flint and de Waal, 2008: 145). But international attention, for the time being
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at least, was fixed squarely on the North-South peace process, with the UN, and the AU reluctant
to assume responsibility for dealing with Darfur. The AU sought political leadership, positioning
itself as the primary actor in negotiating a political settlement for Darfur, while shifting the
responsibility to protect civilians to the Government of Sudan. The UN in turn took the lead in
humanitarian relief efforts, but argued that the responsibility to protect civilians resided either with
AMIS or with the Government of Sudan, depending on the current situation. Meanwhile, the
Security Council had outsourced the responsibility of attaining whether or not atrocity crimes were
being committed in Darfur to a commission of inquiry, preferring not to take a decision on the
matter itself. Thus, by the beginning of 2005, responsibilities for the crisis were being shifted from
one actor to another, it being clear that civilians were not being protected, but no clarity being
attained as to who should bear the responsibility for dealing with this.
On 09 January 2005 the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), consisting of six protocols,
was signed in Nairobi, concluding the IGAD negotiations and, at least formally, bringing to an end
the North-South conflict. At the signing of the CPA, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, the
serving Chair of IGAD, contended that the peace agreement was a success both for IGAD and for
Sudan, noting that:
We in the IGAD region and Africa as a whole have created a viable partnership, which reduces the chances for
outsiders to jump into regional conflicts where they have very little knowledge about them (in Iyob and
Khadiagala, 2006: 124).
While the signing of the CPA indeed represented an important milestone towards peace in
Sudan, this had come at the expense of the security of the people of Darfur. The UN Security
Council in particular had allowed Khartoum to continue its engagements in Darfur as it saw fit,
pursuing an increasingly violent counter-insurgency campaign, in exchange for bringing to an end
the North-South conflict. Whilst spirits were high in Nairobi, the list of atrocity crimes being
committed in Darfur mounted, with no end to the conflict in sight, and with the humanitarian
situation rapidly deteriorating.
5.4 The Responsibility to Protect Thy Image
On 11 January 2005, two days after the signing of the CPA, Jan Pronk reported to the Security
Council that violence in Darfur had seeped into the IDP camps, and that the previous month had
witnessed an arms build-up, ongoing attacks on all sides, the spread of violence into West
Kordofan, and the emergence of new rebel groups. Pronk argued that the only recourse to
stabilizing the situation was the deployment of a further expanded and strengthened AU presence
in the ground. Pronk, in his address to the Security Council, explicitly called for a robust armed
AU presence, arguing that the AU was now the organization responsible for the protection of
civilians in Darfur (United Nations United Nations Security Council Official Records, 2005: 2 – 3).
Yet with the recent signing of the CPA, the United States was reluctant to push African members
to accept this position, and urged Council members to await the findings of the ICID, established
by Resolution 1564 in September 2004.
The Commission presented its report to the Security Council two weeks later on 25 January
2005, affirming that crimes against humanity and war crimes had been and continued to be
committed in Darfur, and asserting that these were no less serious or heinous in nature than acts
of genocide. Specifically, the Commission found that government forces and militia had
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conducted indiscriminate attacks, killings of civilians, torture, enforced disappearances, the
destruction of villages, rape and other forms of sexual violence, pillaging and forced displacement
throughout Darfur. Moreover, in certain instances, the Commission noted that individuals,
including senior government officials, may have committed acts with genocidal intent. However,
given the complex nature of these dynamics, the Commission found that only a competent court
would be able to determine whether specific acts had been committed with genocidal intent or not
(International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, 2005). Yet as the report of the Commission was
being presented, the dynamics of the conflict were already changing. The government had to a
large degree attained its goal of blocking the direct military threat posed by the armed
movements, and had succeeded in turning the movements and the Janjaweed against one
another (Flint and de Waal, 2008: 150). Khartoum was now happy to let the conflict of all against
all – armed movements, Janjaweed, tribal militia, police and armed forces – run its course, and to
focus its efforts, for the time being at least, on the South. Displaying goodwill towards the South,
and making it clear that Khartoum was indispensable to a resolution of the ongoing conflict in
Darfur, it was calculated, would ensure that the Government of Sudan gained both political
credibility while maintaining sufficient leverage to resist Western pressure when needed. While
the report of the Commission sparked a heated debate in the Security Council, it found little
traction among African members or the AU. The AU Assembly, meeting in Abuja, the scene of the
Darfur negotiations, from 30 – 31 January 2005 came out only as strongly as to condemn the
ceasefire violations by all parties concerned, and called for a political settlement to the conflict
(African Union, 2005[b]).
In the Security Council, members of the EU, including the United Kingdom, pushed for a referral
of the Darfur matter to the ICC, with the British Ambassador arguing that an ICC referral was
“non-negotiable”. The United States however, opposed to the ICC since its creation, proved
reluctant to legitimize the Court, and instead proposed the creation of a special tribunal in Arusha,
coupled with the special tribunal for Rwanda, which could indict and prosecute war criminals.
African states, led by Nigeria, were however opposed to both notions, proposing instead the
creation of an AU tribunal, a proposal which received Sudanese support. This proposal was
however countered by the European members, which feared that any compromise on the ICC
would undermine the Court. For more than two months, the debate continued in the Security
Council, with uncertainty on whether a referral to the ICC would necessitate the authorization of a
UN intervention in Sudan (Bellamy, 2005: 49 and Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 155 - 156).
In late February, Jean-Marie Guehenno, the UN Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping,
forwarded a proposal containing four options on Darfur to the Secretary General. Guehenno
proposed that the UN could provide logistical support to a strengthened AU presence in Darfur,
deploy a joint UN/AU mission to the region, replace AMIS with a robust UN peace support
operation, or authorize a multinational force, as had been done in East Timor, to intervene in
Darfur. Each option was noted to be more robust than the previous, but in turn less politically
viable. On 7 March 2005 the Secretary General convened a meeting with all the members of the
Security Council in his office, a highly unusual move in UN protocol. Annan personally presented
each option to the members of the Council, arguing that the Council’s decision-making should not
be governed by Khartoum’s refusal to allow the UN to play a role. Yet the Council proved
reluctant, and unanimously favoured the provision of logistical support to AMIS. Guehenno later
remarked that it was perfectly clear to him that the Council would never have authorized a UN
intervention without Khartoum’s express authorization (Traub, 2010: 19). This approach by the
Council was criticized, even from within the UN Secretariat. A former official working in the
Department of Political Affairs later remarked that the Council failed to engage with Khartoum at a
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political level, with too much emphasis being placed on peacekeeping as the only option to
resolve the crisis. Rather than attempting to intimidate Khartoum, or shy away from intimidation,
UN officials argued that the Council should have paid more attention to the political dynamics at
play in Sudan, and which were driving calculations in Khartoum (Traub, 2010: 20).
Once the Security Council’s reluctance to deal with Darfur had become clear, the only feasible
option was to decouple the issues before the Council. By the end of March, the Security Council
adopted three separate resolutions. Resolution 1590 authorised the establishment of the United
Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), tasked with supporting the North-South Comprehensive
Peace Agreement, and with exploring modalities for the provision of support to AMIS. The
Resolution condemned human rights violations in Darfur, but moved to reaffirm the commitment
of the UN to the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of Sudan (United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1590, 2005). Resolution 1591 imposed travel bans and an
asset freeze on individuals committing human rights violations and obstructing the peace process
in Darfur (China, Russia and Algeria abstained) (United Nations Security Council Resolution
1591, 2005). Efforts were again made to include an arms embargo against Sudan, but at Chinese
insistence, this was dropped once more (Holslag, 2007: 7). Evidence soon emerged that China
and Russia had continued to supply Khartoum with attack helicopters, fighter-bomber aircraft and
other forms of weaponry which were now being used in Darfur (Taylor, 2010: 182).
Resolution 1593 then dealt with the findings generated by the ICID. After it was agreed that an
ICC referral would not necessitate further intervention by the Council, and the United States had
committed to abstaining from the vote despite its continued objections to the ICC, the Security
Council through Resolution 1593 on 31 March 2005 (Algeria, Brazil, China and the United States
abstaining) referred the Darfur matter to the ICC (United Nations Security Council Resolution
1593, 2005). Two African nations, Benin and Tanzania, voted in favour of the referral, despite
strong objections from the AU. Algeria, the third African non-permanent member of the Council at
the time, abstained however on the grounds that the Council had failed to explore alternate
options which had been proposed by the AU (Shabas, 2010: 139). Explaining its decision to
abstain from the vote, the United States reaffirmed its fundamental objection to the ICC, which it
claimed “strikes at the very essence of the nature of sovereignty”, but noted the importance of a
unified response to Darfur and the need to end impunity in the region (United Nations United
Nations Security Council Official Records, 2005[b]: 3).
Sudanese President al Bashir quickly responded to the referral, insisting that his government
would not cooperate with the ICC, and would refuse to surrender Sudanese nationals to the Court
for trial (The American Journal of International Law, 2005: 693). Nevertheless, the Security
Council forwarded 51 names to the ICC for investigation of alleged atrocities committed against
civilians. At the same time the Council moved to strengthen the existing arms embargo and
imposed an asset freeze and travel ban on those suspected of violating the cease-fire agreement
(Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 156).
In Addis Ababa members of the AU found themselves unable to forge a common position on
Darfur, divided over the referral to the ICC. This was heightened by the proliferation of diplomatic
efforts, taking place in Nigeria, Egypt, Libya, Eritrea and South Sudan. This proliferation of
initiatives led Konaré, on 25 April 2005 to request that all Darfur-related initiatives be coordinated
through the AU. Certainly this move sought to reduce duplication of effort and overlaps which
could undermine the peace process, but it also sought to re-position the AU at the centre of the
Darfur negotiation process and establish the Union’s pre-eminent authority (Badescu and
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Bergholm, 2010: 102). Konaré again reported to the Peace and Security Council on 28 April 2005
that the situation in Darfur had not improved, and that attacks against civilians were ongoing, with
both the Government of Sudan and the armed movements engaged in ongoing violations (African
Union, 2005[c]). The Council, while voting to increase the AMIS force to 6,171 military personnel
and 1,560 police officers, did not move to expand the mandate of the mission. Rather, the Council
commended the Government of Sudan for committing to withdraw its Antonov bombers from
Darfur. The Council did however urge states to ensure that all efforts at arriving at a political
settlement on Darfur be coordinated through the AU, again seeking to establish primacy on
Darfur (African Union, 2005[d]). While the Council moved to assert political leadership and
responsibility over Darfur, no moves were made to assume greater responsibility for the
protection of civilians, either through AMIS or through engagement with the Government of
Sudan.
Attempting to circumvent the international legal processes now instigated against Sudan,
Khartoum moved to negate the need for an international criminal investigation on Darfur. On 7
June 2005 Sudanese Chief Justice instituted the Special Criminal Court on the Events in Darfur
(SCCED) to prosecute crimes committed during the Darfur conflict under Sudanese criminal legal
jurisdiction. In November 2008, the mandate of the SCCED was extended to include crimes
under international humanitarian law. The Government of Sudan sought through the instigation of
the SCCED to undermine any international legal proceedings in Darfur through the principle of
primacy of jurisdiction, yet it quickly became evident that the SCCED could not be used to
substantiate such claims. By the end of 2009, only 13 cases had been brought before the Court,
all of which involved ordinary crimes. Where charges did relate to the large-scale attack against
civilians, convictions were only handed down for theft where this had taken place after an alleged
attack (African Union, 2009[a 56 – 57). In a similar move the Sudanese Minister of Justice
announced on 18 September 2005 that a Specialised Prosecutor for Crimes against Humanity
would be established in Khartoum, but this office never got off the ground. On 3 August 2008 a
Special Prosecutor was appointed by the Minister of Justice to focus in particular on crimes
committed in Darfur since 2003, yet by the end of 2009 no cases had been submitted to the
courts by the Special Prosecutor, and there was no expectation that any would in future (African
Union, 2009[a]: 58 – 59).
The Government of Sudan therefore quickly demonstrated that its measures at criminal
prosecution were designed only as political tools to bypass the ICC and not as mechanisms
which would seek to seriously investigate allegations of atrocity crimes and prosecute those
found to be responsible for their commission. Konaré, fearful that a perceived culture of impunity
in Darfur would undermine the AU’s credibility, quietly proposed the establishment of an African
inquiry into Darfur to al Bashir, along the lines of the international panel which the OAU had
established for Rwanda. Konaré’s envoy even indicated to the Sudanese Minister of Foreign that
an African panel could be used to forestall a UN inquiry, but al Bashir rebuffed Konaré’s offer,
confident that international attention on the North-South peace process would limit a push for
justice in Darfur (Flint and de Waal, 2008: 182). A culture of impunity, therefore, would remain a
guiding principle in Darfur on the part of Khartoum for years to come. Efforts elsewhere to bring
some form of accountability for Darfur also failed to gain traction. Following the ICC referral, the
United States Congress proposed a Darfur Accountability Act, but this was buried by heavy
resistance on the part of the State Department, which argued that the proposed measures would
constrain its negotiating position with Khartoum and that it failed to sufficiently recognize
Khartoum’s cooperation in South Sudan (Katz, 2006:25).
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The AMIS mission meanwhile, in anticipation of receiving expanded support through UNMIS for
the implementation of a future peace agreement in Darfur, began preparations on the ground for
the disarmament of the Janjaweed and the armed movements, despite the absence of a mandate
from the Peace and Security Council to do so (de Waal, 2007: 1050). It became clear however
that this was an impossible task, not least because AMIS would be forced to disarm members of
the government security services to put an end to the violence in Darfur. Facing more urgent
challenges, AMIS quietly moved away from notions of disarmament. The AU continued to face a
raft of increasingly serious challenges in Darfur. Troop generation proved extremely challenging,
the mission had no financial sustainability, logistical support measures were stretched well
beyond their limits, and the deterioration of the security situation on the ground confined AMIS
personnel to defending themselves from attack in their own camps. As one observer notes, it
became increasingly clear that the mission was not up to the tasks of ensuring the protection of
civilians and facilitating humanitarian assistance (Mwanasali, 2006: 97). Partners quickly stepped
in to provide expanded support to AMIS, particularly through the provision of financial and
logistical support for the mission. The British government, through the EU, for example provided
over 400 vehicles, while the United States, through the use of contractors, constructed camp
facilities, office space and accommodation for the mission. Canada contracted 16 helicopters for
the mission, and the Netherlands provided three further helicopters. In 2005, Norway provided
office accommodation for the mission’s police in IDP camps. Yet despite this support, AMIS
reported that it still required $200 million in 2005 just to address its most urgent needs (Anyidoho,
2006: 155).
As UN support to the AU was escalated, so too did the tensions between the two organizations
rise. Senior AU officials reportedly were not keen to accept UN advice on peacekeeping
operations, with the Chairperson of the AU Commission, reportedly blocking UN efforts in Addis
Ababa, insisting that the AU needed no advice from the West (Traub, 2010: 21). Yet as the
situation in Darfur deteriorated, AMIS found itself increasingly unable to perform its tasks while
the Sudanese government worked to ensure that the mission would operate in as limited a
manner as possible. Khartoum insisted, for example, that a Sudanese soldier accompany every
detachment of AU troops, closely identifying the mission with the Government of Sudan as
opposed to an independent actor and a source of protection in the minds of many civilians in
Darfur. The mission was also obstructed in other ways. The supply of jet fuel was delayed,
grounding AMIS aircraft, while visas were denied to non-African trainers and support staff,
ensuring that nobody in the mission could operate the donated Armoured Personnel Carriers
(APCs). UN pressure on the AU to hand over the mission steadily began to increase, with the EU
and the United States exerting increasing levels of diplomatic pressure on the Peace and Security
Council.
As these efforts were underway, and as the ICC commenced with its lengthy process of
investigations on Darfur, diplomatic wrangling reached new heights. Pakistan, China and Russia
moved to argue before the Security Council that the scale of human suffering in Darfur was
insufficient to provoke serious reflection on whether Sudan was fulfilling its responsibilities to its
citizens, and sought to have Darfur removed from the agenda of the Council arguing that the UN
had no business dealing with the matter. Great Britain, France and the United States became
increasingly reluctant to force the Darfur issues on the Council and this left only the Philippines
still pushing seriously for a UN intervention on humanitarian grounds. Invoking responsibility to
protect language, the Philippines argued that Sudan had failed in its obligations to its own
citizens, and that the responsibility to protect the citizens of Darfur had now ceded to other states.
Yet these calls went unheeded. The Security Council, meeting on 23 September, adopted
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Resolution 1627 on Sudan, extending the mandate of UNMIS and congratulating the Government
of Sudan for its efforts towards peace in the South with no mention of Darfur (United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1627, 2005).
The Government of Sudan continued to reject notions of human rights violations, and states such
as Brazil proved increasingly reluctant to even contemplate the matter in the Security Council
(Bellamy, 2005: 41 - 42). Unwilling to further pursue the matter within the chambers of the
Council, Chile, Germany, Great Britain, Spain and the United States invoked responsibility to
protect language outside of the Council, and argued that the responsibility to protect civilians had
now been ceded by Sudan not to the Security Council, but to the AU. As the responsible regional
mechanism, this group of states argued, the AU now bore the primary responsibility for protection
in Darfur above and beyond its efforts at forging a political settlement in Abuja (Bellamy, 2005:
42). Reinforcing the leadership of the AU, the Council met on 21 December 2005 to argue that
while the situation in Sudan continued to pose a threat to international peace and security, the
sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of Sudan were recognised, and the
Council expressed its commitment to the AU-led negotiations on Darfur in Abuja and the
responsibility of AMIS to ensure the protection of civilians (United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1651, 2005).
The United States in particular was keen to now position the AU as holding the primary
responsibility over Darfur, given its increasingly complicated relationship with Sudan which it did
not wish to jeopardize before the Security Council. While it wanted to push Khartoum for an end
to the conflict in Darfur it was also increasingly relying on Khartoum for assistance in the war on
terror and was developing closer links with Sudanese government in the intelligence sector. In
mid-2005, the United States had flown Salah Gosh, Sudanese chief of intelligence and one of the
primary architects of Khartoum’s engagement in Darfur, to the headquarters of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Virginia on a private plane for meetings on intelligence cooperation in
the American ‘War on Terror’ (Grono, 2006: 628 and Stedjan and Thomas-Jensen, 2010: 166).
Gosh was later accused by a UN panel of having command responsibility for many atrocity
crimes committed in Darfur. Yet Sudanese cooperation was seen as vital to combating the Al
Qaeda armed movement, and the American administration was reluctant to place this relationship
under unnecessary strain over Darfur. When details of the meetings later became public, activists
and members of the American Congress were furious, yet none felt that they could publicly
oppose the Bush Administration’s efforts aimed at ‘making America safer’, and the matter soon
faded away (Stedjan and Thomas-Jensen, 2010: 166).
By December 2005 AMIS had reached a force strength of approximately 7,000 personnel, drawn
from Nigeria, South Africa, Senegal, Rwanda, the Gambia, Kenya, Ghana, Egypt and Libya
(Badescu and Bergholm, 2010: 104). Yet the AU appeared weary of continuing to take primary
responsibility for action in Darfur, and in January 2006 the Peace and Security Council expressed
its support, in principle, for a transition from AMIS to a UN-led operation within the framework of
the partnership between the AU and the UN in the promotion of peace, security and stability in
Africa. As one observer notes, the belief became increasingly widespread that the AU had failed
in Darfur, and the AU was keen to ensure that the UN took responsibility for Darfur sooner rather
than later (Mwanasali, 2006: 97).
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Chapter 6: The Rise and Demise of Responsibility to Protect Discourse: Responses to the
Darfur Conflicts from 2006 - 2010
6.1 Introduction
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the UN and the AU struggled to formulate responses to
the Darfur conflicts over the period 2003 through 2005, the same period in which the
responsibility to protect norm first emerged. The AU sought to establish political primacy over
Darfur, but was unable to articulate or implement an effective response beyond the establishment
of a political process of engagement. The UN on the other hand prioritised the North-South peace
process, and asserted that the protection of the civilian population was first the responsibility of
the Government of Sudan, and later, the responsibility of AMIS. Responsibility to protect
discourse only started to surface as of July 2004 in Security Council discourse, but in a limited
manner. The Philippines was most vocal in its utilisation of responsibility to protect discourse,
supported by the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and Spain, however each adopted
a different interpretation of whose responsibility it was to protect the civilian population in Darfur,
with responsibility being allocated to the UN, the AU and the Government of Sudan alternately.
The norm however during this period remained in the emergence phase, and it therefore is not
surprising that it did not feature that prominently in discourse surrounding Darfur.
By the end of 2005 however the norm had been endorsed by the UN General Assembly, and
from 2006 entered into the cascade phase, becoming increasingly codified and entrenched. While
the norm had featured in a limited manner in discourse surrounding Darfur, in particular between
2004 and 2005, given the entrenchment of the norm in the UN and its mirroring in the AU’s
emerging peace and security regime, it could reasonably be expected that from 2006 onwards
the norm would increasingly come to feature in discourse, both at the UN and perhaps in the AU,
in the formulation and implementation of responses to Darfur. This chapter will track the
application of the responsibility to protect norm to the international responses to Darfur over the
period 2006 through 2010, in an attempt to assess both the manner and the degree to which the
norm featured in the formulation and implementation of response to Darfur, in a continued effort
to assess whether the norm was useful in addressing the type of conflict situations it was
designed to address.
6.2 The Rise of Responsibility to Protect Discourse over Darfur
In January 2006 Sudan was poised to have taken over the rotating Chairmanship of the AU for a
one year period, yet fearful that this would risk undermining all credibility for the organisation,
influential members worked to ensure that Sudan’s Chairmanship be delayed by at least a period
of one year. The negotiations which ensued resulted in a compromise, whereby the
Chairmanship of the Union would be handed to the Republic of the Congo (under the Presidency
of Sassou-Nguesso, who had come to power in a coup d’etat in 1997), and Sudan would instead
assume the Chairmanship in 2007 (Williams, 2007: 278). The final declaration of the Summit read
as follows:
The leaders expressed their appreciation for the initiative taken by HE President Omar Hassan Al-Bashir to
accept the postponement of his term of Chairmanship for the AU until 2007. The leaders consider this gesture
to be a true reflection of the great sense of responsibility and leadership demonstrated by President Al-Bashir.
The leaders agreed after extensive consultations that Sudan will assume the Chairmanship of the Union in the
year 2007 (African Union, 2006[a]).
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While the reluctance of African states to allow Sudan to accede to the Chairmanship of the AU
was seen by some as a punishment of Khartoum’s actions in Darfur, other observers argued that
the political undercurrents, reflected in the final declaration, showed that group solidarity mattered
more in Africa than the protection of human and peoples’ rights (Udombana, 2006: 111). Yet
Sudan was blocked time and again by member states from assuming the Chairmanship of the
Union. In 2007, despite Khartoum’s protests, Ghana assumed the Chair of the Union, and when
Khartoum sought finally to assume leadership of the Union in 2008, this was blocked by the East
African Region, and Tanzania assumed the Chair (Williams and Black, 2010: 15). In 2009 Sudan
abandoned its efforts, and Libya took over the Chairmanship, followed in 2010 by Malawi.
In January 2006, the UN Secretary General reported that serious abuses against civilians
continued in Darfur, perpetrated in particular by Sudanese armed forces and militias supported by
the government (United Nations Security Council, 2006[a]). The same month, a panel of experts
submitted a lengthy report to the Security Council, documenting a string of violations, in particular
on the part of the Government of Sudan (United Nations Security Council, 2006[b]). Yet no action
was taken by the Security Council on these reports. Instead, the President of the Council on 3
February commended the AU for the contributions of AMIS to the provision of a “secure
environment for civilians” (United Nations Security Council, 2006[c]). Two months later, the
Security Council “took note” of the report, and requested all relevant international partners to
continue to provide relevant information to the panel of experts, whose mandate had been
extended for a further six months (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1665, 2006).
The Peace and Security Council, fast losing credibility over Darfur, again moved to accept, in
principle, a UN presence in Darfur, and in February 2006 the Security Council authorised the UN
Secretariat to begin preparations for a possible deployment of a peacekeeping operation to
Darfur. Despite the reluctance of most members of the Council to have the UN assume primary
responsibility in Darfur, it had become increasingly clear that some form of UN presence was
becoming unavoidable. The thinking however was that a UN presence would operate in support
of an AU operation with primary responsibility for the protection of civilians, and that the Council’s
responsibilities would thereby be limited, at least in the immediate future. This decision
nonetheless angered Sudanese authorities, with President al Bashir declaring that Darfur would
be “a graveyard for any foreign troops” (quoted in Traub, 2010: 22). Sudanese officials quickly
worked to tone down this message, insisting that a UN peacekeeping force could only be
acceptable once there was a peace to keep, and that the Security Council should wait until the
Abuja process had produced a viable political settlement. The AU, somewhat reluctantly as it
would prolong the AMIS mission, agreed with this approach, and in March 2006 the Peace and
Security Council reaffirmed its in principle commitment to accepting UN peacekeepers in Darfur
once a political settlement had been reached, and extended the mandate of AMIS by a further six
months.
The situation on the ground however continued to deteriorate rapidly, and stretched AMIS to its
limits. In March 2006, the Sudanese air force began painting its aircraft in AMIS colours and used
them to re-supply their forces and to conduct bombing raids against civilian targets, in clear
violation of the ceasefire agreement and international law. AMIS troops took photographs, but the
mission leadership refused to take the matter up with Sudanese authorities, let alone to have
reports on the matter filed (Flint and de Waal, 2008: 178). AMIS was at this stage reliant on the
government for force protection, and in some cases for daily rations for its peacekeepers, and
was simply incapable of acting on such flagrant violations. The UN Secretary General reported on
a similar violation in his report to the Security Council on 9 March 2006, a clear breach of
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international law, but the Council took no action to address the matter (United Nations Security
Council, 2006[d]).
An attempted coup in Chad in April 2006 by rebels purportedly backed by the Government of
Sudan further soured relations between Khartoum and N’djamena, and placed Darfur at the
centre of an escalating regional conflict. The UN Secretary General, reporting to the Security
Council on 5 April, warned that the civilian population in Darfur continued to suffer the brunt of the
violence, perpetrated in large part by forces over which Khartoum had direct or indirect control. In
unusually strong language, the Secretary General reminded the Government of Sudan of its
unconditional duty to protect its citizens (United Nations Security Council, 2006[e]).
Perhaps growing more fearful of the regional implications of the Darfur conflict than of the human
rights violations, the Security Council met on 25 April 2006, adopting Resolution 1672. The
Resolution, for the first time, instituted targeted sanctions against those suspected of having
committed war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur, but only four individuals were
targeted: a low-level air force commander, a Janjaweed commander, and two leaders of the
armed movements (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1672, 2006). Beyond the
sanctions, no measures were taken to address the worsening crisis in Darfur. As one senior UN
official bitterly noted:
The international community is keeping people alive with humanitarian assistance until they are massacred (in
Grono, 2006: 628).
The AU, feeling overwhelmed by the task it was now facing, and sensing a reluctance on the part
of the Security Council to take on the responsibility for dealing with Darfur, decided that the
primary responsibility for protecting civilians and for bringing an end to the conflict actually lay not
with itself, but with the belligerents party to the conflict. During the final days of the Abuja
negotiations leading up to the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement, AU representatives framed
debate around the challenge of implementing the international responsibility to protect civilians in
Darfur from the most egregious of crimes. Indeed, on numerous occasions from 2004 up until the
end of the negotiations in 2006, representatives from the SLM and JEM demanded that states
fulfil their commitment to protect civilians as a precondition for pursuing peace talks with the
government. AU mediators however were quick to circumvent the framing of negotiations in such
terms, and reframed the task as having to achieve security by emphasizing the responsibilities of
the parties themselves for the protection of civilians (De Waal, 2007: 1052). Discussions in Abuja
on precisely who was responsible for protecting the people of Darfur from war crimes, crimes
against humanity and systematic violations of human rights had thus shifted this responsibility
from the major powers to the Government of Sudan, to the Security Council, to the AU, and
finally, in the final days of Abuja, back to the belligerents themselves. In frustration at these
developments, Gareth Evans, then President of the International Crisis Group, during a public
speech at the University of New South Wales on 30 April 2006, asked:
Whether we really are capable, as an international community, of stopping nation-states murdering their own
people. How many more times will we look back wondering, with varying degrees of incomprehension, horror,
anger and shame, how we could have let it all happen (Evans, 2006: 1)?
Increasingly, pressure was exerted on the Abuja negotiations to yield a peace agreement, driven
in part by the impatience of donors, and in part to enable a transition from AMIS to a UN-led
peacekeeping force, as demanded by the powerful lobbies, in particular in the United States,
pushing for states to ‘save’ Darfur (Flint, 2010: 14). The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was
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signed on 5 May 2006 in Abuja by the Government of Sudan and the SLM faction led by Mini
Minawi. The other factions of the SLM and the JEM refused to sign, arguing that the agreement
could not resolve the political conflict in Darfur nor bring an end to the atrocities still being
committed on the ground. What remained of the SLM and the JEM quickly splintered into
numerous factions, returning to Darfur to continue the military campaign against the Government
of Sudan and the Janjaweed.
The fact that only two parties to the conflict had signed the DPA proved a death blow to the
agreement. Yet to make matters worse, technical advice on the implementation of the agreement
was ignored, and neither the UN nor the AU fulfilled their commitments to take rapid practical
steps to support key tasks outlined in the agreement, such as the verification of the positions of
armed groups or the disarmament of the Janjaweed (in the latter case, because the AU Special
Representative, in his own words, “forgot”). The worst error however, as noted by de Waal, was
the decision by the AU to expel the non-signatory parties from the Ceasefire Commission,
breaking all links with the movements which had refused to sign the Abuja agreement (2007:
1048). Indeed, the DPA had been drafted in the anticipation that all the armed movements would
sign, and therefore included provisions for the AU to provide technical assistance, supplies and
logistics to the movements once they had signed. In effect, this clause led AMIS to provide
technical and logistical support to SLA-Minawi, making it a belligerent to the conflict and the direct
adversary of the non-signatory movements (Flint and de Waal, 2008: 233).
The immediate effect of the DPA, argues one observer, was to deepen the crisis, and within days
of the signing of the agreement, riots broke out in the displaced camps and fighting intensified,
resulting in a further 100,000 displaced persons (Flint, 2010: 16). Frustrated at the failure of the
Abuja process to bring about an inclusive agreement, Abdul Wahid, one of the armed movement
leaders, left Abuja fuming that “the international community wants success, not peace” (in Flint,
2010: 17). While the Darfur Peace Agreement fell to pieces, the ICC investigations into Darfur
were left to collapse as well. The degree to which the Security Council remained accountable
over Darfur received increasing attention, in particular with regards to the ICC referral. Juan
Mendez, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide at the time,
argued that:
The Council acted as if once they made the referral, everything was in the hands of the ICC, and they didn’t
need to worry about it. That was fatal to the ICC’s opportunity to do its work inside the country. […] The
international community basically allowed Khartoum to dictate the pace and sequence of negotiations on
everything – from accountability to protection to humanitarian assistance and the peace process (in Traub,
2010: 22 – 23).
The Security Council however, sensing that political means to resolve the Darfur crisis had been
exhausted through the ICC referral and the signing of the DPA, and still reluctant to take the lead
responsibility for solving the crisis, pushed for a strengthened AU peacekeeping presence on the
ground. On 16 May 2006, shortly after the signing of the DPA, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 1679 which called on the AU and the UN to agree on requirements necessary to
strengthen the capacity of AMIS to enforce the security arrangements of the Darfur Peace
Agreement, and noted the intent to launch a follow-on UN operation in Darfur at some point in the
distant future (Security Council Resolution 1679, 2006). While supporting the Resolution, both
China and Russia made it clear that any UN presence in Darfur would have to first be made
acceptable to Khartoum. Sudanese authorities, despite the attainment of a political settlement,
remained reluctant to accept a UN presence, and President al Bashir in June threatened an
international jihad against any UN deployment in the region, asserting:
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there will not be any international military intervention in Darfur as long as I am in power (in Grono, 2006: 629 –
630).
Reports emanating from Darfur also made it likely that Khartoum would continue to resist a UN
presence there. Indeed, while Sudanese government continued to argue that villages were being
attacked on the basis of their being used as operations hubs by the armed movements, evidence
continued to emerge which suggested that Sudanese air and ground forces, working closely
together with the Janjaweed, continued to attack villages where no prior presence of the armed
movements could be established. Further, the evidence continued to suggest widespread
violation of human rights, international humanitarian law and continued and purposeful breach of
the Geneva Conventions (Marong, 2007: 3). Khartoum was unlikely to allow a UN presence in
Darfur while it continued its counter-insurgency campaign against the civilian population. While
Darfur continued to burn, and while the Security Council sought to avoid taking responsibility, the
Council, somewhat ironically, met on 28 June 2006 for its first open debate on the protection of
civilians in armed conflict. Jan Egeland, the Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs,
sought to remind the Council of its unavoidable responsibilities:
We, as the United Nations, and the Security Council specifically, now have the responsibility to protect, as
reaffirmed in resolution 1674 (2006). There are too many times when we still do not come to the defence of
civilian populations in need. When our response is weak, we appear to wash our hands of our humanitarian
responsibilities to protect lives. The world is, indeed, a safer place for most of us, but it is still a death trap for
too many defenceless civilians – men, women and children (quoted by International Coalition for the
Responsibility to Protect, 2006[a]).
Argentinean representative Garciá Moritán argued that:
the principle of non-intervention must be balanced by the principle of non-indifference against massive
violations of human rights and humanitarian law. […] Both elements, the responsibility to protect and the new
resolution [1674] of the Council on the protection of civilians are the start of a new phase regarding the actions
to be taken by states in this subject (in International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, 2006[a])
The Canadian representative, Allan Rock, agreed, but warned that words alone would not make
the agenda of protection of civilians a reality, and that only concrete steps and the willingness to
make flexible and pragmatic use of all levers of power available to the Council would enable it to
meet its responsibility to the vulnerable The Chinese representative, Liu Zhenmin, however
argued that the primary responsibility for the protection of civilians lay not with the Council, but
with the governments concerned, and that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states should
not be undermined for the purposes of protecting civilians (International Coalition for the
Responsibility to Protect, 2006[a]). Interestingly, the United States changed tack as well, with
representative William Brencick arguing that:
The primary responsibility for protecting civilians lies with these nations and their governments, and
international efforts should only complement government efforts (in International Coalition for the Responsibility
to Protect, 2006[a]).
By the end of the same month the Secretary General reported to the Security Council that large-
scale attacks against civilians in Darfur were ongoing, and that serious thought needed to be
given to the transition from AMIS to a UN-led operation (United Nations Security Council, 2006[f]).
While many members of the Security Council and the broader membership of the UN therefore
were willing to endorse the responsibility of the Council for the protection of civilians in conflict
zones, and others were quick to argue that this responsibility lay with the member states
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themselves, this debate seemed to have taken place in complete isolation from the realities of the
Council’s engagement with and actions on Darfur, where the conflict continued to spiral out of
control.
Unperturbed by the developments on the ground and by the struggle of AMIS to give meaning to
its mandate, the AU Assembly met in the Gambia from 1 to 2 July 2006. The Assembly adopted a
range of decisions, but no mention of Sudan or Darfur could be found in its outcomes document.
The Assembly did move to invoke article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the Union however; the
first time the article had been invoked since the founding of the AU. Recalling articles 3(h), 4(h)
and 4(o) of the Constitutive Act, the Assembly decided that the criminal accusations levelled
against Hissène Habré, the former President of Chad, fell within the jurisdiction of the AU, and
that criminal proceedings against Habré were the responsibility of the Union. The Assembly duly
requested Senegal to conduct the criminal proceedings against Habré on behalf of the AU
(African Union, 2006[c]: Dec. 127(VII)). This decision was based on an earlier decision on the
Habré matter, taken in January 2006, that the Union would adhere to the principle of the total
rejection of impunity, and that priority would be given to an African mechanism through which to
seek justice for Habré (African Union, 2006[b]: Dec.103(VI)). Yet while the Union was willing to
invoke article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act at the level of the Assembly against Habré, not a single
declaration or decision was made on Darfur or Sudan.
6.3 Building Castles of Sand: Responding to Wars within Wars
In August 2006 the Arab League expressed its support for Khartoum, arguing that the UN should
not move to deploy a peacekeeping force to which the Government of Sudan remained opposed.
As the Security Council prepared to consider a further draft resolution on Sudan, President al
Bashir moved to garner further African support for his opposition to a UN deployment. On 26
August, Bashir met with Alpha Konaré in Khartoum to reiterate his opposition to a UN
deployment, and expressed his disappointment that African members of the Security Council
were poised to support the draft resolution. Al Bashir’s efforts were to no avail however. Despite
continued opposition by Khartoum, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1706 on 31 August
2006, by a vote of 12 in favour, with China, Russia and Qatar abstaining (Udombana, 2007: 97).
Ghana, Tanzania and the Congo, the three non-permanent African members of the Council at the
time, all voted in favour of the Resolution (Bah, 2010: 17). The Resolution affirmed both
Resolution 1674 on the protection of civilians in armed conflict and the responsibility to protect
norm as outlined in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcomes Document and
extended the operations of UNMIS into Darfur, handing responsibility for the implementation of
the Darfur Peace Agreement to UNMIS no later than 31 December 2006, the anticipated date of
expiration of the latest AMIS mandate (Security Council Resolution 1706, 2006). The Resolution,
notably, reminded the Government of Sudan of its responsibility to protect civilians under threat of
violence, and invited Sudanese consent to the deployment of a UN force to Darfur, implying that if
consent was not forthcoming, such a force might be deployed without consent. While the
invitation for Sudanese consent was included at the insistence of Russia and China, some
members of the Council felt that this provision critically weakened the Resolution. The Ghanaian
representative, Nana Effah-Aptengeng, for example, indicated her concern that the Council had
even requested Sudanese consent, and argued that the Council did not require the consent of the
Government of Sudan to intervene given the seriousness of the violations concerned (O’Neill,
2006).
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One week after the passage of Resolution 1706, al Bashir called the bluff of the Security Council
and rejected the terms of the resolution. Al Bashir, argues one observer, decided to draw a red
line, and refused to be pushed into a further UN deployment in Sudan without renegotiating the
terms of engagement, insisting that he would not accept a UN force designed to place Sudan
“under mandate, a sort of trusteeship” (in Udombana, 2007: 102). Privately, senior figures in the
Sudanese government made it clear that no consent for the deployment of an international force
would be given at any level, declaring that the resolution constituted “unjustifiable hostility against
Sudan” (in Grono, 2006: 629). In New York, Sudanese officials sought to clarify that the biggest
obstacle lay not with the resolution itself, but with the notions which French Foreign Minister
Bernard Kouchner was seeking to advance under the guise of Resolution 1706; authorisation for
the establishment of humanitarian corridors, by force if needed, from Chad to Darfur. Khartoum,
fearing that N’djamena would use these corridors to continue arming and supporting the
movements in Darfur, therefore reacted so violently to Resolution 1706, denouncing it as a form
of intervention on humanitarian grounds under the guise of the responsibility to protect (Interview
14, 2010). An array of senior UN officials visited Khartoum in September, hoping to find common
ground with the government, but to no avail.
On 11 September, the Security Council met to debate the latest report of the Secretary General
on Sudan, which had documented a string of ongoing abuses. The Secretary General, opening
the debate, argued that the “tragedy in Darfur” had reached a critical point, which merited the
urgent attention of the Council. Kofi Annan questioned whether the Council could in conscience
leave the people of Darfur to their fate:
Can the international community, having not done enough for the people of Rwanda in their time of need, just
watch as this tragedy deepens? Having finally agreed – just one year ago – that there is a responsibility to
protect, can we contemplate failing yet another test? Lessons either learned or not, principles either upheld or
scorned, this is no time for the middle ground of half measures or further debate. […] The consequences of the
Government’s current attitude – yet more death and suffering, perhaps on catastrophic scale – will be felt first
and foremost by the people of Darfur. But the Government itself will also suffer if it fails in its sacred
responsibility to protect its own people. It will suffer opprobrium and disgrace in the eyes of all Africa and the
whole international community. Moreover, neither those who decide such policies nor those who carry them out
should imagine that they will not be held accountable. But my voice alone will not convince the Government. It
is time now for additional voices to make themselves heard. We need Governments and individual leaders in
Africa and beyond who are in a position to influence the Government of Sudan to bring that pressure to bear
without delay. There must also be a clear, strong and uniform message from this Council (United Nations
United Nations Security Council Official Records, 2006: 3 – 4).
The United Kingdom representative, Sir Emyr Jones Parry, argued that the Government of Sudan
had a clear responsibility towards its citizens, but questioned whether the Government was willing
to discharge this responsibility. The Congolese representative went further, arguing that the
Government of Sudan was clearly failing in its responsibilities, and that the events in Darfur
should by now already have elicited a clear response by the Council. Argentina moved further,
arguing that:
along with the responsibility of each individual state to protect its own population, the international community
has a responsibility to help states exercise that obligation. In the context of the crisis in Darfur, the only way to
protect its civil population is through the presence of peacekeeping troops in the region – neutral and impartial
troops that would neither constitute an occupation force nor limit the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
Sudan. In other words, we are trying to protect the lives and security of millions of innocent civilians, since the
Government of Sudan cannot do so (United Nations United Nations Security Council Official Records, 2006:
15).
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Danish representative Ellen Margareth Løj supported this position, arguing that no effort should
be spared to prevent yet another genocide from taking place in Africa, and that the ongoing
situation in Darfur directly challenged the moral credibility of the Council. The Tanzanian
representative went even further, arguing:
Never before has the international community abandoned a humanitarian and political crisis on the scale of
what exists in Darfur. We cannot leave the people of Darfur alone (United Nations United Nations Security
Council Official Records, 2006: 12).
Yet whilst members of the Security Council condemned the ongoing atrocities in Darfur and
proved in general agreement that states held a responsibility to act, it was not clear what form
that action should take. In the end, the Chinese proposal to leave the Peace and Security Council
and AMIS in the lead won the day, and the Security Council took no new action other than to
extend the mandate of UNMIS in the South two weeks later (United Nations United Nations
Security Council Official Records, 2006: 11).
On 16 September 2006, demonstrators at rallies across the world donned blue berets to demand
that the UN send troops to ‘save’ Darfur (Flint and de Waal, 2008: 191). Despite this pressure, at
the opening of the General Assembly that month al Bashir succeeded in garnering sufficient
opposition to a UN deployment in Darfur, and members of the Security Council began to shy
away from the matter (De Waal, 2007: 1042 and Traub, 2010: 25). As Kofi Annan summarized
several days later:
The fact is, without the consent of Sudanese government, we are not going to be able to put in the troops. So
what we need is to convince Sudanese government to bend and change its attitude and allow us to go in
(United Nations Information Service, 2006).
One disappointed observer noted that the Security Council had by this time expressed every
sentiment except a desire to take strong action to save the people of Darfur (Udombana, 2007:
98). Seizing the moment, the Peace and Security Council extended the AMIS mandate through
the end of 2006, without altering the mandate of the mission to include stronger provisions for the
protection of civilians. The Council did repeatedly request the Government of Sudan to disarm the
Janjaweed militia, and to cease obstructing the deployment of AMIS in accordance with its
mandate, but most often, Khartoum did not heed such calls (Mwanasali, 2006: 98).
Throughout the remainder of 2006, tensions between the AU and the UN on how best to proceed
in Darfur mounted, and the AU remained reluctant to accept a substantial UN role in the
peacekeeping operation. Following intense negotiations with Kofi Annan in Addis Ababa in
November 2006 the AU agreed to sign a memorandum of understanding with the UN to
cooperate on political, humanitarian and military measures. The UN agreed to support the AU
mission with both a light and heavy support package, but negotiations on the modalities of this
support would continue for eight months. Reaching agreement between the AU and the UN on
the political leadership and command and control of the mission would prove particularly thorny
(Traub, 2010: 25 – 26). Following further negotiations during a high-level meeting in Addis Ababa,
it was agreed at the end of November 2006 between the AU, the UN, the permanent five
members of the Security Council, key African member states, the EU, the Arab League and the
Government of Sudan that Resolution 1706 would effectively be shelved. Instead, it was agreed
that three general objectives would now be pursued. First, the political process would be
reinvigorated. Second, attempts would be made to revive and strengthen the, now moribund,
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ceasefire. Third, it was agreed that the AU and the UN would mount a joint or ‘hybrid’ operation in
Darfur (MacKinnon, 2010: 80).
While these negotiations were underway AMIS continued to find itself in a perilous situation.
Increasingly, the mission came to be seen as supporting the Government of Sudan, and earned
the ire of both the local population and the armed movements. The JEM, increasing its attacks on
AMIS, argued that the AU had turned itself into “an executive body of President Omar al Bashir’s
junta” (in Flint, 2010: 19). Given this deteriorating situation, AMIS peacekeepers increasingly
remained in their compounds, with mission resources strained simply to provide protection to the
AMIS bases, let alone the population of Darfur.
External pressure on AMIS also began to mount, with many donors, members of civil society and
the media highlighting the weaknesses of the mission and pushing publicly for a rapid transition
into a fully fledged UN ‘boots on the ground’ operation, authorized to use force if needed, even
against the Government of Sudan should this be required. This pressure, particularly on the part
of donors who both criticized the AU for failing to do its job and withheld the resources necessary
for AMIS to achieve its objectives, was perceived by many in the AU as disrespectful, short-
sighted and selfish. Jan Pronk likened the situation to donor “blackmail”, while now retired
Ghanaian General Henry Anyidoho, the senior UN official liaising with the AU at the time,
grumbled despondently that “the donors call the shots” (in MacKinnon, 2010: 92 – 93).
International attention increasingly focused not on what was happening on the ground in Darfur,
nor on the political negotiations aimed at finding a negotiated settlement, but on calls, led by the
‘Save Darfur’ lobbyists, for armed intervention by NATO or other Western forces or, failing this,
for a UN peacekeeping operation mandated to protect civilians by force if necessary (Flint, 2010:
21). Despite publicly supporting the transition to a UN operation, many AU leaders, resentful of
what was perceived as a Western effort to discredit the Union, resolved to drag the transition
process out (MacKinnon, 2010: 92). Moreover, African members of the Security Council, normally
prone to pushing the Darfur agenda, changed tact and proved hesitant to the transition plan being
proposed by the UN, arguing that the Peace and Security Council make any decisions before the
Security Council. While these tensions persisted, pragmatism prevailed and the massive funding
deficit as well as the depressed morale of AMIS ensured that a transition timetable was agreed to
sooner rather than later (Flint and de Waal, 2008: 199 and MacKinnon, 2010: 92 – 93). The AU
quietly received the support of many senior diplomats and humanitarian agencies operating in
Sudan.
During this time, senior staff in the UN estimated that they spent approximately five to ten times
as much effort on dealing with calls for a robust peacekeeping force than on peacemaking efforts
for Darfur, and that this was leading to increasingly stiff opposition from Khartoum. Humanitarian
workers acknowledged that while activist pressure did serve to keep Darfur on the agenda of
Western governments, the focus on the notion of a military intervention as the answer to all of
Darfur’s problems being advocated by some groups increasingly distracted attention from the
immediate needs of the people of Darfur, and from finding a meaningful and workable solution
(Flint, 2010: 22).
In November 2006 the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights released its sixth
report on the human rights situation in Sudan. The report documented a systematic pattern of
attacks against the civilian population in Darfur which, at the very least, demonstrated the
government’s continued failure to disarm the militias and, at worst, the government’s use of militia
forces to target the civilian population. The report argued that the government held the
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responsibility both to refrain from participating in such attacks, and to protect its civilian population
from them, but that there was no indication that the government was either preventing or
responding to the ongoing attacks against the civilian population (United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, 2006). While AMIS continued to make the best of an impossible
situation political efforts continued elsewhere. During a further open Security Council debate on
the protection of civilians on 4 December 2006 attention was drawn by Tanzania to the question
of what should happen when states manifestly failed in their responsibilities to protect their
citizens. Without drawing directly on the Darfur case, Tanzanian Ambassador Mahiga
nevertheless highlighted that:
The greatest challenge to the Council and to states as a whole occurs when Governments not only fail to
protect their citizens, but are themselves the cause of insecurity to their citizens. How can we exercise our
collective responsibility to protect under such circumstances? We should hold such Governments responsible
and accountable for their actions (in International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, 2009[c]).
Kofi Annan expressed similar sentiments on 8 December 2006 during a speech commemorating
International Human Rights Day. Annan gravely remarked that:
The tragedy of Darfur has raged for over three years now, and still reports pour in of villages being destroyed by
the hundreds, and of the brutal treatment of civilians spreading into neighbouring countries. How can an
international community which claims to uphold human rights allow this horror to continue? There is more than
enough blame to go around. It can be shared among those who value abstract notions of sovereignty more than
the lives of real families, those whose reflex of solidarity puts them on the sides of governments and not of
peoples, and those who fear that action to stop the slaughter would jeopardize their commercial interests. The
truth is, none of these arguments amount even to excuses, let alone justifications for the shameful passivity of
most governments. We have still not summoned up the collective sense of urgency that this issue requires
(United Nations News Centre, 2006)
Frustrated at the lack of progress on the part of the UN, the European Parliament adopted a
Resolution on 15 February 2007 calling on the UN to deploy a forceful intervention to Darfur,
even in the absence of the consent of the Government of Sudan. The Resolution called for a UN
force to establish and secure humanitarian aid corridors (based on a proposal by French Minister
of Foreign Affairs Bernard Kouchner) and called on the organisation to act in line with its
responsibilities under the responsibility to protect, arguing that the Government of Sudan had
failed to live up to its responsibilities to protect its population from war crimes and crimes against
humanity, and was deliberately obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The
Resolution, while adopted with vigour in the European Parliament, fell on deaf ears and passed
largely unnoticed (Keane and Wee, 2010: 126 – 127). In New York meanwhile an expert report
had emerged which described in detail how Khartoum had violated the interdiction on transferring
arms to Darfur and recommended the imposition of a tightly controlled arms embargo and other
measures designed to limit the use of illicit weapons. Efforts were made to have the report
brought to the attention of the UN Sanctions Committee, but Chinese diplomatic effort ensured
that the report did not find fertile ground (Holslag, 2007: 7).
On 16 March the Human Rights Council met in Geneva to deliberate a report which had been
compiled by a high-level mission which the Council had dispatched to Sudan. In describing the
report, the head of the mission, Jody Williams, listed a litany of ongoing abuses, before
concluding that Sudan had “manifestly failed in its responsibilities to protect its citizens”.
Sudanese representative unleashed a barrage of criticism, supported by several nations from the
global South. The Algerian representative, speaking on behalf of the League of Arab States,
rejected the report on the basis that the mission had not been mandated to consider whether or
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not Sudan was fulfilling its responsibilities towards it citizens. Similarly, Pakistan, speaking on
behalf of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, argued that the report could not be
considered by the Council as the responsibility to protect had no place in discussions on Sudan’s
human rights record. Five other African states (Ghana, Morocco, Senegal, Tunisia and Zambia)
however spoke in favour of the report. Ultimately however the report was shelved by the Council
(Williams, 2009: 407).
While discussions on the applicability of the responsibility to protect deadlocked in the Human
Rights Council, on 30 April 2007 the Security Council again utilised responsibility to protect
discourse in Resolution 1755 which extended the UNMIS mandate and expressed grave
concerns over the deteriorating humanitarian situation. The Resolution again reaffirmed the World
Summit Outcomes Document, as well as Resolution 1674. In addition to extending the mandate
of UNMIS the Resolution expressed grave concern over the deteriorating humanitarian situation
in Darfur, condemned attacks on the civilian population, and called on all parties to put an
immediate end to the violence and atrocities. But the Resolution did not mention the possibility of
a UN role in assisting the parties to put an end to the violence in the region. Without UN support,
AMIS continued to struggle to generate the resources required to implement its mandate, in
particular with regards to the protection of civilians. While the Peace and Security Council
approved the use of attack helicopters in Darfur in April 2007, by the end of 2009, it was only
Ethiopia which had provided any (African Union, 2009[a]: 102).
In May that year ten members of the Pan-African Parliament (Eritrea, Ghana, Kenya, Mali,
Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda) linked the events in Darfur to
Article 4(h) of the AU Charter, arguing that the AU had a responsibility to mediate and resolve the
conflicts. The parliamentarians however cautioned against enforcing the collective will of outside
parties on Sudan. Thus, whilst the parliamentarians noted that the AU had a responsibility to
intervene on the collective behalf of the members of the Union, this did not extend to a
responsibility to force the Government of Sudan to adhere to external demands, in particular with
regards to human rights violations (Badescu and Bergholm, 2010: 111).
By 22 June 2007, during the third open debate of the Security Council on the protection of
civilians in armed conflict, Ghana and Rwanda lamented on the confusion as to whose
responsibility it actually was to protect the civilian population in Darfur, and the manner in which
multilateral organisations were assigning this responsibility to one another. Without referring
directly to the developments in Darfur, both African nations challenged the Security Council to
play a more decisive role in situations of mass atrocity. Ghanaian representative Robert Tachie-
Menson argued that the Council should recognize the importance of its own role when he noted
that, based on the outcomes of the World Summit and Resolution 1674, it was undeniable that:
The international community has the legal and institutional tools to deal with this issue [the protection of civilians
in armed conflict]. The challenge for us now is to translate the mechanisms at our disposal into effective
practical systems for the protection of civilians. When states and combatants prove unwilling or unable to act,
the international community has a moral and legal duty to intervene to avert a humanitarian catastrophe (in
International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, 2009 [c]).
Rwanda’s Permanent Representative, Ambassador Joseph Nsengimana, did not mince his words
during the same debate, arguing that:
The most serious crimes in situations of conflict are committed against poor, defenceless and voiceless people,
often living in remote locations far from the sight of the international community and the media. It is for such
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people that the implementation of resolutions 1674 (2006) and 1738 (2006) is most urgent. Despite these
resolutions, and despite the endorsement by all states at the 2005 World Summit of the principles of the
responsibility to protect, which my Government strongly supports, too many people continue to suffer
unspeakable horrors in situations of armed conflict. It is clear that much more needs to be done, particularly by
this Security Council, which is the Charter-mandated body responsible for international peace and security.
We believe that our common humanity should unite us in the resolve to put an end to the suffering of millions of
people who live in, and are threatened by, situations of conflict. This resolve entails national Governments
taking full responsibility to protect civilians, and, where they are unable or unwilling to do so, the international
community acting through the Security Council to take appropriate steps to provide such protection. It is
essential that, in taking such actions, the Security Council be seen as consistent and just, acting in the best
interests of the international community, and that it shows special concern for those who are most defenceless
and vulnerable and most in need of protection from states (in International Coalition for the Responsibility to
Protect, 2009 [c]).
While these positions enjoyed broad support in the open debates of the Council, they did not
seem to impact on the Council’s approach to dealing with the protection of civilians in Darfur. In
the meantime, French Minister of Foreign Affairs Bernard Kouchner had embarked on a
diplomatic blitz of Chad, Mali and Sudan to promote a French plan to stabilize Darfur. This
culminated on 25 June 2007 with an international conference in Paris intended to confirm the
unity of the international community in dealing with Darfur. However, no African state attended
save for Egypt, Sudan had never been invited in the first place, and the AU boycotted the
conference, arguing that it had not been consulted and that the French initiative was another one
too many, undermining the Union’s own mediation efforts (Charbonneau, 2010: 225).
Brushing the French effort aside, and following the conclusion of negotiations between the UN
and the AU, together with considerable American, Chinese and Egyptian diplomatic effort in
Khartoum (which secured the consent of the Government of Sudan) the Security Council adopted
Resolution 1769 on 31 July 2007 which authorised the deployment of a joint AU/UN
peacekeeping force to Darfur, known as the hybrid United Nations - African Union Mission to
Darfur (UNAMID). The Resolution reaffirmed the strong commitment of the Council to the
sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of Sudan, and authorized the deployment
of 19,555 military personnel, 3,772 police officers and an appropriate civilian component; the
largest UN peace support operation in history. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the
Resolution also authorized the mission to protect civilians “without prejudice to the responsibility
of the Government of Sudan” (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1769, 2007: 5). The
section referring to the protection of civilians was vague however, and did not provide UNAMID
with clear guidelines as to the role of the mission with regards to protection. Indeed, the section of
the mandate relating to sexual exploitation and abuse on the part of the peacekeepers was 14
times longer than the section related to the protection mandate of the mission.
While the Security Council had now jointly with the AU taken on responsibility for a more direct
role in Darfur, members of the Council were quick to highlight the fact that the responsibility of the
Council itself was limited, and that the Government of Sudan actually bore the primary
responsibility to ensure the protection of civilians and bring an end to the string of abuses ongoing
in Sudan. The Russian representative, Ambassador Churkin, reminded the Council that UNAMID
should work to ensure the protection of civilians only insofar as this observed the sovereign
prerogatives of the Government of Sudan (United Nations United Nations Security Council Official
Records, 2007[a]:5). Belgian Ambassador Verbeke argued that protection for the civilian
population could now only be attained “if all actors in [the] political process take responsibility”
(United Nations United Nations Security Council Official Records, 2007[a]:7). Ambassador Kleib
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of Indonesia was the only representative who ventured to argue that the implementation of
Resolution 1769 rested on the basis of a partnership between the UN, the AU and the
Government of Sudan, and that only through such a partnership of shared responsibilities the
endeavours reflected in the Resolution could succeed and the people of Darfur could be helped
(United Nations United Nations Security Council Official Records, 2007[a]:8). Members of the
Council, despite taking on a direct responsibility for the situation in Darfur through the adoption of
Resolution 1769, were thus at pains to ensure that the responsibility for the protection of civilians
and the implementation of UNAMID’s mandate was either handed back to the Government of
Sudan, or at least was framed as a shared responsibility between the UN, the AU and the
Government of Sudan.
As the mission commenced with the logistics of transitioning an AU peacekeeping operation into
a joint AU - UN mission, UNAMID, which commenced operations in January 2008, still had no
tangible peace to keep, something which increasingly concerned in particular the UN Secretariat.
As the Darfur Peace Agreement of 2006 had still only been signed by one faction of the SLM and
the government in Khartoum, and remained both widely disputed and violated, the onus was on
creating a peace for UNAMID to keep. Thus, with the passage of Resolution 1769 a flurry of
political activity commenced to negotiate an inclusive peace agreement for Darfur, and the AU
and UN envoys, Salim Ahmed Salim and Jan Eliasson respectively, quickly attempted to launch a
new round of negotiations (De Waal, 2007: 1042 – 1043). Yet while negotiations on UNAMID and
on a political settlement for Darfur were commencing yet again, the situation on the ground was
becoming more intricate. Fearing that UNAMID would seek as a first priority to provide security
around the displaced camps, Khartoum made moves to empty the camps, seeking to deprive the
armed movements of safe recruitment grounds and attempting to display to the outside world that
the situation in Darfur had stabilized to the point where displaced persons were now ‘voluntarily’
returning home once more (Brosché, 2008: 45 – 46). The UN and the AU would need to move
quickly to provide the security envisaged through the establishment of UNAMID.
Yet progress was slow, as the Darfur conflict had degenerated into a series of wars within wars,
marked by low-intensity conflict on all sides, the fracturing of the armed movements, and
Khartoum’s near total loss of control over the Janjaweed, which it had both armed and trained
with great effort. The UN was also losing ground with Khartoum during this time, and on 28
September the Security Council, deploring the ongoing violence, impunity and deterioration in the
humanitarian situation, was forced to demand that Sudanese airforce cease aerial bombings and
the use of aircraft painted with UN markings in bombing raids in Darfur (United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1779, 2007). AMIS too was losing legitimacy on the ground, and on 29
September 2007 the AU base in Haskanita was attacked by the JEM, leaving 12 Nigerian
peacekeepers dead. The AU was increasingly fighting to protect itself within its own
encampments, as opposed to contributing to stabilizing the situation in Darfur, let alone protecting
civilians there (Bah, 2010: 9). As Khartoum deployed Chinese MiG fighter-bomber aircraft in
Darfur for the first time in September 2007, the civil society lobby movements increased their
condemnation (Flint and de Waal, 2008: 263). Some North American activists proclaimed that
Darfur’s camps for the displaced were becoming the “new frontline in Khartoum’s genocidal
counter-insurgency war”. The Prosecutor of the ICC, Louis Moreno-Ocampo, went further,
arguing that the Government of Sudan was seeking to turn the camps into “concentration camps”
(Flint and de Waal, 2008: 241).
As UNAMID planners in New York sought to establish a joint AU-UN mission in Darfur, a first for
both organisations, and as political efforts resumed to find some semblance of peace for the
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mission to keep, frustration mounted on all sides. While the UN had commenced with an
integrated planning process, drawing together the relevant organs of the Secretariat and the UN
agencies, the AU was by and large left out of the planning process, as was the Sudanese
government. Approved plans for the integrated mission were routinely taken to Addis Ababa
where AU buy-in, as opposed to ownership, was sought. While UN collaboration with the EU and
NATO increased as preparations for the deployment of UNAMID progressed, the AU was left to
work with the Government of Sudan on seeking political acceptance for the mission, while the
Sudanese government, mostly left out of the planning process, chose to work exclusively with the
AU, and no longer the UN on Darfur. Complicating matters, UNDPKO officials soon noted that a
human rights agenda quickly came to dominate discourse on the planning for UNAMID.
Representatives from the ICC, humanitarian planners from the Office of the Coordination for
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the UN High Commission for Refugees and the office of the
Special Advisor of the Secretary General on the Prevention of Genocide all participated in
UNAMID planning meetings, and increasingly DPKO planners noted that the emphasis of the UN
approach in Darfur was shifting from a political and security agenda to a humanitarian and human
rights agenda. The exclusion of the AU from the planning process, DPKO officials later argued,
ensured that the human rights agenda came to dominate preparations for UNAMID (Interview 5,
2010).
At the opening of the 62nd session of the UN General Assembly in September 2007, Lesotho’s
Deputy Prime Minister Archibald Lesao-Lehohla lamented on the continued failings of the
organisation in Darfur:
We must recall that, in the year 2005, this Assembly solemnly proclaimed the role of the entire international
community, acting through the United Nations to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, and other
crimes against humanity. Unfortunately this is not what is happening on the ground. We still notice inaction on
the part of the Security Council, or its reaction coming too late! The harrowing experience of Rwanda and now
Darfur are living testimony to this (in International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, 2009[c]).
By November of that year Nigeria too joined the call for more decisive action in the face of atrocity
crimes. Nigerian Ambassador Felix Aniokoye, during the fourth open debate of the Security
Council on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, noted that:
More than ever, the challenges of protecting civilians in armed conflicts have expanded and become more
daunting. My delegation therefore believes that the time has come for the international community to re-
examine when it is its responsibility to protect, without prejudice to the sovereignty of Member States.
Genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes committed against unarmed civilians in situations of conflict are grim
reminders that the time is right for the international community to determine when to exercise its responsibility to
protect (in International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, 2009[c]).
The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights went further. Meeting at its 42nd ordinary
session in Brazzaville from 15 – 28 November 2007, the Commission adopted a Resolution on
Strengthening the Responsibility to Protect in Africa. The Resolution noted the deep concern of
the Commission that:
in the recent past, the international community has not responded quickly enough to situations of genocide, war
crimes and crimes against humanity, and the [sic] continued slow response to the allegations of genocide and
crimes against humanity (African Union, 2007).
The Resolution went on to condemn the string of abuses ongoing in Darfur, and called for greater
cooperation between the UN and the AU in arriving at a negotiated settlement for Darfur and in
strengthening peacekeeping efforts there (African Union, 2007). Yet the Resolution failed to elicit
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any meaningful response from either organisation. Slowly, Eliasson and Salim’s efforts began to
yield some results, and, on the insistence of the AU, a new round of peace talks commenced in
Libya at the end of October 2007. The choice of location proved fatal however, given Libya’s
intricate role in the conflict. Jan Eliasson later reflected that things had gone awry right from the
beginning of the negotiations:
One of the two groups wouldn’t come to Libya. Then the deployment of the hybrid force was proceeding so
slowly. The psychological impact was that the movements, who felt this was so important, saw that in fact
nothing was happening. Second, the movements were split. In the beginning of September, JEM split into two
factions who hated each other. Once the faction that left the JEM accepted to come to Sirte, the other leader
refused. Third, the major issue for the Government of Sudan and the SPLM was the north-south issue. That
cooperation got very bad. In October, the SPLM suspended work with the government. So they refused to go to
Sirte, with the Government of National Unity. Then another movement dropped out because they said they were
coming to the talks on the basis that they were dealing with the Government of National Unity (in Traub, 2010:
28).
A further challenge was that the prospect of a UN deployment in Darfur raised both erroneous
and unrealistic expectations of what such a force could actually do on the ground, which de Waal
notes were echoed and amplified by many Darfur activists and appeared to be endorsed by an
extraordinarily high level of international diplomatic effort vested in bringing the UN to Darfur. This
however notes de Waal fed both fears and hopes in Sudan, which contributed to the challenge of
finding a political path to bring an end to the conflict. In Khartoum in particular, fears were raised
as to the threat that a UN force might pose to the ruling regime, that a UN force may be able to
execute arrest warrants on behalf of the ICC, and that the United States had ulterior motives
which would be attained through the deployment of a UN force. It was also not lost on the
Government of Sudan that NATO’s intervention in Kosovo appeared to be leading towards the
independence of the region, and that the US government was providing military assistance to the
SPLA in South Sudan in anticipation of a move for independence there in 2011. As wrangling on
what to do about Darfur escalated outside of Sudan, the political dynamics in Khartoum began to
heat up as well, as previous political divisions between moderates and hard-liners were once
again brought to the fore. In spite of the re-establishment of relations with the United States,
many in Khartoum did not perceive that the rewards were adequate for the concessions which
had been made over the CPA.
Indeed, government leaders in Khartoum felt that they continued to be sanctioned and pressured,
a fact that was continually reiterated first privately and later, and more vocally, publicly.
Increasingly, mistrust mounted in Khartoum and raised the reluctance among hardliners to
meaningfully implement the provisions of the CPA, let alone to engage on Darfur, where only
further concessions would be made without any tangible rewards for the regime in Khartoum
(I.D.F and Assal, 2010: 30). Inability to engage meaningfully with Khartoum on a political level
ensured that the hardliners within the Government of Sudan, in particular those in control of the
security establishment, ultimately came to dominate, led by President al Bashir and supported by
members of the extremely powerful security establishment which had exercised control over the
government’s response to Darfur. In addition, the dominance of the interventionist discourse over
Darfur, it was later criticized, served to undermine the political efforts aimed at seeking a
negotiated settlement. Indeed, the AU High-Level Panel on Darfur observed that throughout 2007
political negotiations on Darfur were largely overshadowed and undermined by interventionist
discourse, noting that:
peace negotiations were conducted in the shadow of international efforts to bring a United Nations
peacekeeping force to Darfur under a Chapter VII mandate drawn from the principle of the “Responsibility to
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Protect.” These efforts consumed far more time, effort and political capital at an international level than the
revived Joint Mediation (African Union, 2009[a]: 43).
As 2007 ended, Khartoum demonstrated once more that despite international pressure it was not
willing to engage meaningfully on Darfur. Within a month, Khartoum appointed first Musa Hilal, a
Janjaweed commander and wanted by the ICC for a range of crimes, as advisor in the Ministry of
Internal Affairs overseeing state policy on Darfur, and then Ahmed Haroun, a military officer who
had been responsible for the government’s Darfur interventions between 2003 and 2004, as
primary liaison officer with UNAMID. The appointments, as Flint and de Waal note, were a clear
snub to the international community (2008: 262). The Security Council concurred. Meeting on 27
November, members of the Council were infuriated with the lack of progress in Darfur, and it was
broadly agreed that the Government of Sudan was failing to comply with the demands of the
Council. Ambassador Sawers from the United Kingdom argued that the Government of Sudan
was blatantly “insulting” the Council, while Belgian Ambassador Verbeke argued that the
cooperation of Sudanese authorities had deteriorated “to the point of non-existence”.
Ambassador Verbeke threatened that the Council:
do[es] not and will not tolerate the continued indifference of the Government of Sudan to the appeals of the
international community in the face of grave violations of international humanitarian law (United Nations United
Nations Security Council Official Records, 2007[b]: 24).
Despite the Council’s frustrations, Jan Eliasson’s appeals that the Darfur peace process be
considered irreversible finally prevailed, and the Council elected not to take stronger measures
against Khartoum. Meeting again on 5 December, the Council found that Sudan was still
deliberately refusing to comply with previous Security Council Resolutions and was refusing to
cooperate with the ICC. Yet it was only Ambassador Verbeke that took a strong stance, arguing:
This blatant refusal to cooperate shows great contempt not only for alleged victims of crimes against humanity
and war crimes, but also for decisions taken by the Security Council on behalf of the international community
(United Nations United Nations Security Council Official Records, 2007[c]: 9)
But Verbeke’s pleas for stronger action went unheeded, and the Council acted only to request the
cooperation of the Government of Sudan in the implementation of previous Resolutions. With the
transition from AMIS to UNAMID weeks away, the Council was not prepared to further jeopardise
its already poor standing in Khartoum any further, no matter how outrageous the violations in
Darfur may have been. On 01 January 2008, UNAMID became operational, although in effect
AMIS peacekeepers simply donned blue UN berets that morning as opposed to their green AU
ones. The sad reality, as Flint and de Waal argue however, was that UNAMID was designed to
satisfy Western public demand for military intervention, with the vision of the mission based on
images of Darfur from 2003 and 2004 rather than the complex conflict which Darfur had
developed into since. Senior UN and AU staff in Khartoum worried that, at best, the mission
would be AMIS in new clothes, and at worst, it would “trip over itself and become the world’s
worst peacekeeping operation” (in Flint and de Waal, 2008: 270).
By February 2008, following four months of stalled negotiation efforts in Sirte, Jan Eliasson
reported to the Security Council, frustrated, that the armed movements were not ready to engage
in substantive negotiations and lacked consolidated positions. The Council was divided on how to
proceed. The representative from Costa Rica, Ambassador Weisleder, called for compliance on
the part of Khartoum:
117
This is an organisation of sovereign states – states with equal rights, but also equal responsibilities. Costa Rica
is convinced that sovereignty is not so much a right as an obligation, and that the principal obligation of every
state is to protect those who live within its territory. Therefore, we call respectfully but forcefully on the
Government of Sudan to exercise its sovereignty by protecting the hundreds of thousands of persons who are
suffering daily the consequences of a fratricidal war (United Nations United Nations Security Council Official
Records, 2008[a]: 12).
The Chinese representative, Ambassador Wang Guangya, however took a different position,
arguing that:
the implementation of Resolution 1769 is not the exclusive responsibility of the Secretariat, the African Union or
the Government of Sudan. The international community must share that responsibility (United Nations United
Nations Security Council Official Records, 2008[a]: 10).
Yet the Council could not agree on what that responsibility might be, and in the end it was
decided that the conflicting parties bore the responsibility to ensure the implementation of
previous Resolutions and to revive the peace process, as well as to protect civilians. One week
later, on 19 February 2008, Ashraf Qazi, the Secretary General’s Special Representative for
Sudan, briefed the Security Council. Qazi warned the Council that its emphasis on the Darfur
question was threatening to undermine the North-South peace process, and that the Council
would need to be careful in how it engaged with Khartoum, lest the CPA be threatened:
Should the CPA unravel, the prospects for a peaceful outcome in Darfur would largely disappear. On the other
hand, should the implementation of the CPA succeed in bringing about a democratic transformation and in
making unity attractive to the people of Southern Sudan, the prospects for an end to the humanitarian crisis and
a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Darfur would brighten. I say this because the perception that the
overwhelming concentration on Darfur has distracted attention from the CPA is especially real among the
Southern Sudanese. […] We must also recognise the need for better and more effective engagement with the
Government of National Unity. The experience of the past three years strongly suggests the need for a policy of
engagement, rather than sanctions. While our Charter and mandate obligations, as well as the several delays in
CPA implementation commitments, often leave us with little choice but to give public voice to our concerns, it
remains just as essential to retain the confidence of both our main interlocutors if we are to successfully assist
the parties in implementing the CPA (United Nations United Nations Security Council Official Records, 2008[b]:
5).
The Council, reluctant to threaten the CPA, decided to back away from Darfur and framed its
efforts according to a three-pronged approach of utilising the ICC, UNAMID and the mediation
efforts under Eliasson and Salim to find a solution to Darfur. The Council thus pushed the burden
of attaining a way forward in Darfur over to the ICC, the peacekeeping operation and the
mediators themselves. By June that strategy quickly unravelled. On 5 June, the Prosecutor of the
ICC, Louis Moreno-Ocampo, briefed the Council, sighting a total lack of cooperation on the part of
the Government of Sudan and ongoing atrocities in Darfur:
Sudanese officials are protecting the criminals and not the victims. Denial of crimes, cover-ups and attempts to
shift responsibility have been another characteristic of the criminal plan in Darfur. We have seen it before. The
Nazi regime invoked its national sovereignty to attack its own population, and then crossed borders to attack
people in other countries. In my own country, Argentina, the military dictatorship had a well-documented
strategy to disguise the criminal system of disappearances. They denied the crimes, they minimised their
crimes, they denied the involvement of members of the Government in the crimes, and finally they proposed to
forget the crimes and focus on political solutions. Remember also Karadzic’s Directive 7, instructing his army to
create a situation of total insecurity, with no hope of survival for the people of Srebrenica, while making sure to
avoid international outcry. […] Let me conclude. A rebellion is going on in Sudan. Under international law, a
Government has the right and the responsibility to maintain control of its territory. There is no doubt about that.
But there is no military justification for bombing schools, and no legal excuse for raping women. Those crimes
have been carefully prepared and efficiently implemented. They are not mistakes. They are not inter-tribal
clashes. They are not cases of collateral damage. They are, quite simply, criminal acts against civilians –
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unarmed civilians. Citizens from Sudan are being deliberately attacked by Sudanese officials. […] Their own
state is attacking them. If the international community does not protect the Darfuris, they will be eliminated. It
takes a lot to commit massive crimes. It takes planning and organisation. It takes commanders and many
executioners. But mostly, it requires that the rest of the world look away and do nothing. […] Silence has never
helped protect the victims. Silence only helps the criminals (United Nations United Nations Security Council
Official Records, 2008[c]: 5)
Costa Rican Foreign Minister Bruno Stagno Ugarte, who had travelled to New York for the
meeting, had harsh words for the Council:
The actions of the Council, and thus of the Member States gathered around this table that give life to it, have
clearly been inadequate to the situation in Darfur. Internal differences and political calculations have thus far
impeded effective action by the Council. What we can agree on, although it is not of much comfort, is that the
Council has complied with the final paragraph of Resolution 1593 (2005), in that it has remained seized of the
matter. However, the perpetuation of the situation is in and of itself part of the problem, because as time
passes, the Council runs the risk of accommodating evil as the graves continue to be filled in Darfur. […] I
exhort the Council to find a solution that adequately addresses the imperatives of both peace and justice. It
certainly cannot continue with what, as time passes, seems to be a policy of appeasement of Khartoum and of
indifference to the atrocities that are occurring in Darfur. […] The Government of Sudan is toying with us, toying
with human dignity, toying with the authority of this Council (United Nations United Nations Security Council
Official Records, 2008[c]: 6).
Costa Rica was however the only nation to make an appeal for stronger action. Despite the fact
that the European Union had at that time already made over 70 ‘statements of concern’ over
Darfur, one of the organisation’s more robust foreign policy tools, European members of the
Council were reluctant to push the matter (Evans, 2009: 187). Council members thus argued that,
despite the concerns of the ICC Prosecutor, additional emphasis should now be placed on
UNAMID and on the mediation efforts, led by Eliasson and Salim. Yet the two mediators brought
with them two different approaches, and the mediators were soon played off against one another
by the belligerents. Eliasson, it appears, was favoured by the armed movements, as through him
they could play to the sympathies of the West. Salim on the other hand was favoured by the
Government of Sudan, which through him could play to the AU (Interview 20, 2010). Indeed,
while the UN increasingly appeared to apply sympathy for the armed movements and the
displaced persons, the AU was looking to the elite politics in Khartoum (Interview 21, 2010).
The three-pronged approach to Darfur increasingly came to resemble a two-pronged approach.
On 24 June, Eliasson and Salim jointly briefed the Security Council, their last briefing before
stepping aside to make way for a single joint AU-UN mediator, Djibril Bassolé, the former Minister
of Foreign Affairs from Burkina Faso. Maintaining two mediators, with two different approaches,
had simply proven too challenging, and Eliasson and Salim had not been able to make sufficient
headway. Both mediators reluctantly admitted that the political process in Darfur had reached an
impasse. The Government of Sudan refused to consent to a peacekeeping operation with an
enhanced mandate before agreement had been reached on the political goals which the mission
would help protect, while the armed movements were reluctant to sign up to a political process
which would be enforced by a joint AU-UN presence which they did not trust. UNAMID, the
fledgling peacekeeping operation with no peace to keep, found itself trapped in the middle,
desperately reliant on the political engagement of the AU and the UN with Khartoum and the
armed movements to be able to play a meaningful role on the ground in Darfur (Traub, 2010: 28).
With the mediation and UNAMID in peril, the Security Council appeared left with a zero-pronged
strategy for Darfur.
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Responding to tough questioning by the Costa Rican representative, Salim Ahmed Salim argued
that while the Government of Sudan had indeed not met the international expectations or its
internal obligations, the primary responsibility for the situation in Darfur remained with the regime
in Khartoum, and that the Security Council needed to accept the reality that:
you have to deal with the nice guys and the bad guys wherever they appear, whether they come from the
Government side or the side of the movements (United Nations Security Council Official Records, 2008[d]: 26).
Reflecting on the dire situation, British representative John Sawers urged the Council not to get
too distracted by Darfur, and that exerting too much effort there could prove detrimental to gains
made elsewhere:
First of all, I think it is quite right to put the centrality of the peace agreement first, even in discussions on Darfur.
It was very clear to us all in Sudan that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) is the cornerstone of
peace in Sudan. If the CPA founders, then there is no hope in the short term or the medium term for progress
elsewhere. We have to do everything we can to keep the CPA on track (United Nations Security Council Official
Records, 2008[d]: 10).
Andrew Natsios, the former US Special Envoy to Sudan, wrote shortly thereafter that the main
strategic objective of the United States should no longer be to stop the violence in Darfur, but to
support the North-South process, and instead of confronting Khartoum, should seek to engage it,
even in the face of vocal objections on the part of the powerful Darfur advocacy community
(Traub, 2010: 31). As international attention shifted back to the North-South peace process,
Bassolé commenced work as the Joint Chief Mediator on Darfur. Yet the attention of the AU had
already shifted elsewhere. Overwhelmed, the Peace and Security Council was now dealing with
the Comoros, Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Chad, the Central African Republic, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi and Côte d’Ivoire. Meeting in Sharm el-Sheikh from
30 June to 1 July 2008, the Assembly of the Union adopted a range of decisions and
declarations. Darfur received one short paragraph of attention in the outcomes document, while
Zimbabwe merited a two-page resolution (African Union, 2008). The AU, it appeared, was happy
for Darfur to become the UN’s responsibility, and to move on to other conflict areas where it might
be able to play a more meaningful role and save face.
Yet while the challenge of engaging with peacekeeping efforts in Darfur was handed by the AU
back to the UN, the AU still sought to retain political primacy over the international response to
Darfur. The Peace and Security Council on 21 July 2008 mandated the establishment of an AU
High-Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD) to examine how the issues of accountability and combating
impunity on the one hand, and reconciliation and healing on the other, could be effectively and
comprehensively addressed in Darfur (African Union, 2010). The Panel, consisting of prominent
Africans, and under the chairmanship of former South African President Thabo Mbeki, soon set to
work attempting to generate fresh political options for the AU on Darfur. The same day, the Peace
and Security Council requested the UN Security Council to defer the ICC process for a period of
one year, allowing for the Panel to undertake its work and for political efforts on Darfur to gain
momentum in Doha. The Security Council however refused the request, and the ICC
investigations and the work of the Panel continued side by side. While the AU shifted its efforts
from UNAMID to the AUPD, the Security Council placed its bets on UNAMID. Yet meeting on 31
July, the Council was forced to admit that UNAMID was not yielding the desired results. The
Council noted that, one year after adopting Resolution 1769, the security and humanitarian
situation in Darfur continued to deteriorate. The Council, noting the ongoing attacks on civilians,
requested UNAMID to make “full use of its current mandate and capabilities with regard to the
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protection of civilians”, but with equal measure stressed the need for the mission to focus its
efforts on enhancing the safety and security of UNAMID personnel themselves (United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1828, 2008). UNAMID found itself having to divide its resources
between protecting mission personnel and assets and protecting the civilian population in Darfur
within the constraints of the weak mandate it held to do so. Whatever civilian protection
expectations the mission had raised were now coming into serious doubt.
While the AUPD gained momentum the AU and the UN on 2 October 2008 forwarded a list of
available units for UNAMID to Khartoum, seeking authorization for the enlargement of the mission
beyond its previous AMIS forces. While Khartoum had initially agreed to the deployment of
UNAMID on condition that the mission be “predominantly African in character”, units from
Thailand, Nepal and the Scandinavian countries were rejected. Khartoum now demanded an
exclusively African peacekeeping force. While some African countries stepped forward offering
additional troops, the numbers required could not immediately be found on the continent, and
UNAMID by the close of 2008 remained critically under-staffed. On the political front, Bassolé had
since his appointment sought to promote dialogue between Khartoum and the JEM, at the time
the largest of the armed movements in Darfur, shifting the negotiations to Doha under the
auspices of the Arab League. Negotiations were fraught with challenges though, and throughout
2008 and 2009, little progress would be made. The choice of location was also heavily criticized
by some of the movements, given Qatar’s open support for the Government of Sudan in previous
years, in particular during its tenure as a non-permanent member of the Security Council. Indeed,
Qatar had abstained on the vote to establish a UN peacekeeping operation in Darfur, and in 2008
had been the first Arab country to accuse the ICC of “interfering in the internal affairs of Sudan”
(Flint, 2010: 33).
The ICC Prosecutor again briefed the Security Council again on 3 December, citing the ongoing
obstructionism by Khartoum as a major concern. Yet the Council was divided. Some, though
supportive of the work of the ICC, were reluctant to push the matter too strongly. Others, such as
South Africa, openly challenged the work of the Prosecutor, arguing that the ICC was ignoring
progress made in the political negotiations on Darfur and was sidelining the work of the AU. It
was only Costa Rica which once more called for any action on the part of the Council, with
Ambassador Urbina appealing to other members of the Council:
We are in the presence of a State that does not want to – or is not able to – protects its population, who are the
target of war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and ethnic cleansing. How much longer will the Council
delay in examining whether we are seeing the first case of the responsibility to protect, as stipulated in the 2005
World Summit Outcome (United Nations Security Council Official Records, 2008[e]: 14)?
Ambassador Urbina’s calls went unheeded though, and the Council remained divided on how to
proceed on the question of the ICC investigation of al Bashir. Meeting just a few weeks later for a
further open debate of the Security Council on the protection of civilians in armed conflict
however, UN member states spent four hours successively professing their deep and unwavering
commitment to the protection of civilians, the defence of human rights, and the rejection of
impunity. Member states from the global South were quick to lambaste Israel for its human rights
violations in Gaza, yet Darfur barely found mention in the debate (United Nations Security Council
Official Records, 2009[a]).
Meeting from 1 to 3 February 2009, the AU Assembly expressed its deep concern at the possible
indictment by the Prosecutor of the ICC against President al Bashir, and argued that the approval
of the Prosecutor’s application and the issuing of an arrest warrant against al Bashir would
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“seriously undermine” ongoing efforts at facilitating a resolution to the conflict. Instead, the
Assembly requested that the UN wait for the findings of the AU High-Level Panel on Darfur, which
it hoped would chart a way forward on the questions of accountability, combating impunity,
peace, justice and reconciliation (African Union, 2009[b]: Dec.213(XII)). This request went
unheeded by the UN however, which appeared eager to demonstrate its commitment to attaining
tangible outcomes on Darfur. On 4 March 2009 the ICC ordered an arrest warrant for President
Bashir on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Following the indictment, some of
the armed movements refused to negotiate with the Government of Sudan, arguing that they
would not negotiate with an indicted war criminal (Bah, 2010: 11). President al Bashir in turn
scoffed at the arrest warrant, and threatened to bring the United States of America to book over
genocide against the Native Americans, in Vietnam and over the atomic bombing of Hiroshima in
1945 (BBC, 2009).
The indictment served to deepen the rift between the Security Council and the Peace and
Security Council, with dire consequences for the faltering Darfur peace process, now taking place
in Doha. The Peace and Security Council moved quickly to request the Security Council to
suspend the indictment for a period of one year, under Article 16 of the Rome Statute. Yet the
Council’s requests failed to elicit even a response from the Security Council. Angered, Burkina
Faso, Libya and South Africa, the three African non-permanent members of the Security Council
at the time, sought to amend a draft resolution extending the UNAMID mandate with Article 16
language. But this move was blocked, in particular by the United Kingdom, the United States and
France. The United States in particular argued that it would veto the draft resolution if it contained
Article 16 language, and that the prosecution of al Bashir needed to proceed. While China and
Russia felt that the ICC indictment would undermine efforts aimed at attaining a political
settlement on Darfur, they did not move to support the AU call for a suspension of the indictment
either. Thus, the ICC indictment against al Bashir was allowed to continue (Bah, 2010: 12 and
Traub, 2010: 30). Representatives of the AU Commission and member states were not pleased
that this process had gone ahead despite their objections. Jean Ping, the Chairperson of the AU
Commission, argued:
we support the fight against impunity […] but we say that peace and justice should not collide, that the need for
justice should not override the need for peace (in Bah, 2010: 12).
At its subsequent Summit in Tripoli in July 2009 the AU decided not to cooperate with the ICC.
The decision was presented as an African consensus, but this was shaken as Ghana, Botswana,
South African and Chad distanced themselves from the decision and committed to adhering to
their treaty obligations under the Rome Statute. Ghana’s Minister of Foreign Affairs later
lamented that African states had decided not to cooperate with the ICC not out of reluctance
towards the ICC itself, but in retaliation for the unwillingness of the Security Council to respond to
the request of the Peace and Security Council to delay Bashir’s indictment (Bah, 2010: 14).
The fallout following this decision proved challenging for the AU. Senegal, the first African
signatory to the Rome Statute, voiced reservations over the move to indict Bashir, while
Botswana publicly lauded the move. Libya on the other hand moved to condemn the ICC, and
using its position of Chair of the AU called on African states to withdraw their membership from
the ICC (Bah, 2010: 14). While President al Bashir embarked on a whirlwind tour of defiance
across North Africa and the Middle East, planned visits to Nigeria, South Africa and Uganda were
quietly cancelled as it became clear that these countries remained committed to the Rome
Statute and their treaty obligations. By this time however, Darfur had been classified as a low-
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intensity conflict by the head of UNAMID, Rodolphe Adada, with the armed movements, the
government and the Janjaweed having fought each other to exhaustion, and the willingness of
the UN to address the situation on the ground had mostly waned. Meeting on 30 July 2009 the
Security Council expressed its concern that two years after the adoption of Resolution 1769 the
situation in Darfur continued to deteriorate, and found that the Government of Sudan was still
failing to comply with its obligations. Resolution 1881 again made reference to Resolution 1674
on the protection of civilians and to the provisions of the 2005 World Summit Outcomes
Document related to the responsibility to protect, but went only as far as to call on UNAMID to
make better use of its existing mandate related to the protection of civilians in Darfur (United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1881, 2009). The Security Council, it appeared, was tired of
dealing with Darfur, and sought only to ensure that the mandate of UNAMID was continued,
disinterested in the actual developments on the ground.
6.4 A Bitter Compromise: CPA, DPA or GPA?
On 29 October 2009, following a year of exhaustive consultations, the AUPD submitted its report
to the Peace and Security Council meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government in
Abuja. The report clearly mapped the Darfur conflict within the context of the broader centre-
periphery conflict in Sudan as well as within the conflict dynamics dominating the region. The
report argued that the settlement of the Darfur conflicts required primarily a political approach, the
application of justice, and a process of reconciliation in a society in which the social fabric had
been all but destroyed. The report further argued that the AU had clear responsibilities to act on
Darfur, but that the fundamental obligation to take a lead in restoring peace in Darfur fell on the
Government of Sudan, which as a sovereign government held responsibilities towards its people
which were not subject to negotiation (African Union, 2009[a]).
The report noted that, seven years after the latest round of conflict, the attacks against civilians in
Darfur had left an estimated 2.7 million persons displaced, tens of thousands killed and maimed,
and a people who had once entrusted their security to their government without faith in its
readiness or ability to protect them (African Union 2009[a]: 48). Yet the way forward for the AU,
and for the international community at large, was to seek political dialogue with Khartoum and the
negotiation of a political settlement, not only for Darfur, but one which would be representative of
the broader social and political conflict in Sudan taking into account the realities of the CPA, the
DPA, the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA - signed in 2007), the upcoming national
elections in 2010 and the referendum on independence in the South in 2011. This “Global
Political Agreement” (GPA), as the report conceptualised it, required engagement with the central
political powers in Khartoum, and would by necessity need to re-shape the political landscape in
Sudan, not only as related to Darfur but as related to Sudanese society as a whole.
In presenting the report to the AU, Thabo Mbeki emphasized that a resolution to the conflict in
Darfur had to be brought about by Sudanese people themselves, and could not be imposed from
the outside. In this context, Mbeki argued that the AU, and international society at large, needed
to consider the “Sudan crisis in Darfur” as opposed to the “Darfur crisis in Sudan”. The AU,
argued Mbeki, could only assist in bringing the relevant stakeholders together and in uniting them
behind a common vision and programme in Sudan. The rest, the Panel found, was up to the
Sudanese people themselves (Social Sciences Research Council, 2009).
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Responding to the submission of the report, the Peace and Security Council moved quickly to
ensure that the findings of the AUPD guide the way forward on Darfur. The same day as the
report was submitted the Council endorsed the report and its recommendations and stressed that
these provided a clear roadmap for achieving peace, justice, reconciliation and healing in Darfur,
and would contribute to the overall objective of promoting sustainable peace and stability in
Sudan. The Council therefore decided that the recommendations in the report would form the
basis of further AU engagement in Darfur and its interaction with international partners. The
Council again condemned the ongoing human rights violations in Darfur and expressed its
commitment to combating impunity, but once more called on the Security Council to defer the ICC
indictment against Bashir “in the interest of peace, justice and reconciliation” (African Union,
2009[c]). The Council also cautioned the UN, expressing its conviction that:
the achievement of lasting peace and reconciliation in Darfur requires that Sudanese stakeholders take full
ownership of the process and that, given the necessary support, the people of Sudan will be able to bring to an
end the conflict in Darfur in an inclusive, peaceful and expeditious manner, bearing in mind that Darfur is a
manifestation of the broader political and other challenges facing Sudan as a whole. Council [sic] stresses that
the international community needs to play a supportive role, based on a proper understanding of the causes
and consequences of the conflict in Darfur (emphasis in original, African Union, 2009[c]: 2).
At the end of 2009 the focus of international engagement on Sudan had shifted back towards the
management of national elections in 2010, and the conduct of the referendum on self-
determination for the South in 2011 and the referendum on the future status of the Abyei region in
an attempt to prevent a worst-case scenario of a renewed all-out civil war in Sudan. Yet as one
observer has noted, the international process had become so complicated that disagreements
among the permanent five members of the Security Council, within the UN, between the UN and
the AU, and among Sudan’s neighbours had come to consume as much energy as the mediation
of the Darfur conflict itself (Flint, 2010: 43). By early 2010 agreement had largely been reached
that the Doha negotiations would be left to proceed as a joint AU – UN effort, should Bassolé
manage to revise a process which faltered in May 2010 shortly before the hosting of national
elections in Sudan. Indeed, privately many officials in New York and in Addis Ababa described
the Doha negotiations as moribund.
Rather, effort would be placed on supporting the work of the AUPD, and the Peace and Security
Council in early 2010 extended the mandate of the Panel to cover the whole of Sudan, and an
implementation mechanism was established at the AU Commission in Addis Ababa. While
publicly supporting the work of the AUPD, many UN officials expressed reservations that the AU
was being overly assertive and were dissatisfied that the UN had once again been
outmanoeuvred on the political front (Interview 7, 2010). As the mandate of the AUPD was being
extended, quiet negotiations, with Norwegian support, between the SPLM and Khartoum were
resumed in a remote location in Western Ethiopia, designed to prepare Sudan for partition in
2011. As one senior Norwegian diplomat observed, partners had finally come to the realisation
that making unity attractive between the North and the South was a strategy which had long ago
failed, and focus now needed to shift towards ensuring that the potential fallout from the 2011
referendum could be limited as best as possible (Interview 25, 2010). This approach once more
necessitated positive engagement with Khartoum. Any willingness on the part of the AU or the
UN to engage critically with the leadership in Khartoum on Darfur, therefore, appears to have all
but disappeared by early 2010. Indeed, both organisations by 2010 appeared to have reverted to
the strategy utilised between 2003 and 2005; ignore Darfur and engage with Khartoum to ensure
the best possible outcome for the North-South peace process. The addition of genocide to
President Bashir’s arrest warrant by the ICC in July 2010 appeared not to have impacted on this
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decision. While the AU and the UN shifted their strategies back towards the CPA, the Security
Council held a further open debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict on 11 November
2009. Initiating the debate, the President of the Security Council, Austrian Foreign Minister
Spindelegger, argued:
We, the international community, have to do better. We need to live up to our shared responsibility to effectively
respond to situations in which the safety and security of civilians are in danger. No conflict justifies breaches of
international humanitarian law. No conflict justifies the refusal of access for humanitarian workers to civilians in
need. No conflict justifies impunity for those who have committed serious crimes against civilians. The Security
Council has a key role to play. The Council has a broad range of tools at its disposal to ensure compliance by
all parties with their obligations under international law to protect civilians, to facilitate access for humanitarian
aid and to ensure accountability for serious crimes against civilians. Today, the protection of civilians is at the
core of United Nations peacekeeping (United Nations Security Council Official Records, 2009[b]: 3).
For eight hours that day, member states one after the other highlighted the achievements of the
UN and their unwavering commitment to the protection of civilians. Indeed, many highlighted the
unique set of responsibilities placed upon states and on the UN and the Security Council in
particular in ensuring the protection of civilians (United Nations Security Council Official Records,
2009[c]). The Darfur situation was not even mentioned in the Council’s debates that day. The
responsibility to protect also did not feature in this debate. Indeed, the responsibility to protect
had already decreasingly featured in discourse since 2007, and had all but ceased to be
highlighted in debate on Darfur since the middle of 2008. By the end of 2009, it had all but
vanished from discourse surrounding Darfur.
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Chapter 7
-
Findings and Recommendations for Further Research
7.1 Introduction
International interventions failed to prevent both the outbreak and the escalation of the conflicts in
Darfur, to bring to an end the conflicts, and to deal effectively with an ever-mounting threat to
international peace and security. Interventions designed to protect the people of Darfur from war
crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and, ultimately, acts of genocide similarly
failed. In addition, based on the analysis above, it is also apparent that the responsibility to
protect norm did not have the impact its proponents intended in Darfur. At the same time as the
norm was becoming increasingly entrenched and salient in international society it also came to
feature ever less in the international discourse surrounding responses to Darfur. Indeed, it
appears as though the more the norm was gaining ground within international society, the less it
was actually featuring in discourse surrounding the very phenomena in international society for
which it was intended. Thus, it would appear that whilst at a normative level the responsibility to
protect was developing and gaining in acceptance, in its application the norm proved less useful,
and ultimately disappeared entirely from the discourse within which it was intended to be
embedded.
This chapter seeks to explore why this apparent contradiction developed, and why the
responsibility to protect norm ultimately failed to contribute to the formulation of effective and
meaningful responses to the Darfur crisis. The chapter will also explore the possible
consequences of this apparent norm failure more broadly, both for the responsibility to protect
norm itself as well as for future responses to atrocity crimes in Africa. Indeed, as will be argued
below, the failure of the norm in Darfur is quite instructive. As will be argued, this represents not
only a failure of the responsibility to protect norm in the case of Darfur itself, but indeed reveals
weaknesses in the very norm itself. Despite having emerged and cascaded so rapidly, it will be
argued, the norm ultimately has not been that successful in its application, and is unlikely to
meaningfully feature in discourse surrounding interventions on humanitarian grounds in its current
iteration. Advancing this argument even further, it is possible that the norm may in future recede
more than it advances and becomes further entrenched, let alone internalised. Building on these
findings, and given the apparent failure of the responsibility to protect as a norm for framing
responses to atrocity crimes, this chapter seeks to generate insights into how future conflicts in
which atrocity crimes are committed may be dealt with by states, and to assess whether
responses to atrocity crimes, as envisioned by the responsibility to protect norm, may in fact be
more or less likely in future. Finally, this chapter seeks to reflect on the Constructivists research
agenda in International Relations on norm development, diffusion and utility in international
society, and to recommend areas of research which require further attention if the Constructivist
agenda in International Relations, as well as our understanding of norms and their role within
states, is to be advanced.
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7.2 The Responsibility to Protect and Darfur – A Case of Norm Failure?
The UN, when the conflict first gained international attention in early 2003, proved extremely
reluctant to address the deteriorating situation in Darfur, dismissing the conflicts in the region as
tribal in nature, and member states and Secretariat staff proved unwilling to have their attention
drawn away from the North-South negotiations which after years of deadlock were finally yielding
progressive results. It was only when the rapidly deteriorating situation in Darfur and the mounting
evidence of large-scale and wide-spread human rights violations, including early accusations of
atrocity crimes, could no longer justifiably be ignored that member states turned their attention to
Darfur.
Yet the decision was quickly made; the North-South peace process would not be jeopardised,
and while a humanitarian relief operation was mounted and the conflicting parties were
encouraged to refrain from violating human rights further, the UN refused to be drawn into the
political dimensions of the conflict, let alone to engage with Khartoum on the matter when the
Government of Sudan was proving compliant in the negotiations on the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement. The trade-off was quite apparent, and was also correctly interpreted by Khartoum;
the Government of Sudan was free to act in Darfur as it pleased, as long as progress was being
made in the negotiations on the future of South Sudan. As the signing of the CPA drew nearer,
and as the scale of atrocities in Darfur began to exceed belief, the Security Council was cautious
to praise Khartoum in public, and to keep any criticism over Darfur at the level of bilateral
relations and private discussions in Khartoum. Yet, as was made clear in every Security Council
meeting until early 2005, the responsibility to protect civilians in Sudan as a whole resided
exclusively with the Government of Sudan.
Following the signing of the CPA in January 2005 the Security Council mustered the will to turn its
attention to Darfur, in the hope that there might now be more room for manoeuvre with Khartoum.
Initial calls for the deployment of a peacekeeping force were pushed aside in favour of a
peacemaking approach, and the UN sought to engage with Khartoum and the armed movements
in a negotiated process to bring the violence to an end. Yet when it became clear that the UN had
no leverage on Darfur members of the Security Council were quick to assert that the efforts of the
AU should take primacy. The decision to hand the responsibility for dealing with Darfur to the AU
found broad support, but for very different reasons. For officials in the United States and Europe,
handing responsibility for Darfur to the AU was viewed as a means of preventing their armed
forces getting embroiled in another African conflict zone when their attention was drawn primarily
towards Iraq and Afghanistan. For African leaders this proved an opportunity to establish the
credentials of the AU as the dominant peace and security institution on the continent. For the
Government of Sudan in turn this decision proved welcome, as engaging with the AU was
deemed preferable to engaging with the West, as well as a means of avoiding sanction over
Darfur when Khartoum needed to play a strong hand (Clough, 2007: 8).
The AU was therefore left to get on with the business of securing a political settlement in Darfur
and, through the deployment of AMIS, to bear the brunt of the responsibility for the protection of
civilians. Yet when the report of the ICID highlighted the string of abuses, including the
commission of atrocity crimes in Darfur by the Government of Sudan, the Council was forced to
take stronger action, or at least publicly be seen to be taking stronger action. Again the Council
was able to absolve itself of a responsibility to react by referring the Darfur file to the ICC. While
the ICC investigations commenced, the UN began to exert pressure on the AU to finalise a
political settlement for Darfur, the pre-requisite for any further UN engagement. Indeed, by the
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end of 2005 it was broadly recognised within the UN and the Security Council in particular that
the deployment of a peacekeeping operation had become unavoidable, lest the UN be accused of
watching over another Rwanda. The endorsement of the responsibility to protect by the World
Summit in September 2005 and by the Security Council shortly thereafter did very little to
influence this line of thinking however, and by the end of 2005 it would appear that the
deployment of a peacekeeping operation to Darfur was viewed primarily as a face-saving
measure for the UN, and not in light of any responsibilities which member states felt the
organisation may have held. Indeed, at this time the pressure being exerted by what was broadly
labelled the ‘Save Darfur’ coalition was mounting both on the UN and on its leading Western
member states, and both needed to be seen to be doing something.
It was thus that the UN and members of the Security Council, in particular the United States and
the EU, began to exert pressure on the mediation team and the negotiating parties in Abuja,
rushing through the DPA which was anticipated to pave the way for a UN deployment. As soon as
the DPA had been signed, the Security Council pushed heavily for a UN peacekeeping
deployment, adopting Resolution 1706 three months after the signing of the DPA which
authorised the deployment of a UN operation in Darfur, and invited, but did not require,
Khartoum’s consent. Yet Khartoum did not consent, and the Council did not muster the will to
enforce its own resolution. In November 2006 it was agreed that Resolution 1706 would
effectively be scrapped, and a new approach to Darfur was sought. As the security situation
continued to deteriorate and it became increasingly apparent that the DPA had failed, the Council
again left the responsibility for action in Darfur with the AU, watching first as the mediation efforts
stalled, and then as Khartoum blocked the efforts of the ICC to investigate atrocity crimes in
Darfur. It was only in late 2007 that the Security Council re-engaged, when the possibility of a
transition from AMIS to UNAMID had been facilitated. After January 2008, the UN began to play a
more prominent role in Darfur through UNAMID, yet the Security Council was reluctant to assume
a responsibility for the protection of civilians. UNAMID was handed a weak mandate with regards
to the protection of civilians, and the DPKO proved reluctant to provide guidance to the mission
on how to interpret or execute the mandate. The resources which would have been necessary for
the mission to execute its protection mandate where in any case never provided.
UNAMID was thus deliberately prevented from taking on a strong protection role in Darfur while
the Security Council sought, through the failing mediation effort, to strengthen its ability to engage
with Khartoum politically. When the ICC indictment against al Bashir was issued, the Council
provided political support to the ICC but did not seek to enforce the indictment, just as it had
failed to enforce the other indictments which the Court had issued on Darfur. Increasingly it
became apparent that the Council was unable to engage with Khartoum on Darfur in a
meaningful manner, and when the North-South peace process began to unravel in mid-2009 the
Council decided to disengage from Darfur and focus its efforts on the CPA once more. Indeed,
the Council appears to have been reluctant to jeopardise the gains made in the South of Sudan
for what appeared an intractable situation in Darfur. The new approach would be one of
appeasement, rather than confrontation, with Khartoum. The indictment of al Bashir in July 2010
on charges of genocide did little to alter this approach. As one observer notes, the sad reality is
that Darfur simply did not matter enough, and Sudan mattered too much, for the Security Council
to ever consider taking serious action to prevent or put a halt to war crimes, crimes against
humanity, ethnic cleansing and, ultimately, acts of genocide (Grono, 2006: 628). Throughout its
engagement with Darfur, once it had decided to deal with the Darfur matter following a two-year
period of avoidance, the Security Council was willing to concede that a responsibility to protect
the civilian population in Darfur existed, and that the international community was vested with a
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responsibility to protect the population of Darfur should the Government of Sudan prove unable or
unwilling to do so. Initially, the Security Council argued that this responsibility resided with the
Government of Sudan, but when this position could no longer viably be maintained, the
responsibility to ensure the protection of the civilian population of Darfur was ceded by the
Council in turn to the AU, to AMIS, to the ICC, to the belligerents themselves during the
negotiations in Abuja, and to the Government of Sudan once more following the signing of the
DPA.
Since that time, even with the establishment of UNAMID, the Security Council remained reluctant
to assume any direct responsibility for the protection of civilians in Darfur, lest this propel the
Council onto a collision course with Khartoum; a confrontation which the Council had lost many
times before. While initially featuring between 2005 and 2007, between 2007 and 2010 the use of
responsibility to protect discourse in the Security Council and in discourse on Darfur rapidly
diminished. Whereas member states were keen to make use of the norm and to justify action on
the part of the Council and of states as a whole on the basis of the norm, over time this waned,
and by mid-2009 it was only Costa Rica which still sought to invoke the norm in the Security
Council. By 2010 no state was attempting to frame the international response to Darfur within
responsibility to protect discourse. Where the responsibility to protect norm was invoked, in
particular in the period between 2006 and 2007, this was done so mostly by advocacy groups and
early supporters of the norm.
Yet the pressure to ‘do something’ about Darfur based on the responsibility to protect norm
resulted only in a framing of the solution to Darfur as a UN intervention, by force if needed,
resulting in the disastrous adoption of Resolution 1706. Whereas the responsibility to protect
norm was intended to facilitate effective and meaningful responses to conflict situations in which
atrocity crimes are committed, in the case of Darfur it contributed only to alienating Khartoum
even further, to exposing the weaknesses of the UN and in particular of the Security Council, to
obstructing the path of political engagement, and ultimately, to impeding the international
response to providing humanitarian assistance and the protection to the civilian population in
Darfur. By many accounts, in the UN context it could well be argued that the responsibility to
protect norm did not contribute to the formulation and implementation of effective responses to
atrocity crimes, but indeed served only to complicate, confuse and weaken the international
response. The responsibility to protect norm then, in the case of the UN response to Darfur,
appears to have achieved results entirely contrary to its stated purpose and normative content.
The AU similarly seemed uncertain of how to deal with Darfur. Political engagement emerged in
2004 through participation in the N’djamena negotiations, but this was aimed only at obtaining a
humanitarian ceasefire agreement. The AU held no desire to become embroiled in the conflicts in
Sudan and quickly sought engagement with the Security Council on Darfur. Yet when it became
clear that the Security Council did not intend to address the Darfur crisis, the Peace and Security
Council decided to take the lead itself, sensing an easy opportunity through which to assert the
political authority of the newly established AU in a conflict situation on the African continent. It
was thus that a symbolic observer mission was sent to Darfur to monitor the ceasefire agreement.
Yet the AU had neither the intention nor the capacity to support a fully-fledged peacekeeping
operation. As events in Darfur spiralled out of control, the Peace and Security Council and AMIS
found themselves irrevocably sucked deeper into the Darfur quagmire. AMIS was strengthened,
but only to the degree that the mission could protect itself while political engagement with the
armed movements and with Khartoum was sought through the Abuja negotiations. Yet the AU
sought to engage in high politics, and adopted an approach of constructive engagement with the
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Government of Sudan, more hesitant to move without the approval of Khartoum than without the
approval of the Security Council. The AU thus focussed all its efforts on the Abuja negotiations,
leaving AMIS mostly to fend for itself while a hasty political agreement, anticipated to facilitate the
entry of the UN into Darfur, was sought.
Abuja however proved disastrous for the AU, as AMIS suddenly found itself a combatant in Darfur
(fighting on the side of the Government of Sudan and SLM-Minawi) with no peace to keep. The
UN shied away from sending in a robust peacekeeping operation, and the AU was left to seek
renewed engagement with Khartoum and the armed movements over a period of two years
before, finally, responsibility for Darfur could be ceded to the UN, as had already been intended
four years prior. With UNAMID commencing operations, and with the UN keen to now minimise
the role of the AU in the mission, the AU could finally renew its approach on Sudan afresh.
Seeking the political upper hand, the AU High Level Panel on Darfur was established, the
mandate of which was extended from an initial remit of Darfur to cover the entire Sudan. To the
frustration of many in the UN, Khartoum was eager to maintain positive working relations with the
AU, and by early 2010 the UN had, politically speaking, been left out in the cold with regards to
both Darfur and Sudan more broadly.
Despite an interest in maintaining political and moral leadership on Darfur, the AU at no point
appears to have held a particular interest in assuming responsibility for the protection of civilians
there. Both the AMIS and the UNAMID mandates remained particularly weak with regards to the
protection of civilians, despite continuous enlargements of the missions and expansions of their
mandates. The AU consistently affirmed that the primary responsibility for the protection of
civilians resided with the Government of Sudan, and when, during the Abuja negotiations, it was
suggested by some international partners that provisions be inserted into the final text of the
peace agreement strengthening the protection mandate of AMIS, the AU refused, arguing instead
that the responsibility for the protection of the civilian population in Darfur rested with the armed
movements and the government; the belligerents to the conflict themselves.
Interestingly also, despite the continuous support of many African states for the responsibility to
protect norm within the UN at various levels of engagement, within the AU the norm never once
surfaced with regard to the Union’s response in Darfur. Even more curious however is the
absence of discussion on the applicability of Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the Union to
Darfur. The Union has only invoked Article 4(h) language once since its founding in 2002, and
this was in connection to the trial of a former Chadian president. Indeed, the Peace and Security
Council consistently argued that, while grave, the situation in Darfur did not merit consideration in
light of Article 4(h), which would have allowed the Union to respond to the commission of atrocity
crimes. Curiously therefore, while member states of the AU proved avid supporters of the
responsibility to protect norm in the UN context, even calling for the Security Council to act in
Darfur on the basis of the norm, no evidence exists that it appears to have played any role
whatsoever within the AU itself when it came to Darfur, or any other conflict situation for that
matter.
On the basis of this analysis it then becomes clear that the responsibility to protect norm, despite
its increasing salience in international society, failed to contribute to the attainment of its content
goal in the case of Darfur. Indeed, it could even be argued that the norm contributed to outcomes
explicitly contrary to its content goal. The director of a research and advocacy organisation
established to promote the responsibility to protect norm concurred with this position, conceding
that, in the case of Darfur, the norm had not been useful, and had probably served only to
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encourage unconstructive behaviour on the part of all stakeholders (Interview 2, 2010). Another
prominent researcher and activist on the responsibility to protect goes further, arguing that
whereas the responsibility to protect had been intended to facilitate the shaping of engagement at
critical moments, in the case of Darfur the norm had probably done more harm than good,
isolating external actors from constructive engagement with Khartoum and weakening their
position to bring to an end the commission of atrocity crimes (Interview 3, 2010). Other observers
are even more critical. A senior official in the UN DPKO argued that the haphazard application of
the responsibility to protect norm, when its proponents did seek to apply it, served only to raise
false expectations and placed responsibilities on the peacekeeping missions which could not be
met. These unrealistic expectations only served to antagonise Khartoum further, argued this
official, contributing to a rapid breakdown in relations between Sudan and the UN. In the end,
UNAMID suffered from this breakdown in relations, as, in the words of the DPKO official,
cooperation with the Government of Sudan deteriorated to the level of “a joke, a big joke”
(Interview 9, 2010). Indeed, many UN officials and member states later reflected that the UN had
to a large degree been pushed into Darfur by advocacy groups, resulting in the organisation
entering Darfur with the wrong mindset and a lack of will to be there in the first place (Interview 9,
2010).
It is clear, therefore, that the responsibility to protect norm appears to have encountered a
distinct, and curious, contradiction. At one level, the norm emerged, was consolidated and
codified, became increasingly entrenched and institutionalised in international society, and from
2005 onwards became increasingly salient, in particular at the level of the UN, but also among
African states within the UN context. In addition, the norm can easily be recognised in the peace
and security regime which the AU has been creating since 2003. Yet at the same time as the
norm was being codified, institutionalised and entrenched, its relevance, applicability and utility
receded, being applied decreasingly in relation to Darfur, the type of conflict situation for which
the norm was conceived and developed. Where the norm was applied, its application appears to
have complicated as opposed to facilitated the formulation of meaningful and effective responses.
Indeed, in certain instances, it could be argued that the use of responsibility to protect discourse
may not have contributed to addressing Darfur, but perhaps made this close to impossible. The
question, of course, is why?
Several factors are of importance here. For one, where the responsibility to protect norm was
invoked, this was done almost exclusively to justify calls for military action in Darfur or, failing this,
for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation there. This invocation of the norm worked to
ensure that responsibility to protect discourse was not appropriate or relevant to dealing with the
challenges being faced by states in seeking to formulate a response to the crisis. Indeed, as Flint
has demonstrated, the subordination of peacemaking efforts to calls for peacekeeping, driven in
large part by advocacy campaigns to ‘Save Darfur’ through military intervention, only served to
harden the intransigence of the armed movements and to strengthen the belief of the
Government of Sudan that the West maintained an only partially hidden agenda for regime
change (2010: 12). During the two years of negotiation it took to enable the transition from AMIS
to UNAMID, again driven by a belief that a UN-led operation would be able to protect civilians, the
conflict resolution approaches demanded by those in Darfur were ignored, and mediation efforts
largely put on hold. During this time, fighting continued to escalate between the armed
movements communities themselves, banditry was on the rise, and the government continued its
offensives against the civilian population, causing the numbers of civilians requiring humanitarian
assistance to double from an estimated 2 million to an estimated 4 million, while the number of
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internally displaced persons rose from an estimated 1,8 million to an estimated 2,5 million (Flint,
2010: 23).
During this time, while protection was linked to a UN peacekeeping operation at the international
level, aid agencies and humanitarian workers on the ground continued to suffer harassment,
vilification and expulsion, often accompanied by accusations that they were providing information
to the ICC or fabricating incidents to exert pressure on states to undertake military intervention
(Flint, 2010: 23). Yet for many vocal Darfur activists and advocates of the responsibility to protect,
a military intervention by the UN was heralded as the primary solution, and as the direct
responsibility of the international community. Indeed, calls for more forceful action on Darfur were
not confined to civil society, and prominent foreign policy-makers, in particular such as Susan
Rice and William Cohen in the United States, pushed for a harder line on Darfur. Some activists
called for intervention not only in Darfur, but also in Chad, arguing that the UN should remain firm
in its resolve:
The Sudanese regime will likely balk at each step, but in each case, the international community must push
back (Smith, 2007)
Others were however more nuanced in their approach, arguing that the best means of influencing
Khartoum lay in exerting greater international pressure in the form of UN sanctions and robust
diplomacy, and that debating military intervention alone against a backdrop where meaningful
multilateral solutions had not yet been exerted was unproductive, and indeed dangerous. Here
responsibility to protect discourse was moved away from interventionist discourse, and centred
firmly on the development of a range of multilateral forms of engagement, of which intervention,
by forceful means if necessary, was only one component (Prendergast and Spiegel, 2007).
Nevertheless, as Flint and de Waal noted, the high expectations for a what a UN peacekeeping
operation implemented under the rubric of the responsibility to protect norm should do were
simply astonishing to officials in UNDPKO (Flint and de Waal, 2008: 196). Even outside of the UN
system, there was criticism towards this interpretation of the responsibility to protect in relation to
the Darfur agenda. The advocacy officer of a major international relief agency for example argued
that:
Many activists were hugely detrimental in terms of looking for solutions. They created mass hysteria which
limited the ability of decision-makers to pursue legitimate options. They have no concept of the fact that Sudan
is a country and Darfur is just one part of it. These groups sucked up the space available for seeking solutions
to the immediate needs of the people on the ground in Darfur because they focused all the attention of decision-
makers on the far-fetched, long-term and debatable notion of a ‘military solution’ to the conflict, and of a UN-led
intervention being the panacea to all Darfur’s problems. For many humanitarians on the ground, the takeover
was a far-off objective that we all knew would probably not work even if it did occur because no matter what
people believe, you can’t bring peace and safety for civilians to a place as big and complicated as Darfur by the
barrel of a gun – even if it is 20,000 guns (in Flint and de Waal, 2008: 185).
A further challenge the responsibility to protect brought to international policy-makers framing
responses to Darfur lay in the inapplicability of the norm to complex conflict situations in which a
range of human rights violations and atrocities take place, but which do not neatly adhere to what
are already loose definitions and understandings of war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic
cleansing and genocide. In Darfur in particular these definitions came as much to support calls for
intervention, framed in responsibility to protect discourse, as to oppose intervention, similarly
framed in responsibility to protect discourse. The AU for example consistently argued that while
atrocity crimes were being committed in Darfur, genocide was not, and that forceful intervention
was therefore not merited. The AU thus chose to adhere to the genocide provision of its Charter
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only, dismissing war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing as legitimate grounds
for intervention on the part of the Union. In the UN the reluctance of the Security Council to admit
the scale of crimes being committed pushed the United States to publicly declare that genocide
was ongoing in Darfur, the first time a state had publicly accused another of committing genocide
since the signing of the Genocide Convention.
In the Security Council no agreement could be found on whether the scale of the crimes either
justified or necessitated international intervention, and the task of assessing the scale and nature
of crimes was handed to the ICID. The subsequent report of the Commission, confirming the
worst fears of many observers, was left to languish in limbo for several months before the Darfur
file, at least the atrocity crimes component, was handed over to the ICC. Yet the Court, as was
known by the members of the Security Council, would take years to investigate, and would only
have the capacity to prosecute a handful of individuals. The Court would not be able to put an
end to the violence on the ground, nor to prevent the further commission of atrocity crimes in
Darfur. In addition, the emphasis placed on atrocity crimes and the use of the ICC to deal with
these during an ongoing conflict as part of a conflict management strategy would later prove
problematic. As Flint noted, the use of the ICC by the Security Council highlighted the
contradictions inherent within the international responses to Darfur with, on the one hand, a
flawed peace process seeking to legitimise an equally flawed peacekeeping operation that, to be
successful, required the cooperation of the ruling elite in Khartoum and, on the other hand, the
instigation of an international criminal process that alienated the ruling elite and made any
dealings with it or concessions to it, even in the interest of peace, unsavoury and politically
unfeasible (Flint, 2010: 26). The emphasis on atrocity crimes and the choice of using the ICC to
deal with these in an ongoing complex conflict situation increasingly left states with fewer viable
options to dealing with Darfur.
Yet the biggest challenge the responsibility to protect norm brought to those seeking to frame
international responses was, quite simply, ascertaining whose responsibility it was to protect or to
intervene, be this through means of non-coercive or coercive measures. The Security Council
alternated between assigning this responsibility to the AU, the Government of Sudan, the armed
movements, the ICC, and then finally to the peacekeeping operation in Darfur. Once it had
become clear that UNAMID would not be able to do much more than AMIS had however, the
Security Council was happy to re-assign the responsibility for dealing with Darfur to the AU once
more. The AU, in turn, was happy to retain political primacy over the international responses to
Darfur, but not once sought to take responsibility for the protection of the civilian population there,
leaving this to the Government of Sudan and the armed movements, the very parties to the
conflict which were committing the atrocity crimes in the first instance. Between them the UN and
the AU also sought to shift the responsibility to protect on to the humanitarian community, human
rights bodies, AMIS and UNAMID (both of which never held anything other than exceedingly
weak protection mandates), and, through the AU Panel on Darfur, to the Sudanese people
themselves. As one senior legal officer in the UN pointed out, “when everybody is responsible,
nobody is responsible” (Interview 16, 2010).
In this regard then it can then be noted that the responsibility to protect norm hampered
international responses to Darfur primarily in three areas; namely in terms of how to respond, in
terms of when to respond and in terms of who should respond. In the final assessment on Darfur
then, it is clear that the responsibility to protect was not a particularly useful norm, proving rather
damaging and at least to a degree working precisely counter to its intended purpose. Yet given
this assessment, and bearing in mind that the norm emerged between 2001 and 2005 and only
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entered into a cascade phase from 2006 onwards, should international policy-makers move away
from the norm, as it seems to have complicated the framing of international responses to atrocity
crimes, or should Darfur be considered a unique situation, the first test case for the application of
the responsibility to protect norm from which lessons can be learned and the norm further refined,
providing an improved basis for future international responses to war crimes, crimes against
humanity, ethnic cleansing and genocide?
7.3 The Utility of the Responsibility to Protect Norm in International Society
The apparent failure of the responsibility to protect norm in the case of Darfur can be interpreted
in one of two ways. First, as many of the norm’s supporters and advocates would claim, the
failure of the norm in Darfur is not reflective of a broader failure of the norm in and of itself. For
one, it could be argued that the failure of the norm is indicative of the fact that the norm had
indeed not cascaded and become meaningfully entrenched in international society but that the
norm was still emerging and located in a process of norm contestation when the Darfur crisis first
erupted. The norm could therefore not meaningfully be applied to the Darfur case, but in future
will have a greater impact on international responses to atrocity crimes. Others might in turn
argue that the norm indeed may not have contributed to an effective response to the Darfur crisis,
but would remind that norms do not determine actor behaviour but merely enable or constrain it,
and that the infusion of responsibility to protect discourse over Darfur is already a success on its
own, highlighting the manner in which the norm is increasingly becoming entrenched and
internalised in international society. In addition, the argument has recently emerged that the
responsibility to protect should perhaps not be considered so much as a norm but rather as a
normative agenda which requires further investigation and implementation (Bellamy, 2010).
A second way of understanding the failure of the responsibility to protect norm in Darfur is
however to view this in light of the failure of the norm more broadly and its lack of utility in
international society. Here the argument would be that despite the emergence and cascade of the
norm in international society over a relatively short period of time, in its application the norm is not
useful to the attainment of its content goal, and indeed may contribute to outcomes which are
explicitly contrary to its content goal. Indeed, as the case of Darfur highlights, in its application the
responsibility to protect norm appears to have receded, and therefore it could be considered
either as a ‘failing’ or as a ‘failed’ norm. The assumption here would be that the responsibility to
protect, despite having emerged and cascaded so quickly, will gradually change or simply fade
away, becoming replaced with other emerging norms or already entrenched ones. To gain deeper
insight into this perspective however requires an analysis of several factors which have already
impacted on the norm, or are likely to impact on the norm in future, and which will either enable or
constrain the further entrenchment and development of the norm in international society.
One factor which has impacted on the development of the responsibility to protect norm already is
the perception that the norm is a predominantly Western one within a context in which the moral
authority of the Western world is rapidly declining. While the moral authority of the West is
declining in many aspects (in particular in the realm of human rights, environmentalism, free-
market capitalism and democracy), it is perhaps the military interventions in Kosovo, in Iraq and
in Afghanistan which have most undermined the West and which have most impacted on the
responsibility to protect norm. MacFarlane, Thielking and Weiss, for instance, argued that the
post facto justification of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 on humanitarian grounds highlighted the
potential for abuse of the notion that an international responsibility to protect those suffering
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serious harm if their own state is either unable or unwilling to avert it exists, shrinking the
normative space for consensus on the legitimacy of interventions on humanitarian grounds which
had emerged during the 1990s. Indeed, MacFarlane, Thielking and Weiss already in 2004 argued
that future attempts to intervene in cases of mass murder or systemic human rights violations
could be discredited merely by referring to the war in Iraq (2004: 977). This line of thinking was
also advanced by David Clark, a former Special Advisor to the British Foreign and
Commonwealth Office. Clark explicitly argued that Iraq had wrecked the case for interventions
conducted on humanitarian grounds, and that as long as power in the United States remained in
the hands of the Republican right it would be impossible to build a consensus behind the idea that
the responsibility to protect could be a power for good. “Those who continue to insist that it can,”
argued Clark, “risk discrediting the concept of humanitarian intervention” (in Bellamy, 2005: 38 -
39).
As Bellamy correctly notes, if the credibility of those states most associated with the new norm is
undermined by perceptions that they have abused it or raised it primarily for self-serving purposes
the process of normative change is likely to be slowed or reversed (Bellamy, 2005: 32 - 33).
Similarly, the justification of the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, and the subsequent and
continued armed presence of the West there, has likely served only to delegitimize the human
rights and interventionist agenda of the West in the eyes of many observers. Yet even the NATO
intervention in Kosovo has not aided the responsibility to protect norm. While the intervention
itself proved controversial at the time, the manner in which the West has subsequently handled
the question of Kosovo’s status has proved problematic for notions of interventions on
humanitarian grounds. Indeed, as de Waal notes, it was not lost on Sudanese leadership that
NATO continued to maintain a presence in the former Yugoslav province and appeared to be
leading Kosovo ever closer to independence. A further concern was that while the United States
of America openly supported Kosovar independence it was simultaneously providing military
training and assistance to the SPLA in Southern Sudan in preparation for a referendum on
independence scheduled for 2011 (De Waal, 2007: 1046). As one aid worker in Sudan noted,
public rhetoric by Western leaders and human rights advocates only served to confound the
Darfur problem:
What appeared to be strong and important statements in the US or UK had a negative impact in Sudan, where
they fed into a very public paranoia that the West was only interested in Darfur to justify taking Sudan’s oil and
stealing Muslim territory as they claimed had occurred in Iraq (in Flint and de Waal, 2008: 188).
Moral appeals to human rights and interventions on humanitarian grounds on the part of the West
therefore began to wring increasingly hollow. With regards to the responsibility to protect norm, in
particular, it seemed increasingly as though the West sought to assert a right to intervene on
humanitarian grounds, but to abrogate any responsibility to do so. As one observer notes, while
the proponents of the norm were right to be concerned with the danger that states might abuse
humanitarian justifications to legitimate unjust interventions, they should have paid more attention
to the danger that the norm could equally be used by those same states to avoid assuming
responsibility for intervention (Bellamy, 2005: 53).
A second factor impacting on the responsibility to protect norm is its reliance on an alignment of
state interests as opposed to a reformulation of state interests. This is, to a degree, the normative
contestation that Finnemore and Sikkink made reference to; or a clash of interests as states
construct them. Although Tony Blair asserted in 1999 that the protection of human rights was a
state interest in and of itself for the United Kingdom, this state interest remains in competition with
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other interests of the state, however defined. The advancement of the responsibility to protect
norm does appear to have become an explicit interest for certain states such as Canada, France
and Norway, which made the norm an active part of their foreign policy. Yet these states sidelined
the norm in favour of other interests when it came to the case of Darfur. Other states never
sought to frame their foreign policy in human rights and humanitarian terms. Russia, for instance,
viewed arms sales to Sudan as its vital interest, while China’s interests lay in the arms trade and
in securing access to Sudanese oil (Udombana, 2007: 110). The United States, on the other
hand, sought, quite unsuccessfully, to balance its state interests in the defence of human rights
on the one hand with security cooperation with Sudan on the other. The balance was a delicate
one, but one which the Government of Sudan knew to exploit in its favour all too well. Indeed,
whenever international rhetoric on Darfur began to heat up Sudanese authorities appeared to be
at pains to prove most co-operative in the global war on terror (Grono, 2005: 628). Add to this
American support for the likes of Pakistan’s Pervez Musharaf or Uzbekistan’s Islam Karimov, and
the extent to which the major powers are willing to write off their human rights agendas as part of
counter-terrorist strategies or other concerns raises real questions about the viability of the
responsibility to protect as an embodiment of international human rights solidarity and
humanitarianism as state interests in international society (MacFarlane et al. 2005: 985). Even
Tony Blair would have difficulty in explaining the inclusion of human rights and humanitarianism
as a core interest of the United Kingdom in Sudan. The United Kingdom has continuously
sidelined Darfur in favour of the CPA, in which it has invested heavily both politically and
financially. The United Kingdom, rather than implement existing sanctions against Sudan, has
consistently sought ways to cancel portions of Sudanese external debt, to increase development
assistance and to lift earlier sanctions in a bid to ease tensions between North and South Sudan
(Udombana, 2007: 110). As one experienced Foreign and Commonwealth Office diplomat
observed with regards to the United Kingdom and the responsibility to protect:
We are not moral because we are moral. We are moral because we believe it is in our strategic interests to be
so (Interview 17, 2010).
It therefore cannot with any conviction be argued that the responsibility to protect has become a
state interest, or that it has succeeded in formulating discourse on state interest to the degree
required for the norm to have a meaningful impact in international society. Even the norm’s most
ardent supporters, states such as Canada and Norway, have increasingly moved away from the
responsibility to protect. As one senior Norwegian diplomat expressed, Norway was simply no
longer interested in supporting “another bad Canadian idea” (the other having been the concept
of human security) (Interview 25, 2010).
An apt critique of the responsibility to protect norm is then that the norm represents more a clever
twist of vocabulary than a first step towards an operational doctrine. While providing standards of
behaviour, the norm does not, for example, provide a politically realistic blueprint for the changes
in state practice that would be required to make the norm meaningful in policy and operational
terms. The norm, it has been argued by some, can therefore be considered as little more than a
reformulation of Augustine’s doctrine of just war, with too little useful refinement to adapt it to
contemporary conditions (MacFarlane et al. 2004: 980).
Related to the above, a third challenge the responsibility to protect brings with it is the prescriptive
component of the norm. Indeed, the norm appears to be founded on the solidarist assumption
that governments can be persuaded to act in response to a humanitarian crisis, either in line with
or contrary to the interests of the state, by the force of international opinion or on the basis of
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domestic pressure. Indeed, as one observer has noted, the responsibility to protect norm appears
to rely to a large degree on the ‘CNN factor’ (Bellamy, 2006: 150). Yet the degree to which
international or domestic pressure can ‘force’ a state to act has not been ascertained in the field
of International Relations, and, as became evident both in Rwanda and in Darfur, even a
crescendo of international condemnation is not enough to force states to intervene. Tony Blair’s
promise that “if Rwanda happens again we would not walk away as the outside has done many
times before”, and his insistence that international society held a “moral duty to provide military
and humanitarian assistance to Africa whenever it was needed” was apparently not enough to
convince anyone of an inherent shared responsibility to intervene or to spur states into action (in
Bellamy, 2005: 31).
A fourth factor impacting on the responsibility to protect norm is one that plagues every norm in
international society; that of norm indeterminacy. Norms, once propagated and established, can
no longer be controlled in their application and further development by the norm entrepreneurs
and norm brokers who assisted in developing and entrenching the norm in international society in
the first place. While this is an inherent aspect of norm development at the international and
domestic levels, in the case of the responsibility to protect norm indeterminacy resulted in
misapplication of the norm at several levels, rendering the norm increasingly obtuse and less
useful. While the norm therefore came to feature increasingly in discourse at the international
level it simultaneously decreased in utility.
A group of retired NATO generals, including a former ICISS Commissioner, for example, argued
that the responsibility to protect justified the first use of nuclear weapons to prevent nuclear
proliferation, while activists have used the norm to refer to action to halt the spread of HIV/Aids or
to protect indigenous populations from climate change. Michael Ignatieff argued that the
responsibility to protect should be invoked to eliminate the international threat of terrorism, Lee
Feinstein argued for a duty to prevent based on the responsibility to protect, and Allan Buchanan
and Robert Keohane called for the cosmopolitan use of preventative military force, based on the
responsibility to protect norm (MacFarlane et al. 2004: 989). In May 2008, when a cyclone struck
Burma/Myanmar and the ruling military junta refused external humanitarian assistance, French
Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner publicly requested the Security Council to invoke the
responsibility to protect to allow the provision of humanitarian assistance by force. UN Under-
Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes argued that this placed the UN in an
unnecessarily confrontational approach, while British Secretary for International development
Douglas Alexander referred to the move as ‘incendiary’ (Thakur and Weiss, 2009: 49). Indeed, as
Ramesh Thakur and Thomas Weiss argue, invoking the responsibility to protect would only have
angered the military regime and raised reluctance to accept international assistance. This would
also likely have risked antagonising Southeast Asian nations, whose political support for
engaging with the regime was very important. In addition, such a move would likely have
alienated India, China and Japan, whose assistance ultimately proved key to the delivery of the
humanitarian relief supplies which was finally negotiated with the military regime (Thakur and
Weiss, 2009: 49).
The responsibility to protect was similarly invoked by activists over Zimbabwe, a political conflict
in which atrocity crimes were not committed (although political violence was rife), and Russian
diplomats publicly invoked the responsibility to protect to justify their military intervention in
Georgia in 2008 (Axworthy and Rock, 2009: 55). The norm was also invoked to refer to mediation
efforts undertaken in the wake of election violence in Kenya in 2008. Francis Deng, for instance,
urged the Kenyan authorities to meet their responsibilities to protect their civilian population, while
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Archbishop Desmond Tutu argued that the African and international reaction to Kenya was a
manifestation of the responsibility to protect norm in action. Kofi Annan, the chief mediator in
Kenya, and Secretary General Ban Ki Moon later also argued that the intervention in Kenya
represented the implementation of the responsibility to protect on the part of states (Thakur and
Weiss, 2009: 52 and Evans, 2009: 51). Yet whether mediation efforts in a political conflict,
spurred on by election-related violence, is a correct framing of the responsibility to protect is not
certain, and this may indeed be a dangerous framing of the norm. Indeed, whether the ongoing
conflicts in the Philippines and Indonesia, for example, can usefully be labelled responsibility to
protect scenarios, or whether such labelling would prove damaging, requires further investigation.
Consistency also becomes a challenge here. While states was quick to label Kenya a
responsibility to protect success, the norm was never applied to the escalation of conflict in Sri
Lanka in 2009, or to the conflicts still ongoing in Somalia to date. Inconsistency in its application
has served to undermine the responsibility to protect norm in recent years. Indeed, as one
observer of the UN has noted, through selective application supporters of the norm have sought
to give the responsibility to protect “easy wings”. Yet through being opportunistic as opposed to
consistent, both the validity and utility of the norm have been eroded (Interview 7, 2010).
Further, attempts by advocates of the norm to link the responsibility to protect to other normative
developments in international society have not always yielded positive results. The Special
Adviser of the Secretary General on the responsibility to protect, for example, has sought to link
the norm to the development of a normative framework on the protection of civilians in UN
peacekeeping operations, portraying peacekeeping operations as the operational arm of the
responsibility to protect. Many in the UN system however worry that this has stalled progress on
the protection of civilians agenda. In the Specialised Committee on Peacekeeping (known as the
C-34), for example, states have begun to oppose the development of protection of civilians
guidelines for UN peacekeeping operations due to attempts to link this to the responsibility to
protect, resulting in the UN DPKO re-framing its protection of civilians approach and undertaking
initiatives below the policy level. Many DPKO officials now worry that the responsibility to protect
agenda has undermined the protection of civilians agenda, while complaining that the
responsibility to protect places both unrealistic and undue expectations on the peacekeeping
architecture of the United Nations (Interview 11, 2010). A similar situation has developed in the
AU, where the protection of civilians agenda has been slowed down due to fears by member
states that this represents an incarnation of the responsibility to protect norm.
It would thus appear that the indeterminacy factor of norm development has had a particularly
negative impact on the responsibility to protect. Indeed, the inconsistent, and at times
opportunistic, manner in which the norm has been utilised by a range of actors has not served to
strengthen the norm, but at times has rendered the norm largely unrecognisable and quite
inapplicable.
A fifth challenge is that the responsibility to protect norm emphasises the human rights and
humanitarian dimensions over and above the social and political dimensions of conflict situations.
Indeed, the complex social intricacies which give rise to and sustain conflict systems are
neglected in favour of moralistic human rights discourse. As a leading responsibility to protect
advocate noted, in its application the norm represented a moral high ground which positioned
actors against one another in a moral end-game. This however did not lead to useful
engagement, nor did it allow for compromise when required. Ultimately, therefore, the
responsibility to protect norm forced states to adopt a position of extremes from which it was not
easy to retreat and seek political compromise when required or feasible without losing face or
138
irrevocably undermining the responsibility to protect norm itself (Interview 2, 2010). The infusion
of responsibility to protect discourse into policy debates on complex conflict situations therefore
risks obscuring or de-emphasising the political and social dimensions of conflict situations, and
thereby risks detracting from effective conflict management efforts. Indeed, one senior AU official
argued that the utility of the responsibility to protect norm was limited in practice, as it did not
allow for context-sensitivity or specificity once invoked (Interview 24, 2010).
In Darfur for instance, the framing of the problem in a responsibility to protect paradigm led many
observers to believe that the only viable means to halt the killing on the ground was through a
robust, ‘boots on the ground’, peace enforcement operation. That this was an entirely unfeasible
option, and that a robust peace enforcement mission would have served only to aggravate the
conflict, was obscured by responsibility to protect discourse. The political solutions, both feasible
and required, to bring an end to the conflicts in Darfur, though these would have been slow to
negotiate and implement and would not have brought an immediate end to the killing there, were
sidelined both as immoral and as too mild given the gravity of the crisis. The framing of the Darfur
problem within a responsibility to protect paradigm therefore placed the UN in an increasingly
confrontational approach with Sudan. Indeed, UN DPKO officials would later criticise that the use
of responsibility to protect discourse proved, if anything, provocative in the case of Sudan and
served only to endanger UNAMID personnel and the population of Darfur even further (Interview
8, 2010). Similarly, many in the UN system worried that the responsibility to protect discourse
heightened expectations of what could be achieved, both among member states and among the
civilian population in Darfur. Yet these expectations could of course not be met. As one UN
official noted:
These [responsibility to protect] notions are meaningless if they cannot be backed up by implementation on the
ground. Then they are just words... (Interview 10, 2010).
A sixth challenge faced by the responsibility to protect norm, and clearly evidenced by the Darfur
case, as with any other conflict situation, is that in the long term states cannot be the guarantor of
human rights; within the current international system, only a state can. While states can advance
human rights norms and seek compliance with these by other states, it is ultimately states
themselves that choose to interpret, guarantee and uphold human rights, not the international
system. Yet the responsibility to protect norm assigns the right and responsibility for the
maintenance of human rights to other states where a particular state has manifestly failed to
uphold human rights standards. As one observer notes, the use of such language is dangerous,
as the incapacity of the international system to implement the human rights commitments
assigned to it through the responsibility to protect norm, based on altruistic notions, offers false
hope, in particular of sustained responsibility and commitment, and serves only to undermine the
human rights regime already developed (Warner, 2003: 114).
Fusing the above lines of argumentation, a seventh and final challenge to the responsibility to
protect norm can be identified. The norm, it appears, was developed and advanced without due
recognition for the current realities of international society and without sufficient linkages made to
tie the norm to existing, more accepted, norms within that system. Instead of building the
responsibility to protect on the basis of other norms, such as the normative shift underpinning the
establishment of the AU (broadly labelled as a move towards ‘non-indifference’) or on developing
notions of the protection of civilians in peacekeeping operations, proponents of the responsibility
to protect chose to frame the norm as a further development of the notion of humanitarian
intervention. The responsibility to protect norm however appears to assume that consensus on
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the legitimacy of humanitarian interventions had indeed been reached at the turn of the 21st
century and proposed a framework through which interventions on humanitarian grounds could
be operationalised within the existing structures of international society. Yet by the end of the
1990s, debate on interventions on humanitarian grounds had only commenced, and no common
ground had been reached. Instead of enhancing and concretising this debate, proponents sought
to use this as the foundation of constructing the responsibility to protect norm.
The norm therefore appears to have reached too far, or have been built on weak foundations,
lacking an existing normative basis or logic of appropriateness on which to base itself. Indeed, the
norm appears to have been based more on a Bessinungsethik (our intentions are good, therefore
the outcome must be good) than on a Verantwortungsethik (our intentions are not confused with
responsible behaviour), and the norm it would therefore appear seems to have become
somewhat quixotic. With striking historical accuracy, John Bolton, the permanent representative
of the United States to the UN at the time of the 2005 World Summit, argued that the UN Charter
had never been interpreted as creating a legal obligation for the Security Council to support
enforcement action, and that neither the UN nor individual states could hold an obligation to
intervene under international law. While Bolton argued that states, individually and acting
collectively, had a right of intervention, this could not be confused with an obligation, and what the
UN did in a particular situation should depend entirely on the specific circumstances themselves
(in Luck, 2009: 19). The responsibility to protect, it would appear, was simply stretched
normatively further than could be sustained by its proponents or the dynamics of international
society at the time.
Advocates of the norm appear to have recognised the challenges posed to the responsibility to
protect, in particular given the failures in Darfur, and since the appointment of the Special Advisor
of the Secretary General Focussing on the Responsibility to Protect have moved to shore up the
norm. Evans for instance argued in 2008 that the norm faced three challenges, these being
conceptual, institutional and political. At the conceptual level, Evans argued that the scope and
limits of the responsibility to protect needed to be better understood to ensure that the norm was
not viewed as a ‘Trojan horse’ legitimising Western interventionism but as a starting point for
states to prevent and react to atrocity crimes. At the institutional level Evans argued that the
capacity should be built to ensure that there was sufficient physical capability to react, while at the
political level the requisite political will should be generated to ensure that responses were
implemented when required (Evans, 2008: 54).
The 2009 report of the UN Secretary General on the implementation of the responsibility to
protect appears to follow a somewhat similar line of thinking. Emphasising a three-pillared
approach, the Secretary General elaborated on (1) the operational means of reinforcing and
supporting the protection responsibilities of the state, (2) international assistance and capacity-
building measures towards supporting states in meeting their responsibility to protect their
populations, and (3) the delivery of timely and decisive responses when required. Placing primary
emphasis on the role states could play in providing support to states facing protection challenges,
the Secretary General nonetheless noted that when the political leadership of a state remained
determined to commit crimes and violations relating to the responsibility to protect assistance
measures would be of little use, and states should seek to assemble the capacity and will for a
‘timely and decisive’ response (United Nations General Assembly Report A/63/677, 2009: 15).
The report further argued that in effect, when dealing with conflicts in which crimes and violations
relating to the responsibility to protect occur, there was no room for sequential approaches, but
that flexible, outcomes-oriented approaches were required, focussed on substance and results as
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opposed to procedure and process (United Nations General Assembly Report A/63/677, 2009: 15
- 16). The Secretary General concluded:
It is true that we have yet to develop the tools or display the will to respond consistently and effectively to all
emergencies relating to the responsibility to protect, as the tragic events in Darfur, the Democratic Republic of
the Congo and Somalia remind us. Nonetheless, when confronted with crimes or violations relating to the
responsibility to protect or their incitement, today the world is less likely to look the other way than in the last
century (United Nations General Assembly Report A/63/677, 2009: 24).
Many observers argue that the re-framing of the responsibility to protect norm on the basis of
three pillars by the Secretary General has been useful, and has created more room for
engagement on the norm, in particular with the global South, through broadening the platform for
engagement away from a focus on military intervention and towards a focus on state
responsibility, international assistance and, ultimately when required, international intervention
(Interview 2, 2010). In June 2010 the General Assembly, under Libyan presidency, held a debate
on early warning and conflict prevention, and by the end of 2010 a debate on the role of regional
organisations, under Swiss presidency, was expected. Efforts have also been underway to link
the responsibility to protect to the protection of civilians in peacekeeping operations. The office of
the Special Advisor on the responsibility to protect will by the end of 2010 also have been merged
with the office of the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, with the Secretary General
of the UN taking a keen interest in the promotion of the responsibility to protect.
Yet, in light of the inherent challenges the norm faces, its limited utility in international society
and, in the harshest assessment, its failure, it is unlikely that these efforts will yield much result.
Rather, while the norm will continue to play a role in discourse at the inter-state level and perhaps
more prominently so in the non-state sector, emphasis will likely shift back towards the how of
interventions on humanitarian grounds, centring on notions of robust peacekeeping, the
protection of civilians, international humanitarian law, early warning, and effective conflict
prevention and management, including post-conflict peacebuilding. In addition, Western states
are likely to continue to retreat from the norm, favouring an emphasis on norms which they can
advance, but to which they cannot be held accountable. It is therefore likely that the West will
return to a discourse centred on notions of democracy, good governance and human rights, as
was prominent in the early 1990s. Of the Secretary General’s pillars, the first (the responsibilities
of the state) and third (the responsibilities of international society) will likely be avoided, with
debate focussed on the second pillar (international assistance for conflict prevention and
management). In time, discussion may even return to a right of intervention on the part of states
on humanitarian grounds, but not to a responsibility to do so. While elements incorporated by the
responsibility to protect norm will therefore continue to feature in international society, the norm
itself will likely increasingly be altered. The responsibility to protect thus emerged, cascaded in
international society, and then, instead of becoming internalised, appears to have become less
useful through its application. Yet if the responsibility to protect norm has failed to contribute
towards the attainment of its content goal, and is an example, at least at present, of an
unsuccessful norm, how will states respond to future conflict situations in which atrocity crimes
are committed, in particular in Africa?
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7.4 The African Union, the United Nations and
Future Responses to Atrocity Crimes in Africa
From this study it has become clear that while states have sought to strengthen their ability to
shape a common peace and security agenda and to act in a joint manner when threats to
international peace and security arise, operationalising this agenda has brought numerous
challenges with it. In particular, defining and giving meaning to the relationship between the UN,
the primary international organisation mandated with the maintenance of peace and security, and
the AU, since 2003 an increasingly important actor in the peace and security field in Africa, has
proved challenging. Following the establishment of the Peace and Security Council in March
2004 the Security Council adopted two presidential statements recognising the importance of
strengthening cooperation with the AU and of assisting the Union in developing its own capacity
to deal with security challenges. The importance of cooperation between the two organisations
was reinforced through the adoption of Resolution 1625 by the Security Council in 2005, which
supported the establishment of a ten year capacity-building programme for the AU. Yet as Aning
and Atuobi note, while the UN and the AU talk of partnership fundamental differences have
emerged about what such a partnership entails, what the guiding principles should be, and who is
responsible for the successes and the failures of this partnership (Aning and Atuobi, 2009: 102).
Differences between the AU and the UN are likely to continue to appear as the AU further
develops and operationalises its peace and security architecture, and differences are also likely
to arise between the AU and the sub-regional organisations mandated with peace and security
tasks in Africa, which also form part of the African peace and security architecture. Indeed, as
one observer argues, the transformation from the OAU to the AU represents a qualitative
improvement in the evolution of intra-African cooperation and integration (Mathews, 2008: 33).
Yet the approach that sub-regional organisations and their dominant member states have to
dealing with threats to peace and security on the continent are not necessarily the same, and
may diverge in critical areas.
ECOWAS, for instance, is currently establishing the ECOWAS Standby Force under the African
Standby Force concept. The arrangement is to be used in four particular cases; namely (1)
aggression or conflict within a member state, (2) conflict between two or more member states, (3)
internal conflicts that threaten to trigger a humanitarian disaster, pose a serious threat to regional
peace and security, result in serious and massive violations of human rights, and / or following
the overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government, and (4) any other
situation that the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council may deem appropriate (Adebajo,
2008: 142). Outside of the use of the standby arrangement, the Mechanism for Conflict
Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace and Security (established in 1975) is authorized to
mandate intervention in member states in cases of aggression or conflict, or threats thereof, in or
between member states (Sarkin, 2008: 61). Of importance, ECOWAS member states have
empowered the organization to act without prior Security Council or AU authorization, indicating
that such authorization need only be sought after an intervention has been conducted.
SADC on the other hand is establishing the SADC Standby Force, also under the African Standby
Force arrangement, which is intended for use (1) in cases of large-scale violence including
genocide, ethnic cleansing and gross violations of human rights, (2) a military coup or other
unconstitutional change of government, (3) a civil war or insurgency, and (4) a conflict that
threatens regional peace and security (Adebajo, 2008: 148). In addition, the Organ on Politics,
Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC), established in 1996, is mandated to protect against
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instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, intra-state conflict, inter-state conflict and
aggression. The Chairperson of the SADC Organ, acting on the advice of the Ministerial
Committee of the OPDSC, is also authorized to recommend to the SADC summit that
enforcement action be taken, although this can only be sanctioned as a last resort, and in line
with Article 53 of the UN Charter. SADC, therefore, requires the authorization of the UN Security
Council before it can undertake enforcement action (Sarkin, 2008: 62).
In addition to SADC and ECOWAS, the Economic Community of East African States (ECCAS)
established a Council for Peace and Security in 1999, and is currently operationalising its own
standby arrangement for the African Standby Force, the Multi-National Force for Central Africa
(FOMAC). The Arab Maghreb Union is similarly establishing the North African Regional
Command (NARC), and the East African region has established the East African Standby Force,
already operational and headquartered in Nairobi. IGAD, headquartered in Addis Ababa, has also
lately joined the list of organizations seeking a peace and security role in Africa and is in the
process of establishing a conflict prevention and intervention framework. While these
developments at the sub-regional level are important and should be viewed in a positive light, it is
also important to recognize that each region is developing its peace and security architecture in a
unique fashion, and that normative differences between the organizations can already be
witnessed. The more the AU seeks to give meaning to its own security arrangements, the more it
will also need to rely on cooperation with the sub-regional organizations which form the
foundations of that architecture, at least with respect to the African Standby Force, and the more
important these normative differences become.
Based on these developments, it becomes clear that the relationship between the AU Peace and
Security Council and the UN Security Council will be key to any responses to future conflicts in
which atrocity crimes are committed in Africa. Yet this relationship must be developed in an
environment in which the Security Council, in the words of a senior UN official in New York,
maintains a condescending view of the Peace and Security Council and of the AU as a whole
(Interview 13, 2010). While the Peace and Security Council thus views its role as maintaining
peace and security in Africa on behalf of the UN, the Security Council continues to view the
Peace and Security Council as attempting to undermine its authority and primacy (Interview 19,
2010). Although countries such as South Africa have worked to foster greater collaboration
between the UN and the AU, the Security Council remains uncomfortable with the growing role of
the Peace and Security Council. At a joint meeting between the two Councils in Addis Ababa in
2009 the Russian delegation refused to meet formally with the Peace and Security Council,
insisting that the meeting be held informally. This served only to anger the African members of
the Security Council and the members of the Peace and Security Council (Interview 15, 2010).
Yet this was nothing new. In January 2005 the Peace and Security Council, meeting in Libreville,
decided to forcefully disarm the Interahamwe in the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo,
given the inability of the UN to do so (Mwanasali, 2006: 99). By early 2006 the AU had conducted
a technical assessment mission and was preparing to launch an armed intervention when the
Security Council blocked the intervention, not wanting to discredit its own mission in the region
(Interview 18, 2010). One observer has noted that the strained relations between the Security
Council and the Peace and Security Council have served to increase the potential for normative
incompatibility between the two Councils (Interview 22, 2010).
This is not to say that the AU is more likely to intervene in conflicts or situations where atrocity
crimes are perpetrated any more than the UN may be. In fact, these differences could even lead
to fewer interventions being conducted in future. John Akokpari, for instance, highlights that while
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the AU has established the grounds for intervention, the modalities for intervention remain far
from established, potentially leaving room for interpretation and contestation between
perpetrating states and the AU and ultimately serving to delay interventions when these are
required (Akokpari, 2008[a]: 373). A senior official in the UN’s Department of Political Affairs
similarly argued that in the case of Darfur the Government of the Sudan was able to both identify
and exploit the normative space between the AU and the UN as these organisations sought to
assert themselves politically (Interview 6, 2010). Delving deeper, a senior African diplomat in New
York argued that the challenge in Darfur was not the absence of agreement that threats to peace
and security needed to be addressed. Rather it was giving these meaning and relevance within
the complex set of interactions that govern peace and security in Africa, and the increasingly
deteriorating relations between the United Nations and the African Union (Interview 12, 2010).
Within this context, then, it may become increasingly difficult to formulate and conduct
interventions in conflict situations, in particular those involving the commission of war crimes,
crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and genocide.
This is not to say, of course, that interventions in cases of atrocity crimes will not occur in future.
In 2008 the AU for the first time authorised the use of force, deploying a military force to the
Comoros to restore the authority of the government there. In addition, as Solomon Gomes has
noted, the engagement of the AU in Darfur represented a radical departure from the OAU when it
was confronted with similar situations in the past (Gomes, 2008: 126). However, the
organisation’s actions in Darfur also highlighted the inability of the AU to effectively deal with its
more powerful members, such as the Sudan. Sudan, for instance, was a member of the Peace
and Security Council when the violence erupted in Darfur, and the Council found itself
constrained in attempting to formulate a response. This proved a recurring challenge. When in
2005 the AU Commission called for a Peace and Security Council meeting to review video
evidence that the Government of Sudan was painting its Antonov bomber aircraft in AU colours
and using these to conduct aerial assaults on civilian targets in Darfur, the Sudanese government
was able to block the motion and have the evidence buried (Badescu and Bergholm, 2010: 111).
Thus, while the Union may be willing to use force against its weaker members, it appears unlikely
that interventions against the more powerful members of the organisation will be considered in
the near future. The issue of consent is also critical at this juncture. For the AU the consent of the
member state being intervened in appears to remain crucial to its interventionist security regime.
The lack of cooperation on the part of the Government of Sudan clearly exposed the complexities
of implementing the AU’s interventionist principles, even in cases where the Union recognised
that grave crimes against humanity were being perpetrated. Humanitarian interventions, by
definition conducted in the absence of the consent of target state authorities, conducted against
larger member states therefore appear unlikely within the context of the AU in the immediate
future. Indeed, interventions conducted without the consent of the target state authorities still
appear to run contrary to the evaluative political culture currently underpinning the AU. In
addition, as noted by Sarjoh Bah, the African deployment in Darfur and the subsequent
deployment to Somalia sharply exposed the risks of mounting humanitarian responses without
having the necessary resources in place (Bah, 2010: 4). The AU will be sure to avoid making that
mistake again in the near future.
Nevertheless, the AU, the sub-regional organisations and UN continue to breathe life into an
enhanced and more robust peace and security architecture for the African continent. As Chris
Landsberg has argued, the African calabash is now half-full as far as new norms and principles
are concerned. Over the coming years, the major challenge will be to implement these and to
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operationalise the new institutions. African leaders will indeed have to muster the political will to
encourage and cajole one another to live by the new norms and values which they themselves
have articulated and agreed to (Landsberg, 2002: 140). Francis Deng, optimistically and
accurately, argues that while these initiatives remain largely prescriptive, they do indicate
incremental progress in the response of African governments to the plight of their peoples (2006:
127). How African governments will respond to the commission of atrocity crimes in Africa, once
again, remains to be seen however.
Outside of the AU, responses to conflicts characterised by the commission of atrocity crimes are
not likely to change much in the immediate future. The UN will likely continue to resort to
mediation, the delivery of humanitarian assistance, the deployment of peace support operations
following the settlement of a conflict, and the provision of support to post-conflict peacebuilding
efforts. Indeed, the UN Secretariat is currently working to strengthen its ability to respond to
conflict situations along these lines, enhancing its mediation capabilities, strengthening the
coordination of humanitarian assistance, developing the Peacebuilding Commission and
strengthening the ‘One UN’ concept to provide more holistic support to peace processes.
It is however not likely that the UN will move towards conducting more robust interventions, or
that it will take a stronger stance in censuring its member states. It is also not likely that the
responsibility to protect norm will feature strongly in discourse surrounding humanitarian crises, or
the conduct of humanitarian interventions, in a manner that will alter behaviour on the part of UN
member states. While some states may generally move towards a stronger recognition of a right
of intervention, it is not likely that a responsibility of intervention will be recognised any time soon.
Rather, states, and the Security Council in particular, will likely work to retain the highest degree
of flexibility possible in the formulation and implementation of interventions, when these are
deemed necessary. However, the roles and responsibilities of the intervening states or coalitions
of the willing will in future be curtailed as opposed to expanded. Thus, while interventions on
humanitarian grounds will continue to be conducted, these will likely not be conducted along the
lines advocated by the responsibility to protect norm, but instead will likely be limited in nature,
designed to avert or halt the most immediate mass violations of human rights in a responsive
manner. The degree to which the responsibility to protect, as opposed to the right to protect, will
feature in discourse surrounding such interventions however remains to be seen.
7.5 The Constructivist Research Agenda on Norm Development, Diffusion and
Relevance in International Society
At the level of International Relations theory, several observations on the Constructivist approach
can be drawn from this study, which require further consideration and application by International
Relations scholars. As has been highlighted throughout this study, while Constructivism provides
a useful perspective to the study of change in international society, the study of norms and their
development does require further conceptual development and application if the utility of the
Constructivist approach is to be enhanced. From this study, several areas of further investigation
can be highlighted.
At one level, while the norm life cycle concept is useful, it does entail inherent limitations, as
illustrated earlier. Yet what becomes clear from a study of the development and diffusion of the
responsibility to protect norm is that, in what is labelled the norm emergence phase, greater
attention needs to be paid to processes of norm contestation and the manner in which new norms
145
seek either to find ontological ‘fit’ in existing logics of appropriateness, or the manner in which
they seek to re-frame logics of appropriateness. Indeed, Constructivist literature to date does not
provide sufficient insight into the manner in which new norms seek to build on existing ones
during processes of norm contestation and what would differentiate a successful framing attempt
from an unsuccessful one. At another level, in what is labelled the cascade phase, more attention
needs to be placed on processes of norm socialisation. How do socialisation processes work in
environments which are not static, but which are dynamic and in which the content goal of the
emerging norm may no longer be relevant or must be altered to remain relevant to a dynamic
context? And what happens if norm entrepreneurs and socialisation agents no longer support the
norm itself, but other actors do? Is the support of the so-called ‘critical’ states critical only to
attaining a tipping point, or is the further development of a norm contingent on that support
throughout? Similarly, as this study has illustrated, the concept of norm indeterminacy requires
greater attention in Constructivist literature. In particular, of importance here is enhancing the
understanding of whether norm indeterminacy relates to the inability of norm entrepreneurs to
control the manner in which the norm is internalised by other actors, or to the deliberate
misapplication of the norm by those seeking to undermine it or alter it for their own purposes, or
both, and the manner in which this impacts on the development of the norm more broadly.
Another challenge is the non-linearity of norm development processes. Finnemore and Sikkink in
presenting the norm life cycle concept were certain to highlight that the progression of a norm
through the life cycle was not an inevitable process, and that norms which emerge may never
cascade, and norms which emerge and cascade may never become internalised. Similarly,
norms which appear to develop rapidly and successfully in international society may equally as
suddenly recede and prove unsuccessful norms, as appears to be the case with the responsibility
to protect. Yet our understanding of norms which fail to succeed is quite limited, with norm
research to date having tended to focus on norms which have succeeded, the proverbial dogs
which have barked. Thus far, Constructivists have shied away from a focus on norms which
appear to have enjoyed less success; the dogs which have not barked. Yet generating an
enhanced understanding of norms which have not been that successful is important if we are to
recognise these, to study them, and to better understand the criteria which may define the
success or failure of a norm in international society. Indeed, as Finnemore has highlighted, simply
claiming that norms matter is not enough for Constructivists. Rather, they must provide
substantive arguments about which norms matter, as well as how, where and why they matter
(Finnemore, 1996[a]: 130). Taking this argument further, one could equally argue that
Constructivists should also be in a position to provide substantive arguments as to which norms
may not matter, and how, where and why they may fail to matter.
Finnemore and Sikkink provide some indications in their work on the norm life cycle as to which
norms may prove more successful than others, and why. The argument is advanced, for
example, that norms held by states viewed as successful and desirable models in international
society will be more likely to succeed. Thus, Western norms are deemed to be more likely to be
successful than non-Western norms. In addition, universal norms which advance claims of what
is good for all people in all places (such as many Western norms), it is argued, would enjoy
greater expansive potential than localised and particularistic norms (Finnemore and Sikkink,
1998: 909). However, whether this refers to norms which emerge in the West, norms that receive
the support of the West, or norms that conform to the dominant political form of organisation in
the West, political Liberalism, is not explored. Nevertheless, in an era of declining moral authority
and legitimacy of the West, the argument that Western norms will likely enjoy greater success is
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an uncertain one. Indeed, the danger here is that Constructivist work may become too closely
associated Liberal forms of political organisation.
Certainly, in the case of the responsibility to protect, the perception of the norm as a Western one
proved quite damaging, in particular following several military interventions by the West in the first
decade of the 21st century. Similarly, the developing world appears to be tiring of the human
rights rhetoric of the West and seeking to generate its own path with regards to human rights
questions. It is therefore not certain what success norms which are perceived to be ‘Western’ will
have in future. Yet, at present, Constructivism is not able to offer further insights into which norms
may prove successful, or which criteria may define the success or failure of a norm in future. This
shortcoming will need to be addressed if the Constructivist approach is to generate the added
value to the field of International Relations its proponents intend it to. What emerges from this
study, however, is that successful norms may be closer to reflecting already accepted ideas, and
as such find ontological fit, as opposed to articulating new ideas which have no solid foundation in
an existing logic of appropriateness. Unsuccessful norms may be those which reach too far
ahead from the given, and which lack a normative basis, the cognitive frame of reference and the
logic of appropriateness on which to justify themselves.
In addition, it should also be noted that much norm research does not sufficiently take into
consideration the importance of local social contexts and focuses more on the prevailing
international social context, or the dominant social context of international organisation. As long
as the nexus between the international, the regional and the local in norm development remains
under-researched Constructivist research will continue to be hampered. The work of Acharya on
the concept of norm localisation has to some degree assisted in bridging this gap, but the
dynamic processes inherent in norm emergence, development, contestation and internalisation
remain under-researched. The observer therefore tends to assess the manner in which social and
cultural norms in pre-identified geographical regions impact on processes of norm internalisation
and socialisation with regards to norms which originate from the outside, as opposed to the
manner in which these social and cultural norms play a role in bargaining processes at the
international level, and thus also on norm emergence and development there. It is not correct, for
example, to assume that Western countries create norms, and through a process of norm
contestation and localisation the remainder of the global polity seeks to respond to these. In an
increasingly interdependent global community, norm emergence and development processes
must be assumed to be far more dynamic and complex if we are to meaningfully understand
them.
It should also be noted that the meaningful application of the Constructivist approach appears to
rest on the availability of complete information. Therefore, it is probably correct to argue that
Constructivism can more usefully be applied to a historical analysis of norm development than to
ongoing norm development processes. The application of Constructivist analyses to date has
therefore focused predominantly on instances where change has taken place and not much on
instances where change has not taken place, or where attempts at change have failed. Yet as
Constructivist discourse advances it must be able to investigate more rigorously both instances in
which change took place and instances in which it did not. Constructivism has been
demonstrated to be a useful tool in the analysis of norm development and system change in
International Relations from a historical perspective. Thus, Constructivist analysis has been
applied to, for example, the abolishment of the slave trade, the end of colonialism, the demise of
apartheid, and anti-foot binding campaigns in China. However, comparatively little work has been
done on ongoing processes of norm development and system change, where the benefit of
147
historical perspective and hindsight is not available to the observer. This may not prove a
challenge only to Constructivism, and is a critique that can be levelled equally at neo-utilitarian
and other approaches to the study of International Relations or of the social sciences more
broadly. However, it does restrict the utility of the Constructivist approach to International
Relations in ongoing processes of social structural change which impact on the practice of the
political at the inter-state level and makes it more useful to the analysis of historical social
structural change. This may prove an inherent limitation, given that Constructivism is a social
approach to the study of International Relations. However, Constructivists should seek to apply
the approach to ongoing processes of change, both where norms prove successful and
unsuccessful, as much as to historical processes of change where norms have proved
successful, to strengthen the Constructivist research agenda and to enhance its utility to the
study of international society and of international relations. In particular, the further study of norms
which have been unsuccessful, and why, will be of importance to Constructivist work. As this
study of the responsibility to protect norm has illustrated, norms which appear to be relatively
successful can, in their application, do more harm than good and therefore quickly become
irrelevant and fail. Understanding the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of such norm failure is as important as
understanding the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of norm success. With regards to the responsibility to protect
norm, understanding failure is important so that we may understand how more successful
responses to war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and genocide may be
formulated in future.
In the case of Darfur, it is possible that more effective responses could have been formulated
without the existence of the responsibility to protect norm, though this is not likely. Indeed, without
the norm, the UN and the AU would likely still have formulated strategies of engagement founded
on notions of dialogue, mediation, appeasement, the deployment of peace support operations
with limited mandates, and the provision of humanitarian assistance. Certainly none of these
strategies would have been able, in and of themselves, to bring an immediate end to the violence
and the commission of atrocity crimes. However, it is possible that without the use of
responsibility to protect discourse, these strategies may have yielded better results, and
constructed a platform of engagement with Khartoum and the armed movements which could
have led to a swifter resolution of the conflict without entirely alienating the regime in Khartoum,
without the cooperation of which no end to the conflict could have been brought about. Instead,
responsibility to protect discourse, when it did feature prominently between 2007 and 2008,
seems only to have pushed those seeking an end to the violence and Khartoum further away
from one another. It was only when responsibility to protect discourse was dropped from 2008
onwards that finding an end to the Darfur conflicts proved feasible again. However, by that time
the worst of the atrocities had already been committed, and the Darfur conflicts declined in
veracity, the belligerents having fought one another to a stalemate.
As de Waal argues, in pursuit of the responsibility to protect, those intervening in Darfur failed to
achieve the practical solutions that lay within their grasp (2007: 1054). It is often said that the
world is divided among those who make things happen, those who watch things happen, and
those who wonder what happened (from Evans, 2008: 241). With regards to the responsibility to
protect, it was the norm entrepreneurs who sought to make things happen, states that watched
what happened, and the people of Darfur who were left wondering what had happened. But one
thing is strikingly clear. For the Allied soldiers during the Second World War, Arnhem simply
proved a bridge too far. For the people of Darfur, the responsibility to protect simply proved a
norm too far. Regrettably for those against whom the worst of atrocity crimes are perpetrated in
148
future, it appears that the responsibility to protect will continue to prove a norm too far for quite
some time to come.
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